The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius

Foreword

By Ben Potter

The Life of Marcus Aurelius

By Katherine Kennedy

Carnuntum: Where Marcus Aurelius Wrote the Meditations

By Donald Robertson

Marcus Aurelius & Stoicism: Anger, Pain and Justice

By Donald Robertson

Meditations on the Rise of Stoicism

By Alex Barrientos

Having a Healthy Debate: Three Tips from Marcus Aurelius

By Alex Barrientos

The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius

Foreword

By

Ben Potter

This month's Classical Wisdom E-Book provides something of an added bonus to the usual serving of a delicious, ancient opus garnished with a sprinkling of quality, contemporary commentary. This is because, in this instalment, we are not merely serving up another of the almost endless entrées from the magnificent menu of ancient literature, but a piece of writing that could, quite literally, change your life irrevocably for the better!

Quite a boast! And, you might think, you've been here before. We've all had glowing reviews from friends and family telling us how 'Moby Dick changed my life', or how 'I can never look at the world the same after reading For Whom the Bell Tolls'. And, I'm sure, we've all had that feeling of contentment, but slight disappointment, when finishing such a recommended novel – the thought running through our minds being along the lines of: 'well, that was good, but hardly life-changing'!

However, the Meditations (or Things to One's Self) of Marcus Aurelius (121-180 AD) really does give you a prescribed way in which you can actually reduce genuine suffering in your life.

Of course, there's no magic wand to stop bad things happening to you or your loved ones. Nonetheless, Rome's great “philosopher king” lays out a very compelling, very practical way in which you can stop yourself being totally overwhelmed and immiserated by those events.

Indeed, such is the breadth and depth of practical, day-to-day wisdom in the Meditations that one could make a very strong case for it being the most important piece of literature from the entire ancient canon!

But enough of the hard sell from me. Let me pass the torch to our commentary team who provide the mouth-watering appetizers for this month's book.

Katherine Kennedy begins with a superb and succinct biography of the great man himself. Donald Robertson then talks about the geographical context in which the Meditations was written and speculates about how they may have influenced the author; he then discusses three of the key themes of the memoir: anger, pain and justice. Finally, Alex Barrientos delves into the renewed bout of popularity the Meditations are currently enjoying before flagging up the ways in which their teachings can help us in these troubled, polarised times to become better at communication with those who hold diametrically opposite opinions to our own.

So, we've got the man, the writing, the work, the new-found vogue, and the way to stop ruining family occasions by shouting at your cousin for his ridiculous ideas on politics. Alternately, dig straight into the main text and see what effect these lashings of ancient logic have on your hungry, modern mind!

Food for thought, indeed.

Bon appétit!

Ben Potter

August 2020

The Life of Marcus Aurelius

By

Katherine Kennedy

A Man of Many Names

Marcus was born on the 26th of April, in Rome, in the year 121 A.D. He bore many different versions of his name whilst growing up; these changed as his familial status was altered first by the death of his father, then his unofficial adoption by his grandfather, and finally his legal coming of age. Some of the names he was known by include Marcus Annis Verus, Marcus Annis Catilius Severus, or Marcus Catilius Severus Annius Verus.

But, when Antoninus Pius formally adopted him, as Hadrian’s successor, Marcus became heir to the empire, and his name was changed to Marcus Aelius Aurelius Verus Caesar. This name would only change once more; when he became emperor. His final, and full name—Marcus Aurelius Antoninus Augustus—would last until his death.

Roman: Flesh and Blood

Marcus’ family background was as noble as they came. He was of Italo-Hispanic descent on his father’s side and, as such, was a member of the Aurelii, who were based in Roman Spain. The Annia gens is also of Italian descent, with the Annii Veri having risen through the Roman ranks from the 1st century AD. Marcus was related directly to Marcus Annius Verus (I), his great-grandfather, an ex-praetor, and Marcus Annius Verus (II), his grandfather and unofficial adoptive father, who was a patrician.

However, Marcus was also a member of the Nerva-Antonine dynasty courtesy of his grandmother, Rupilia. As such, Marcus was also connected directly to Emperors Trajan and Hadrian through Hadrian’s wife Sabina. She was his grandmother’s half sister, with Sabina and Rupilia being daughters of Trajan’s sororal niece, Salonia Matidia.

Marcus’ mother, Domitia Lucilla, was notable historically, as she was immensely wealthy due to her inherited fortune. As the daughter of a Roman patrician, P. Calvisius Tullus, her wealth was so great that it included brickworks on the outskirts of Rome – which was a boon in an age of rapid expansion – and Horti Domitia Calvillae/Lucillae, the villa on the Caelian hill of Rome, one of the famous Seven Hills of Rome. Marcus would later refer to this villa as ‘My Caelian’, as he was born and raised there, and always remembered it fondly.

Finally, Marcus adopted the gen. name Aurelia when he was chosen as an heir to Antoninus Pius; not just the Emperor, but his adoptive father, and part of the Aurelii Fulvi, who stemmed from the Sabine and were of Italo-Gallic origin. But genes and family names do not an Emperor make. Though Marcus Aurelius was born into noble families, it was his education that would shape the born-leader’s mind and harness his abilities.

Educating an Emperor

Marcus’ formal education was instilled through several private tutors as befits his aristocratic standing; his adoptive father, Marcus Annius Verus (II), through patria potestas authority when Marcus Annius Verus (III) died around 124, oversaw his grandson’s upbringing. Marcus’ education taught him to be of good character and to avoid bad temper, something he recognized as being of great value, and he thanked his grandfather for his wisdom.

“From my grandfather Verus I learned to relish the beauty of manners, and to restrain all anger.” Meditations, I.1

Diogenetus, a painting master, also had great impact on Marcus; as it appears it is he who introduced the young man to philosophy and a philosophic way of life. This extended to Marcus taking up the robes and habits of a philosopher in the year 132. This involved wearing a rough Greek cloak whilst studying, and he would sleep on the ground for a period, although the latter part he would give away after a time, due to the many frequent and vocal concerns of his mother.

Amongst his other tutors were the Homeric teachers Alexander of Cotiaeum, Trosius Aper, and Tuticius Proculus, all who taught him Latin, with Marcus thanking Alexander for teaching him literary styling, which can be seen in Marcus’ Meditations. From AD 136, Marcus had three Greek tutors, Aninus Macer, Caninius Celer, and Herodes Atticus, along with Marcus Cornelius Fronto for Latin.

Late in 136 Marcus’ life changed dramatically; he took the toga virilis and began his training in oratory. After nearly dying, Emperor Hadrian, whilst convalescent in Tivoli, chose Marcus’ intended father-in-law, Lucius Ceionius Commodus, as his successor. Lucius took the name Lucius Aelius Caesar, making Marcus as Lucius’ adoptive son, a direct successor to the throne.

However, Lucius did not live long enough for this to happen; Instead, Lucius died the night before delivering his speech to the senate, in 138. Hadrian then selected a new heir; Aurelius Antoninus, the husband of Marcus’ aunt, Faustina the Elder. In a bold move, and as part of the terms of this agreement between Hadrian and Antoninus, Antoninus was to adopt Marcus and Lucius’ son Lucius Verus. This once again implied that Emperor Hadrian had always kept Marcus in mind for the role of Emperor, eventually.

Upon the death of Hadrian, Antoninus was made Emperor, and Marcus’ previous betrothal was annulled; Marcus would instead marry Antoninus’ daughter, Faustina the Younger. In 140 Marcus was made consul, he was then appointed as a seviri and became the head of the equestrian order with the title princeps iuventutis. As the heir apparent to the Empire, he also took the name Marcus Aelius Aurelius Verus Caesar; a title he would remind himself not to take too seriously with the following admonition:

“Take care that thou art not made into a Caesar, that thou art not dyed with this dye; for such things happen. Keep thyself then simple, good, pure, serious, free from affectation, a friend of justice, a worshipper of the gods, kind, affectionate, strenuous in all proper acts. Strive to continue to be such as philosophy wished to make thee. Reverence the gods, and help men. Short is life. There is only one fruit of this earthly life, a pious disposition and social acts. Do everything as a disciple of Antoninus.” Meditations, VI.30

Life and service under Antoninus saw Marcus rise through the ranks, and at the Senate’s request he joined all the priestly colleges, although there is only direct evidence of him joining the Arval Brethren. DespiteMarcus' objections, he was also required to adopt the habits of his position, the aulicum fastigium or ‘pomp of the court’. As such, he was also made to relocate his home to the House of Tiberius, the imperial palace on the Palatine, something he was loathed to do and which caused him some sadness.

The trappings of his position did not sit well with his philosopher’s mind, and he would struggle to reconcile the two for the remainder or his life. However, through the words ‘Where life is possible, then it is possible to live the right life; life is possible in a palace, so it is possible to live the right life in a palace’, he was convinced the two could work together.

As quaestor, and under the tutelage of Fronto, Marcus received training for ruling the state. He gained practice by dictating dozens of letters, receiving oratory training giving speeches to the senators, and being educated in matters of State. In 145 he was made consul for the second time, with Fronto urging him to rest well before his appointment as Marcus had complained of an illness previously. This ongoing illness would haunt him for many years, especially as he had never been particularly healthy or strong.

Around 146-147, Marcus' health took a downward turn, historically it is unclear if this was physical, mental, or a combination of both, as he drifted away from his studies in jurisprudence, and he tired from his exercises in imaginary debates. At this point, Marcus’ formal education was ended, and his philosophic tendencies began to return to the fore.

Fronto had warned Marcus against philosophical studies, as he disdained both philosophy and philosophers. He had contempt for Marcus’ sessions with Apollonius of Chalcedon, as it is probably he who introduced Marcus to Stoicism. Fronto’s attitude would lead to a distance growing between master and student that would never be bridged. Marcus would keep in touch with Fronto, but from here on he chose to ignore Fronto’s opinions.

Domestic Joys and Heartbreak

In April of 145, Marcus and Faustina finally married, having been betrothed since 138. During their marriage they would have at least 14 children over a 23-year period; including two sets of twins, and only one son and four daughters outliving their parents. The first child, Domitia Faustina, was born in 147, and the next day Marcus received tribunician power and the imperium from Emperor Antoninus.

Although many of his children would not live past early childhood, Marcus’ joy at each birth was celebrated with the minting of Imperial coins, many of which can be seen in museums today. Sadly, this period also marked the deaths of his beloved mother, Domitia Lucilla, and Cornificia, his sister. This period of emotional upheaval may have contributed to Marcus’ downward spiralling health, and cemented his Stoic beliefs: that Nature will always rule men.

Rise to Power

At this time, Lucius Verus began his political career, first as consul in 154, and again in 161, this time with Marcus. Antoninus turned 70 in AD 156, and had grown physically weak; needing stays to keep him upright and nibbling dried bread to stay awake through morning receptions. During this time, Marcus took on more and more administrative duties, including those of praetorian prefect when Gavius Maximus died in 156 or 157. Marcus and Lucius were both designated as joint consuls for the coming year in 160, as Antoninus was quite ill by this time.

On 7th March, 161, Emperor Antoninus Pius died at his ancestral estate of Lorium, in Eturia. Having summoned the imperial council, and having handed over the state and his daughter to Marcus, as evening fell and the night-watch came to ask the password, he uttered it before turning over as if to sleep – aequanimitas (equanimity).

So ended the rule of Anotnius Pius and began that of Marcus Aurelius.

One Empire, Two Emperors

Life changed drastically for Marcus Aurelius, and Rome in 161 when Antoninus Pius died, leaving Marcus effectively as the new Emperor. However, although he was granted the name Augustus and the title imperator, and was elected Pontifex Maximus, Marcus appears to have taken these positions with some hesitation, having to be compelled to do so.

He may have been hesitant due to a literal fear of imperial power—horror imperii—or simply because he preferred the philosophic life. But, due to his training as a Stoic, he did not shrug off what he perceived as his duty and accepted the appointment.

It’s important to reflect on Marcus’ relationship with Hadrian, who was of course Antoninus’ predecessor. Although Marcus doesn’t appear to have had any great sentiment for Hadrian, as he did not mention Hadrian in his Meditations, Marcus was no doubt aware of the former emperor’s plans of succession, and ultimately chose to uphold them.

However, this is where Marcus displayed his sense of fairness, justice, and stoicism; he refused to take up office unless Lucius Verus was also granted equal powers. The Senate capitulated, and two Emperors were now ruling Rome equally, working united, a first for the Empire.

Or, at least that is how it appeared. Marcus held more authority—auctoritas—as he had been consul more times than Lucius, and had been involved in Antoninus’ rule and was Pontifex Maximus. To the public eye, it was clear that Marcus was the senior partner in this joint rulership.

In an unexpected move, the joint rulers then made their way to Castra Praetoria, the Praetorian Guard’s encampment, and Lucius addressed the troops, and made a declaration of a special ‘donative’—a donation which was more than double that from previous emperors, almost several years pay.

With this address and monetary promise, the army immediately declared them as imperatores, and vowed to protect them. This course of action, winning over the military, wasn’t entirely necessary as with previous ascensions, however it was an effective way of solidifying support from the army to the Emperors against any future attacks.

Family Matters

To honor Antoninus, the Emperors held elaborate ceremonies, with his body being cremated at the Campus Martius, and both Marcus and Lucius nominating him for deification. The remains of Antoninus Pius were interred with the remains of Marcus’ beloved children, and former emperor Hadrian’s remains in Hadrian’s mausoleum.

Meanwhile, Faustina was pregnant, and she had dreamt that she would give birth to two serpents, with one stronger than the other. On 31 August (Caligula’s birthday), Faustina gave birth to Titus Aurelius Fulvus Antoninus, and Lucius Aurelius Commodus. The birth was celebrated widely, with coins being minted.

Sometime after both emperors’ ascended, Annia Lucilla was betrothed to Lucius despite him formally being her uncle – as he was also adopted by Antoninus, but wasn’t biologically related to her. During the ceremonies, the Emperors made new provisions to support poor children, something akin to previous imperial foundations.

A New Roman Empire

This joint leadership was popular with the Romans, in part because both Emperors’ were direct and lacked the pomp of former rulers. They also earned favor by permitting free speech, something that had been lacking, with those who spoke out being subject to retribution.

Marcus then proceeded to breathe new life into the empire by replacing major officials. The first to change was the ab epistulis, or those in charge of the imperial correspondence. Next, one of Marcus’ former tutors, Lucius Volusius Maecianus was appointed prefect of the treasury, due to his experience as prefectural governor of Egypt. Finally, Gaius Aufidius Victorinus, Fronto’s son-in-law, was made governor of Germania Superior.

At Marcus’ accession to Emperor, Fronto returned from Cirta, and took up residence in his Roman townhouse. Although Fronto did not dare to write to the emperors directly, he did reflect on how the boy he had known had grown into a great leader, and remarked, ‘There was then an outstanding natural ability in you; there is now perfected excellence. There was then a crop of growing corn; there is now a ripe, gathered harvest. What I was hoping for then, I have now. The hope has become a reality.’

In these early days of his reign, a time when all things appeared to move smoothly and without any conflict, Marcus was able to embrace his philosophic nature. Coinage from the era is stamped with the euphemistic words ‘felicitas temporum‘, or ‘happy times’.

Changing Tides

Sadly, these easy days were to end all too soon. Late in 161 or early 162, the Tiber broke its banks and flooded much of Rome. This flooding took the lives of citizens and livestock alike, causing famine and disease to ravage the city. Marcus and Lucius turned their personal attention to the dire situation, and provided for the communities from the Roman granaries to ease their suffering.

Fonto was obviously pleased with his student’s actions, as he continued to write to Marcus throughout the early days of his reign. He also noticed that, with this new prominence of position, that Marcus might have been ‘beginning to feel the wish to be eloquent once more, in spite of having for a time lost interest in eloquence’, something Fronto was all too keen to assist with, but also reminded him of the differences between Marcus’ personal life and his public one.

As a teacher, Fronto could be no prouder of his pupil; Marcus was beloved by his subjects, he was proving to be a wise and capable emperor, and most of all, Marcus was as eloquent as his teacher could wish for. With Fronto’s words ‘Not more suddenly or violently was the city stirred by the earthquake than the minds of your hearers by your speech’, he commended his student’s rhetorical abilities when the Emperor addressed the Senate after an earthquake in Cyzicus. It was clear to all who heard his words: Marcus Aurelius was indeed the Emperor.

Parthian Attacks

With barely enough time to get comfortable in the Emperor’s seat, Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus’ minds were turned to a ghost that haunted their predecessor. As Emperor Antoninus Pius lay dying, his mind was often consumed by the actions of foreign kings. Such worries would turn out to not be unfounded, though Antoninus would (perhaps fortunately) not live long enough to see his fears justified.

In late summer or early autumn of 161, Vologases IV of Parthia invaded Armenia, removing and exiling its king before installing a king of his choosing, King Pacorus. The governor at the time, Marcus Sedatius Severianus, an experienced military man and Gaul, was, unfortunately, mislead by the prophet Alexander of Abonutichus.

It was the prophet who told the governor that he would easily defeat the Parthians and win glory for himself in the act. Severianus was duped by the snake handler and lulled into a false sense of military superiority. Sadly, Severianus led a legion into Armenia to challenge the Parthians. But, the Parthian general Chosrhoes trapped him near the head of the Euphrates River, at Elegia. Severianus attempted several engagements with the general but failed each time. After three days he committed suicide, leaving his legion to be massacred by the Parthians.

In the winter of 161-162, it was decided that Lucius would take over and direct the Parthian war. As he was strong and healthy, this seemed a wise choice, rather than sending Marcus who had always suffered from bouts of illness.

Marcus may have had an ulterior motive for sending Lucius; as the lesser emperor had developed a taste for debauchery, and he hoped the terror of war would straighten him out and remind him that he, too, was an emperor.

Thus, in the summer of 162, with the Senate’s blessing, Lucius left for the Parthian war. He would spend much of his time in Antioch, wintering at Laodicea, and spending the summers at Daphne, enjoying what were to be his final days as a bachelor. In the autumn of 163, or early 164, Lucius married Lucilla in Ephesus after Marcus moved up the marriage date; perhaps as a result of Lucius taking a mistress, Panthea. Marcus did not attend the marriage of his 13-year-old daughter. Instead, he accompanied them as far as Brundisium, and returned immediately to Rome after they boarded the ship. Some evidence suggests that he was not entirely happy with the arrangement, as he also sent word to his proconsuls not to give the company any official reception.

In the coming years, the war with the Parthians would continue back and forth, with both sides sustaining bitter defeats with heavy losses. Eventually, in 165, the Roman forces moved on Mesopotamia, and after a series of skirmishes the Parthian army was routed at the Tigris River, before the Roman army continued on down the Euphrates River for another major victory. Lucius and the Roman army then turned their sights on the cities of Ctesiphon and Seleucia.

Where Ctesiphon occupied the left bank of the Tigris, Seleucia sat on the left, and despite offering no resistance to the invading army, Seleucia was ransacked. At the end of 165 Ctesiphon was seized, and as the only city that had withstood the Romans, it then faced having the royal palace raised to the ground by fire. Both of these pillaging conquests would leave a black mark on Lucius’ honor and reputation.

Upon the army’s return to Rome, Lucius adopted the title Parthicus Maximus, and both he and Marcus were hailed as imperatores again. When the army returned, in 166, to Media, Lucius then added the extra title Medicus to his name, while Marcus chose to wait until then to include Parthicus Maximus to his list of honors. The two emperors were then hailed as imperatores for the fourth time, and on 12th October Marcus announced his two sons as his heirs-apparent; Annius and Commodus.

Rebellion On All Fronts

The Parthian War wasn’t the only military matter that occupied Marcus’ thoughts. Indeed, much of the 160s were consumed with attacks on almost all of the Roman Empire’s borders. There were skirmishes in Britain, in Raetia (eastern and central Switzerland), and Upper Germany. Marcus had been ill-prepared for inheriting such a calamitous state, and with very little military experience, he was guided by others.

In 166 the borders of the Roman Empire were broken in Upper Germany by the indigenous tribes of the area. Unfortunately, Marcus had replaced capable leaders and governors with friends and relatives of the imperial family, and this nepotism would come back to haunt him.

Where the Roman army had so far succeeded in repulsing the advances of smaller bands of the Germanic tribes, in 168 they faced a much more dangerous combination of united tribes who crossed the Danube.

Attacking between the Danube and Theiss rivers, the Marcomanni of Bohemia, along with the Lombards, followed by the lazyges (one of the main tribes of the Samartians, an Iranian confederation), invaded the Empire’s territory. Lucius Verus, having recently defeated the Parthian leader Vologases, was quick to defend the Danubian border.

At the same time, the Costoboci from Carpathia invaded Macedonia and Greece. However, Marcus was able to repel this attack for the moment. While fending off this advance, the Germanic tribes began settling in Dacia, Pannonia, Germany, as well as Italy.

Although this was not unheard of, the sheer numbers of tribes relocating there required the creation of new provinces; and with the overwhelming number of barbarians arriving, it caused Marcus to banish any and all barbarians who’d been brought to Italy previously, for fear of being overrun.

This onslaught of attacks would not be the worst thing Marcus would have to deal with. While returning to Rome, Lucius became grievously ill with the symptoms of gastroenteritis, although some scholars believe it may have been the Antonine Plague, aka; smallpox. Just three days later, he was dead.

The death of his adoptive brother, and the husband of his 21-year-old daughter, caused Marcus a great deal of heartbreak. He escorted Lucius’ body back to Rome. The co-Emperor would be deified and then worshipped as Divus Verus, soon after the funeral games held in his honor.

Lawmaker and Administrator

Marcus proved to be a prudent ruler of the Empire. Now, as the only ruler, he would spend much of his time in Rome, addressing matters of law. There he would decide over disputes and listen to petitions. This is something that his predecessors had failed to do: being competent in navigating imperial administration. He also paid particular attention to the release of slaves, the welfare of orphans, and how city councilors were selected.

He was a shrewd businessman, seeking the Senate’s approval before spending money, even though he did not need to do so as Emperor. During this period,  Marcus potentially made contact with Han China, though this tenuous link is via a Roman traveler who claimed to represent the ruler of Daqin. There is physical evidence to support this story, with Roman glassware being found at Huangzhou, which shares some coastline on the South China Sea, and golden Roman medallions have been found at Óc Eo, in Vietnam, which dates to Marcus’ rule, or possibly earlier to Antoninus’.

At any rate, in 165/166 the Antonine Plague broke out in Mesopotamia, and possibly continued long after Marcus’ time as Emperor. The Antonine Plague is now suspected to have been smallpox, and was one of the plagues that afflicted the Han Empire at the time of Marcus’ potential contact.

It is believed that during this contact, Roman subjects may have begun a new era of Roman-Far East trading. However, this exchange of goods may also have instigated the wider spreading of the plague, and caused severe damage to Roman maritime trade in the Indian Ocean. For instance, archaeological records spanning Egypt to India show decreased traffic, and this had a significant effect on goods going to Southeast Asia at this point.

End of Days

It was a time of upheaval and uncertainty, with heathen tribes surrounding the borders of Rome, and the Antonine Plague ravaging the Roman populous. For much of the 170s, Marcus’ rule was spent attempting to stem the onslaught, and in 177 he named Commodus as co-ruler (his other son, Annius, died in 169).

This decision caused quite a stir, as his appointment was only the second time in Roman history where an Emperor nominated his biological son as co-ruler, the first being Vespasian and his son Titus. Perhaps Marcus hoped for a similar legacy for his family.

Whatever his intentions, Marcus would not live to see them bear fruit. He passed away in 180, of natural causes, in Vindobona—modern-day Vienna. He was 58 years old, and his ashes were returned to Rome, and there placed in the mausoleum of Hadrian. Upon his death, he was immediately deified, and eventually his efforts against the German tribes and the Sarmatians were acknowledged with a column and a temple in Rome.

Conclusion

Despite the tumultuous events that afflicted Rome throughout Marcus’ reign, he is remembered today as the last emperor of the Pax Romana—the golden age of Rome.

Much of Marcus Aurelius’ life was marred by illness, loss of loved ones. Because of his stoic desire to live a quiet life he never sought the limelight of leadership, but when faced with ruling the empire, it was this same stoic attitude of his that allowed him to accept his fate. It was his natural duty, and he abided by it.

Marcus’ choice of an heir has been heavily criticized, as Commodus proved to be erratic, and lacked both military and political savvy. Though Marcus had done his best to raise the boy to be a capable man and future leader, Commodus would be a bitter disappointment to his father.

The death of Marcus and the reign of Commodus would come to mark the end of the Pax Romana. As Cassius Dio wrote, in an encomium to Marcus Aurelius, reflecting on the transition to Commodus and to Dio’s own times, “…our history now descends from a kingdom of gold to one of iron and rust, as affairs did for the Romans of that day.”

However, if nothing else, it’s worth remembering Marcus' steadfastness. As Dio also said of the man he knew,

“[Marcus] did not meet with the good fortune that he deserved, for he was not strong in body and was involved in a multitude of troubles throughout practically his entire reign. But for my part, I admire him all the more for this very reason, that amid unusual and extraordinary difficulties he both survived himself and preserved the empire.”

Marcus’ iconic stoicism, philosophic nature, and compassionate heart meant he constantly worked towards creating a better Roman world. Marcus lived a life of constant challenges, overcoming them where possible, accepting those that he could not, and all the while striving for the betterment of all.

As he once so beautifully wrote in his Meditations,

“Upon every action that thou art about, put this question to thyself; How will this when it is done agree with me? Shall I have no occasion to repent of it? Yet a very little while and I am dead and gone; and all things are at end. What then do I care for more than this, that my present action whatsoever it be, may be the proper action of one that is reasonable; whose end is, the common good; who in all things is ruled and governed by the same law of right and reason, by which God Himself is.” ~ Book 8. II.

Carnuntum:

Where Marcus Aurelius Wrote the Meditations

By

Donald Robertson

If thou would’st master care and pain,
Unfold this book and read and read again
Its blessed leaves, whereby thou soon shalt see
The past, the present, and the days to be
With opened eyes; and all delight, all grief,
Shall be like smoke, as empty and as brief.

Epigram found at the end of a Vatican manuscript of The Meditations and in the Anthologia Palatina.

The Roman emperor Marcus Aurelius kept private notes of his philosophical reflections, which survive today.  We know them as The Meditations, although the earliest Greek manuscript bears the title Ta eis heauton or “To Himself”.  The Meditations has become one of the most widely-read spiritual self-help classics of all time.  

The Prussian king Frederick the Great was a big fan, referring to Marcus Aurelius as his “exemplar” and his “hero”.  The English philosopher and nobleman Anthony Ashley-Cooper, the 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury, actually wrote his own version of The Meditations called The Philosophical Regimen.  The author John Steinbeck was a fan and mentions The Meditations in his novel East of Eden (1952).  More recently, former US President Bill Clinton named it as his favourite book and former US defense secretary General Mattis said it was the one book he’d advise every American to read.  

Sir Alec Guinness depicted Marcus Aurelius in The Fall of the Roman Empire (1964).  Richard Harris later played him in the Hollywood movie Gladiator (2000), which inspired a new generation of readers to pick up The Meditations.  A script is currently in development for a sequel concerning the story of Marcus’ descendants, which may perhaps cause another wave of interest in Marcus Aurelius, his life, and his philosophical writings. 

However, we know frustratingly little about the origin of The Meditations. There are a couple of intriguing notes, or headings, in the text which helpfully tell us where  Marcus was writing.  Between books one and two are the words “Among the Quadi, at the Gran”, a tributary of the River Danube located on the enemy side of the frontier, almost a hundred miles east of Carnuntum.  Between books two and three it simply says “At Carnuntum”. Because of the odd position of these words in the manuscript, it’s not entirely clear to which books he’s referring.

My belief is that the first location mentioned is where book one of The Meditations was written.  I suspect this was toward the end of the First Marcomannic War when he had crossed the Danube into the lands of the hostile Quadi and was negotiating peace with them.  This part of the book is sometimes believed to have been written last and added as a sort of preface. I think it’s likely the rest of The Meditations, book two onward, was written at Carnuntum by the banks of the Danube, the capital of the Roman province of Upper Pannonia.  

The Roman historian Cassius Dio confirms that Marcus “fought for a long time, almost his entire life, one might say,” with the tribes in the region of the Danube, both Marcomanni and Sarmatians, one after the other, “using Pannonia as his base”.  For much of the Marcomannic wars Marcus presumably stationed himself in upper and lower Pannonia, at the major Roman military camps in Carnuntum, Aquincum, and Sirmium (located in modern-day Austria, Hungary, and Serbia respectively).

The modern town of Petronell-Carnuntum in Austria is the location of the Carnuntum Archeological Park, consisting of three museums, several archeological sites, and detailed reconstructions of Roman buildings, including a functioning Roman bathhouse.  It extends over an area of 10 km². I visited the area to find out more about the setting in which The Meditations was written, in the lead up to the publication of my own book How to Think Like a Roman Emperor: The Stoic Philosophy of Marcus Aurelius.

The Legionary Camp and Roman City of Carnuntum

The story of Carnuntum really begins with the fifteenth legion (Legio XV Appollinaris) founding a legionary fortress there in 40 AD.  Shortly after this it became the headquarters of the Pannonian fleet, which patrolled the Danube. The fourteenth legion (Legio XIV Gemina) were subsequently garrisoned there, adopting it as their permanent base.  Over the years a civilian settlement grew up beside the military camp, which had evolved into a major city, and become the capital of the province by the time of Marcus Aurelius.

The Roman city of Carnuntum had an estimated population of 50,000.  It thrived because it sat at the intersection of trade routes on the Roman frontier, by the banks of the Danube where the Amber Road crossed the river.  The huge army camp which sprawled beside the city had a legionary fortress at the centre where the provincial governor and presumably also the emperor resided.  It was of enormous strategic importance to the Roman military.

At the start of the First Marcomannic War, in the Spring of 170 AD, the Romans suffered a major defeat.  An invading army led by the Marcomanni, accompanied by allied tribes, reputedly slaughtered 20,000 Roman soldiers in what became known as The Battle of Carnuntum.  King Ballomar of the Marcomanni then led his army down the Amber Road, across the Alps, and through Italy until they reached the Roman city of Aquileia, which they besieged.  Eventually they were driven back by Marcus and his generals Pompeianus and Pertinax, who gradually succeeded in liberating Pannonia and the other provinces from the invading tribes.  

It’s believed Marcus stationed himself at Carnuntum from around 171 to 173 AD. A funerary stele commemorating a member of the emperor’s praetorian guard has been unearthed there inscribed with the date 171 AD, proving that Marcus must have been in Carnuntum around that time.  Recent archeological evidence therefore lends support to the note in The Meditations where Marcus suggests that he wrote part of the text there.  

Carnuntum and the Symbolism of The Meditations

That heading is the only explicit references to Carnuntum in The Meditations.  Nevertheless, it’s tempting to relate some of Marcus’ remarks to the setting in which he appears to have been writing.  I wouldn’t be the first to observe that Marcus could easily have been describing his situation, stationed far from home on the front-line of the Marcomannic War in Pannonia, when he wrote to himself that “life is warfare, and a sojourn in a foreign land” (2.17).  

However, here and throughout the rest of The Meditations the things he sees and hears around him every day are elevated into philosophical metaphors about the meaning of life in general. For example, Marcus refers several times to the image of time as a river.  Like other Stoics, he was influenced by the pre-Socratic philosopher Heraclitus who famously said “Everything changes and nothing remains still” and “You cannot step into the same river twice”.  Although the Heraclitean metaphor of time as a river flowing past was almost a cliche, it does acquire more resonance if we think of Marcus writing these words beside the Danube.

The Romans personified the Danube in the form of a river god, a bearded middle-aged man, whose image appears on the Aurelian column at Rome and also in an exhibit at the Museum Carnuntinum.  The River Danube was of immense importance to the Romans and must have featured very prominently in Marcus’ life, commanding the troops along its banks.

It’s easy to imagine that he had the Danube in mind, therefore, when he describes Nature as “a rushing torrent”, which “carries all things in its stream” (9.29).  All bodies, he says, are swept through the substance of the whole “as through a winter torrent” (7.19).

Time is like a river made up of the events which happen, and a violent stream; for as soon as a thing has been seen, it is carried away, and another comes in its place, and this will be carried away too (4.43).

At one point, speaking of the river as a metaphor for change, Marcus also brings to mind the little birds who can be heard in the trees and bushes along the banks of the Danube.

At all times some things are hastening to come into being, and others to be no more; and of that which is coming to be, some part is already extinct. Flux and transformation are forever renewing the world, as the ever-flowing stream of time makes boundless eternity forever young. So in this torrent, in which one can find no place to stand, which of the things that go rushing past should one value at any great price? It is as though one began to lose one’s heart to a little sparrow flitting by, and no sooner has one done so than it has vanished from sight (6.15).

There are other references to animals that seem to evoke his surroundings at Carnuntum.  For instance, he says that someone who wishes for wicked people to do no wrong is asking the impossible, like wanting horses not to neigh, “or anything else that cannot be otherwise than it is” (12.16).  The sound of distant neighing would often have intruded on his meditations while stationed in the military camp at Carnuntum, I think, where thousands of horses were stabled nearby for the use of cavalry units, etc.

There’s surprisingly little reference to warfare in The Meditations, given that at least some of it appears to have been written at a major military camp during a prolonged war.  However, Marcus appears to mention having witnessed the gruesome sight of severed hands, feet, and heads lying at a distance from their bodies (8.34).  Perhaps he was describing the remains on a battlefield in the aftermath of combat. However, he uses it to illustrate the unnatural way in which someone alienates himself from the universe when he refuses to accept his fate, or from the rest of humankind when he acts in ways that are at odds with the common interest.  

There are two amphitheatres at Carnuntum, a military one at the legionary camp and a civilian one near the city, each with a gladiatorial school beside it.  We know Marcus wasn’t remotely interested in the gladiatorial games. Perhaps because of his Stoic philosophical values, he appears to have found the displays of violence both distasteful and monotonous.

Just as you are sickened by the displays in the amphitheatre and such places, because the same scenes are forever repeated and the monotony makes the spectacle irksome, so you should also feel about life as a whole; for all things, high and low, are ever the same and arise from the same. For how long, then? (6.46)

Indeed, Cassius Dio confirms that Marcus insisted that gladiators, at least at Rome, should fight with blunted weapons.

Marcus, indeed, was so averse to bloodshed that he even used to watch the gladiators in Rome contend, like athletes, without risking their lives; for he never gave any of them a sharp weapon, but they all fought with blunted weapons like foils furnished with buttons.

Nevertheless, Marcus felt obliged to attend the gladiatorial bouts at the amphitheatre because the public expected it of him.  He almost certainly, therefore, would have attended games at the amphitheatres in Carnuntum, albeit begrudgingly. Nevertheless, we can stroll among the ruins of those two amphitheatres today, contemplating the notion that we may be where Marcus Aurelius once sat reflecting on the principles of Stoic philosophy and trying to apply them to the everyday sights and sounds around him.

Marcus Aurelius & Stoicism: Anger, Pain and Justice

By

Donald Robertson

Anger

The Roman emperor Marcus Aurelius was renowned for his ability to remain calm in the face of provocation. On one such occasion, a notoriously hot-tempered, and extremely wealthy, aristocrat called Herodes Atticus lost his temper with Marcus, who was presiding over a legal dispute between him and the citizens of Athens.

Herodes did the unthinkable and lunged at the emperor as though he intended to strike him. The praetorian prefect guarding the emperor, instinctively reached for his sword. He would have cut Herodes down in an instant but Marcus quickly signaled him to step back. The emperor rose from his chair completely unfazed and said only “My good fellow, an old man fears little”, before declaring the hearing adjourned. He meant, perhaps, that having come to terms with his own mortality he wasn’t easily flustered by threatening behavior.

We can surmise that Marcus’ lifelong training in Stoicism contributed to his remarkable composure in tense situations like this. Indeed, we know that as a young man he struggled to control his temper because he tells us so at the beginning of The Meditations, the private record of his reflections on Stoic philosophy.

Marcus says that he frequently became angry with his beloved Stoic mentor, Junius Rusticus, and was grateful that he never lost control and did something that he would have regretted. Marcus had probably heard the notorious story about his adoptive grandfather, the emperor Hadrian, who once flew into a rage and stabbed some poor slave in the eye with the point of a metal stylus. When Hadrian finally calmed down and came to his senses he apologized for this horrific act and asked the man if there was anything he could do to make amends. The slave, however, said that all he wanted was his eye back. That was something even an emperor couldn’t grant him. Although our anger may sometimes be fleeting, the harm done by it can nevertheless be permanent.

Indeed, the Stoics described anger as temporary madness. It’s perhaps no surprise therefore to find Marcus returning to psychological strategies for managing anger over and over again throughout The Meditations. At one point, though, he actually provides a list that he describes as ten “gifts from Apollo”, the god of healing, and his Muses (11.18). All of these are arguably still relevant today. Indeed, some of them resemble techniques used in modern cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) for anger management. When you’re offended by someone else’s actions, he says, consider the following…

1. We are naturally social animals designed to help one another.
The Stoics believed that humans naturally form communities and have deep-seated social instincts. We should always bear in mind that we’re adapted to work together for mutual benefit rather than conflict and destruction. Elsewhere, in one of the most famous passages of The Meditations, Marcus tells himself to prepare each morning for the day ahead by imagining all sorts of encounters with troublesome individuals while reminding himself “Neither can I be angry with my kinsman nor hate him for we have come into being for cooperation” (2.1).

2. Consider their character as a whole.
Marcus thinks we should imagine the person with whom we’re feeling angry in different situations – eating meals, sleeping, relieving themselves, having sex, etc. We should particularly bear in mind how their opinions and values shape their behavior throughout the day. When we broaden our perspective beyond the behavior that’s annoying us, we tend to dilute our feelings of anger. We also understand their actions better by placing them in a wider context, and to understand all is to forgive all.

3. Nobody does wrong willingly.
This is one of the central paradoxes of Socrates’ philosophy, which greatly influenced the Stoics. Socrates believed that no-one does wrong knowingly. It arguably follows from this that nobody does wrong willingly either. This ancient principle of moral psychology is hard for many people to accept but it’s the basis of Stoic forgiveness and empathy, and a key part of their remedy for anger. Marcus notes that everyone is offended when accused of wrongdoing. Even murderous dictators typically believe that their actions are justified, though they may seem morally egregious to everyone else.

4. Nobody is perfect, yourself included.
It’s hypocrisy to criticize others without recognizing your own imperfections – a double standard. Marcus actually said that when you notice yourself becoming angry with another person you should take it as a signal to pause and examine whether or not you’re guilty of similar, wrong-headed thoughts or actions. Acknowledging our own flaws, and bearing them in mind, can moderate the anger we feel towards others.

5. You can never be certain of other people’s motives.
Marcus had studied jurisprudence and acted as a judge in many legal disputes. He therefore knew very well how difficult it can be to know another person’s intentions. Anger, however, assumes an unwarranted certainty. Keeping an open mind, by contrast, will help weaken these feelings so that we can deal with the situation more calmly and rationally.

6. Remember we all will die.
The Stoics like to remind themselves that all things are transient, nothing lasts forever, including our own lives and those of the people with whom we’re angry. Before long both of you will be dead and the whole thing long forgotten. When we think about the bigger picture, it doesn’t seem worth getting very flustered about other people’s actions.

7. It’s our own judgement that upsets us.
This is perhaps the most famous doctrine of Stoic psychology. It became the philosophical inspiration for modern cognitive psychotherapy, which is based on the principle that our emotions are determined to a large extent by our underlying beliefs (cognitions). Marcus reminds himself that it’s not really the actions of others that make him feel angry but his own opinions about them, more specifically, opinions that are based upon negative value judgements. Noticing this fact alone can weaken the hold that strong emotions have on our mind but it should also encourage us to examine our beliefs and question whether there might be more healthy and constructive perspectives that we could adopt concerning the same situation.

8. Anger does us more harm than good.
This was another very common Stoic technique. Other people’s actions might harm us physically, damage our property, or our reputation. However, anger injures our own moral character. According to the Stoics, therefore, it hurts us much more deeply than another person’s actions ever could. Anger does us more harm, in other words, than the things we’re angry about. Focusing on the negative consequences of our anger can help motivate us to let it go.

9. Nature gave us the virtues to deal with anger.
The Stoics frequently reminded themselves to contemplate how a wise person, such as Socrates, would deal with challenging people or events, and what strengths or virtues he might employ in specific situations. We all have inner resources that can be used to deal more constructively with difficult people, such as the capacity for patience, tolerance, empathy, and kindness. Reminding ourselves of these positive qualities and contemplating how they could be applied, can help us find an alternative to anger, and a better way of coping.

10. It’s madness to expect others to be perfect.
The Stoics were determinists who believed that the wise are seldom shocked because they view whatever happens in life as inevitable. There’s good and bad in the world. Marcus tells himself that “to expect bad people not to do bad things is madness because that is wishing for the impossible.” It’s therefore irrational to act surprised but when we’re angry we say things like “I can’t believe someone would do that!” Marcus thinks that’s naive and foolish. When someone acts in a way that’s objectionable, we should tell ourselves that is to be expected from time to time. It’s just a part of life. Acting less shocked makes it easier to respond calmly and rationally to events that might otherwise make us feel enraged and offended.

It really does seem that Marcus dedicated himself to practicing psychological techniques like these every day. It’s easy to see how they could have helped him overcome the quick temper of his youth and transform himself into the embodiment of Stoic equanimity that he reputedly became. There are no accounts of him losing his temper despite the enormous challenges he faced throughout his reign. Instead, we’re told that he earned a reputation among Roman citizens for having been an exceptionally wise and gentle ruler.

Pain

The physical frailty of Roman emperor Marcus Aurelius was notorious, and of great concern to his subjects. Around 174-175 AD, he was in such poor health that false rumours that he was dying, or already dead, actually spread throughout the empire. These were taken seriously enough for his most senior general in the eastern provinces, Avidius Cassius, to have himself acclaimed emperor, leading to a short-lived civil war in which Marcus and his loyalist army were victorious.

We know that Marcus suffered from chronic chest and stomach pains, problems sleeping, and poor appetite, among other symptoms. While it’s not clear what illness he suffered from, modern scholars have speculated he may have been describing the symptoms of stomach ulcers, among other things. Curiously, the historian Cassius Dio praises Marcus Aurelius for the remarkable physical resilience that he showed despite being “extremely frail in body”.

To be sure, he could not display many feats of physical prowess; yet he had developed his body from a very weak one to one capable of the greatest endurance.

He concludes his account of Marcus’ reign as follows:

He did not meet with the good fortune that he deserved, for he was not strong in body and was involved in a multitude of troubles throughout practically his entire reign. But for my part, I admire him all the more for this very reason, that amid unusual and extraordinary difficulties he both survived himself and preserved the empire.

Indeed, Marcus lived to be nearly sixty, at a time when war or plague claimed many of his contemporaries at a younger age. For example, his adoptive brother Lucius Verus, despite being a stronger, fitter man, dropped dead aged thirty-eight, and Marcus’ son Commodus was assassinated at thirty-one.

So how is it possible that Marcus Aurelius could both be renowned for poor health and yet praised for his endurance?  We can find an answer in his personal notes practicing Stoic philosophy, The Meditations, where he refers many times to psychological strategies for coping with pain and illness.

However, one of the best illustrations of the basic Stoic approach to pain actually comes from an early 20th century psychotherapist called Paul Dubois. Dubois used to assign his patients homework that involved reading the letters of the Stoic philosopher Seneca. One day when Dubois was explaining to a young patient how Stoic philosophy could help him cope better with illness, the man interrupted, saying: “I understand, doctor; let me show you.”

And taking a pencil he drew a large black spot on a piece of paper. “This,” said he, “is the disease, in its most general sense, the physical trouble – rheumatism, toothache, what you will – moral trouble, sadness, discouragement, melancholy.

“If I acknowledge it by fixing my attention upon it, I already trace a circle to the periphery of the black spot, and it has become larger. If I affirm it with acerbity the spot is increased by a new circle. There I am, busied with my pain, hunting for means to get rid of it, and the spot only becomes larger.

“If I preoccupy myself with it, if I fear the consequences, if I see the future gloomily, I have doubled or trebled the original spot.” And, showing me the central point of the circle, the trouble reduced to its simplest expression, he said with a smile, “Should I not have done better to leave it as it was?”

Dubois adds:

“One exaggerates, imagines, anticipates affliction,” wrote Seneca. For a long time, I have told my discouraged patients and have repeated to myself, “Do not let us build a second storey to our sorrow by being sorry for our sorrow.”

He says this diagram illustrates the Stoic doctrine that “He who knows how to suffer suffers less.” The burden of physical pain or illness is lightened when we are able to look at it objectively, without drawing concentric circles around it and multiplying our suffering by adding layers of fear.

Here is a rough outline of some of the key Stoic psychological techniques that Marcus describes using to cope with his own chronic pain and illness:

Carefully distinguish what’s directly under your control from what isn’t. This is really the basis of the Stoic approach. The Stoic philosopher Epictetus said: “What, then, is to be done? To make the best of what is in our power, and take the rest as it naturally happens.” That became the basis of the Serenity Prayer made famous by Alcoholics Anonymous: “God grant me the serenity to accept the things I cannot change; courage to change the things I can; and wisdom to know the difference.” Marcus likewise tells himself, “It is necessary that those who wish to follow Nature and be of one mind with her should also adopt a neutral attitude” toward things like pain and illness, by accepting the sensations and focusing instead on their own response to suffering (9.1).

2. Compare the consequences of struggling versus acceptance. The Stoics liked to say that it’s not really pain that’s our problem but rather the fear of pain. Struggling against things we can’t change can add to our emotional suffering. They want us to learn a healthy and rational attitude of acceptance instead. Of course, if there are practical steps that could potentially help your condition then take them. However, Marcus reminds himself, in vivid terms, of the futility of struggling against suffering that is beyond our direct control: “Imagine every man who is grieved at anything or discontented to be like a pig which is sacrificed and kicks and screams” (10.28). We commonly intensify our emotional suffering by struggling against events in futile ways and growing frustrated with life.

Remember that it’s not events that upset us but our judgements about them. This ancient Stoic doctrine became the fundamental premise of modern cognitive therapy. Pain and illness are unpleasant but you add another layer of suffering when you allow yourself to indulge too much in negative thinking about your condition. We can learn a great deal from those admirable individuals who are able to view physical illness more constructively.  Marcus says that we should remember that unpleasant physical sensations, such as pain, are natural and inevitable in life, but that our conscious mind should not, “add to the sensation the opinion that it is either good or bad” (5.26).

Take away thy opinion, and then there is taken away the complaint, “I have been harmed.” Take away the complaint, “I have been harmed,” and the harm is taken away. (4.7)

Practice letting go of the inner struggle and actively accepting painful sensations. The Stoics compared life to a dog tied to a moving cart. If the dog tries to struggle and resist it will be pulled along roughly by the cart anyway. However, if it chooses to run behind at the same speed as the cart, things will go smoothly. If we struggle against unpleasant experiences such as pain and try to resist them or become frustrated or resentful toward them then we often just make our lives worse.

5. Contemplate how others cope well with pain and illness and model their attitude and behavior. Marcus must have seen countless examples of others coping with pain and illness throughout his life during the plague and wars that afflicted the empire. Some people cope with such adversity better than others, of course. The Stoics advise us to learn from the example of those who face adversity with wisdom and courage, and emulate their behavior.

Nothing happens to any man which he is not formed by nature to bear. The same things happen to another person, and either because he does not notice that they have happened, or because he wants to show off his strength of character, he is firm and remains unharmed. (5.18)

One of the Stoics’ favorite strategies is to ask what virtue, or resource, nature has given us to cope with a challenge such as facing chronic pain or illness. Contemplating the example set by others is one way of reminding ourselves of potential strengths and coping resources that we already possess.

Justice

What is it, then, that arouses your discontent? Human wickedness? Call to mind the doctrine that rational creatures have come into the world for the sake of one another, and that tolerance is a part of justice… (Meditations, 4.2).

The virtue of justice is one of the main themes that runs throughout The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius. For Stoics, this is a less formal concept than the English word implies and really refers to social virtue in quite a broad sense. Justice entails the exercise of wisdom, kindness, and fairness in our relationships with others both individually and collectively. However, it’s also bound up with Stoic pantheism, the belief that everything in the universe, including every human being, is part of a sacred whole. We’re all in this together as citizens of a single world-city – a notion sometimes referred to as ethical “cosmopolitanism”. More than that, though, the Stoics believed that nature intended human beings to actively help one another. We’re fundamentally designed to co-operate for our own mutual benefit – and malice or conflict between us, though common, is against our true nature.

Marcus, like other Stoics, assumes that human nature is inherently reasoning – we are essentially thinking creatures – and that we therefore have a duty to apply reason consistently to our lives. Doing so would culminate, of course, in the virtue of wisdom. However, there’s a less well-known assumption in Stoicism, which holds that humans are not only essentially rational but also social. “Now every rational being,” writes Marcus, “by virtue of its rationality, is also a social being” (Meditations, 10.2).

From this it follows that in order to truly flourish and fulfil our own natural potential, we should excel in terms of our social relationships. Doing so would culminate in the virtue of justice. Humans are naturally rational and social creatures – the Stoic wise man (or woman) is therefore someone who excels in both regards, exercising both wisdom and justice consistently in his (or her) life.

Marcus tells himself that the supreme good of every creature lies in the goal for which it is naturally constituted and that the supreme good for a human must consist in kinship with others, and the exercise of social virtues such as justice, as it has “long been proved that we were born for fellowship” (Meditations, 5.16).

Indeed, he goes as far as to say that whoever commits an act of injustice acts impiously against the most venerable of gods “since universal nature has created rational creatures for the sake of one another, to benefit their fellows according to their deserts and in no way to do them harm” (Meditations, 9.1).

He therefore reasons that as he is part of the social system, his every action should be dedicated toward improving society, which he tends to call the goal of seeking “the common welfare of mankind”. Any action which does the opposite “tears your life apart”, in a sense, by alienating us from the rest of mankind and preventing us from experiencing a sense of oneness with the rest of humanity – “as does the citizen in a state who for his own part cuts himself off from the concord of his fellows” (Meditations, 9.23).

Indeed, Marcus repeatedly argues that because humans are essentially social creatures our individual welfare necessarily depends upon the welfare of our society, and ultimately the welfare of our species – the great city or society of humankind as a whole. “What brings no benefit to the hive”, he says, “brings none to the bee” (Meditations, 6.54). Elsewhere he explains more literally “What causes no harm to the city causes no harm to the citizen” (Meditations, 5.22). He actually advises himself to respond to every impression of having been harmed by affirming to himself that: “If the community is not harmed by this, neither am I”. He adds that if the community really is harmed, he should not be angry with the person who is responsible but rather show him what he has failed to see.

Elsewhere Marcus goes further and states that only what harms the laws can truly harm the city presumably if they are rendered unjust (Meditations, 10.33). He reasons that those things the majority of us ordinarily complain about as misfortunes in life – such as illness, poverty, or persecution from others – do not themselves corrupt the laws, and can therefore bring genuine harm neither to the city nor to its citizens.

If I remember, then, that I am a part of such a whole, I shall be well contented with all that comes to pass; and in so far as I am bound by a tie of kinship to other parts of the same nature as myself I shall never act against the common interest, but rather, I shall take proper account of my fellows, and direct every impulse to the common benefit and turn it away from anything that runs counter to that benefit. And when this is duly accomplished, my life must necessarily follow a happy course, just as you would observe that any citizen’s life proceeds happily on its course when he makes his way through it performing actions which benefit his fellow citizens and he welcomes whatever his city assigns to him. (Meditations, 10.6)

Although Marcus undoubtedly inherited these ideas from his own Stoic teachers there’s also a much earlier source for the notion that humans are designed to work together by exercising social virtues such as justice, kindness, and fairness to one another. It comes from a speech called The Great Discourse by the first great Sophist thinker, Protagoras. It originated about six centuries before the time of Marcus Aurelius but remained very well-known in the ancient world because Plato recorded a version of it in his dialogue named after Protagoras. What follows is a rough paraphrase of the speech’s content…

The Great Discourse of Protagoras

At first there were gods but no mortal creatures. When the time came, the gods fashioned countless animals by mixing together the elements of fire and earth. Zeus commanded the titan Prometheus to assign different abilities to each living thing.

Some creatures were slow moving and so to make up for this he gave them great strength. Others were weak and so to these Prometheus granted speed. Some he armed while others were given various forms of protection. Small creatures were granted the capability for winged flight or for concealing their dwellings underground. Large beasts had their size for protection. And he took care to grant all creatures some means for their own preservation so that no species should be in danger of elimination by others.

Having equipped them to survive among each other in this way Prometheus then granted them protection against their environment and the harshness of the seasons. He clothed some with dense hair or thick skin, sufficient to endure the heat of summer and ward off the cold through winter months. To some he gave strong hooves, to others claws and hard bodies that were not easily wounded. And every creature was assigned its own source of food. Some pastured on the earth, others ate fruits hanging from trees or roots from beneath the ground. Yet others were predators who fed upon certain types of animals for their meat. To the predators he assigned fewer offspring whereas their prey were more abundant so that there would always be enough to serve as food.

Once he had finished assigning to each species its own special capabilities, however, Prometheus was left with the realization that he had nothing left to give the race of man. Humans are born naked, unshod, unarmed, and with no bed in which to lay their head and rest safely. They were more vulnerable than other creatures and seemed bound to perish. Not knowing what else to do, in desperation, Prometheus stole the technical expertise of the gods Hephaestus and Athena and gave that to mankind, along with the gift of fire.

Once human beings were granted these divine gifts, however, they sensed their kinship to the gods and began praying and building altars to them. They invented clothing, bedding, dwellings, agriculture, and even the use of language to express their thoughts and acquire learning. Men lived apart at first but finding themselves beset continually and harassed by wild beasts they sought to build cities for their own mutual protection.

However, the wisdom that concerns our relations with others belonged to Zeus alone, king of the gods and patron of friendship and families. No sooner than men gathered together trying to save themselves, being lawless, they began instead to wrong one another and fighting broke out among them. Scattering once again from their failed cities, they continued to perish in the wild.

Looking down upon this chaotic scene with dismay, Zeus feared for the destruction of the entire human race. He therefore sent Hermes, the messenger of the gods, to teach mortals about justice and also to instill in them a sense of shame concerning wrongdoing as a deterrent against injustice. By this means Zeus now granted mankind a unique capacity to unite themselves in cities governed by law and the principles of justice, maintaining order through the bonds of friendship and fostering their sense of community.

Hermes asked Zeus whether he should distribute justice and the various social and political virtues among men in the same way as technical knowledge concerning the other crafts had been shared. One man who possesses the knowledge of medicine, for example, was enough to benefit many other men. However, Zeus decreed that every human being must be granted at least some rudimentary knowledge of justice and the arts needed to unite society. He even laid down the law that anyone who was found unable to respect justice and the rule of law should be put to death to prevent them from becoming a pestilence in the city.

For this reason, said Protagoras, although we seek the advice only of those few who are experts with regard to crafts such as medicine or carpentry, concerning justice we allow every citizen to have his say. Further, if someone boasts of being an expert in playing the flute or some such art but is found to be nothing of the sort then he is merely ridiculed as a fool. However, anyone found incapable of respecting justice should be expelled from society because each and every citizen is expected to share at least somewhat in this capacity, so that he may live harmoniously in the company of others.

The Sophist Protagoras originally expressed this doctrine that humans are naturally social creatures in the guise of a myth. According to the tradition that followed, we are obliged to realize our potential for wisdom by exercising the gift of reason to the best of our ability. So, we are also obliged, as Marcus Aurelius said many centuries later, to fulfill our natural potential for friendly collaboration with others by exhibiting the virtue of justice.

Meditations on the Rise of Stoicism

By

Alex Barrientos

Stoicism, as a philosophy of life, has become increasingly popular amongst the general public.

With practical lessons on how to control our temper, how to have good friendships, prioritizing what’s important, facing death, avoiding the pitfalls of consumer culture, and how to live the good life, it is no surprise that Stoicism would have much to offer those of us living in the 21st century.

I myself have improved much in my life due to my readings of Epictetus, Seneca, and Marcus Aurelius.

Though there is some excitement at this re-emergence of Stoicism, there is room for concern as well. Excitement, because there is indeed much that the Stoics said that can and should be applied in our daily lives; concern, because perhaps behind this re-emergence is the fact that people are feeling less and less in control of the world around them.

In the political realm, for instance, the feeling that “my individual actions won’t make a difference anyways” is becoming more widespread, especially amongst youths who notoriously fail to turn out to vote as it is.

This feeling is, of course, a self-fulfilling prophecy: if you believe you can’t make a difference anyways, and so don’t do anything at all, you will, in fact, not make a difference… shocking!

Whether all individual actions in the political realm really make a difference or not, and to what extent they make a difference is beside the point; it is not some well-reasoned, statistical analysis that leads people to feel this way, but the feeling of impotence itself.

The result of this impotence regarding the external world tends to lead people inwards. This is where Stoicism comes in.

They emphasized what they sometimes referred to as a retreat into the self. In other words, focus on what’s in your power and be indifferent toward what is not. All that is in our power are our thoughts and actions and, even in the case of being physically restrained, they argued, a free mind is never in chains.

As Epictetus put it in the opening lines of his Enchiridion,

“Of all existing things some are in our power, and others are not in our power. In our power are thought, impulse, will to get and will to avoid, and, in a word, everything which is our own doing. Things not in our power include the body, property, reputation, office, and, in a word, everything which is not our own doing.”

This is, on the surface and for the most part, helpful advice for many people. In our modern world we do often get tossed about too much: bombarded by social media and television, concerned about having the latest technology, running to the stores to buy the latest fashion.

These are all things which the Stoics thought cause us much inner tumult and which we should be far less concerned with. Their main concern was with living a tranquil and virtuous life, and they saw focusing too much on external things as inherently opposed to tranquillity and virtue.

Here are just several examples of some of the advice the Stoics had to offer:

“What disturbs men’s minds is not events but their judgments on events… And so when we are hindered, or disturbed, or distressed, let us never lay the blame on others, but on ourselves, that is, on our own judgments.” Epictetus, Enchiridion, 5

“Ask not that events should happen as you will, but let your will be that events should happen as they do, and you shall have peace.” Enchiridion, 8

“What difference does it make how many masters a man has? Slavery is only one, and yet the person who refuses to let the thought of it affect him is a free man no matter how great the swarm of masters around him.” – Seneca, Letter XXVIII, Letters from a Stoic

“…how pleasant it is to ask for nothing, how splendid it is to be complete and be independent of fortune.” Letter XV

“Everything hangs on one’s thinking” Letter LXXVIII

“A man is as unhappy as he has convinced himself.” Letter LXXVIII

“Remove the judgment, and you have removed the thought ‘I am hurt’: remove the thought ‘I am hurt’, and the hurt itself is removed.” Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, Book 4:7

“Withdraw into yourself. It is in the nature of the rational directing mind to be self-content with acting rightly and the calm it thereby enjoys.” Book 7:28

“If your distress has some external cause, it is not thing itself that troubles you, but your own judgment of it – and you can erase this immediately.” Book 8:47

“That all is as thinking makes it so – and you control your thinking. So remove your judgements whenever you wish and then there is calm…” Book 12:22

As we can see from these passages, much of what the Stoics had to say was often deeply inspiring and memorable. They are the type of sayings that you keep with you throughout your life. But the underlying assumption the Stoics made—their stark distinction between what is and is not in our power—can, and often does, lead people to apathy and seems in some cases to provide an excuse for those who feel they have no obligation to be concerned with the state of society or political matters.

Furthermore, and this is the heart of the concern, in a political climate where people feel helpless and powerless as it is, Stoicism becomes a philosophical justification for inaction and retreating into the self.

Stoicism seems to reveal itself as a practical philosophy when it is no longer practical or no longer feels practical to change the things around us. Striving to change the things we can no longer accept gives way to accepting the things we cannot change.

But what we can and cannot change, what depends and what does not depend on us, and what is and is not in our control are difficult lines to draw.

The Stoics, Simone de Beauvoir thought, were at least right in acknowledging that we are not oppressed by things. As she wrote,

“[M]an is never oppressed by things; in any case, unless he is a naïve child who hits stones or a mad prince who orders the sea to be thrashed, he does not rebel against things, but only against other men.”

She continues,

“Certainly, a material obstacle may cruelly stand in the way of an undertaking: floods, earthquakes, grasshoppers, epidemics and plague are scourges; but here we have one of the truths of Stoicism: a man must assume even these misfortunes, and since he must never resign himself in favor of anything, no destruction of a thing will ever be a radical ruin for him, even his death is not an evil since he is man only insofar as he is mortal: he must assume it as the natural limit of his life, as the risk implied by every step.”

Indeed, this is one of Stoicism’s greatest strengths. Some of the most beautiful and useful passages the Stoics have to offer are on accepting the natural limits of life and the things that are out of our control.

Yet, if we have established that the natural world and the limits set on us by nature do not oppress us, and furthermore that we must learn to accept these events and limitations rather than thrash the sea, what is it, then, that we should concern ourselves with?

What can, in fact, oppress us and deserve to be given our attention, maybe even our resentment and hatred?

“Only man can be an enemy for man,” de Beauvoir writes,

“It is here that the Stoic distinction between ‘things which do not depend on us’ and those which ‘depend on us’ proves to be insufficient: for ‘we’ is legion and not an individual; each one depends upon others, and what happens to me by means of others depends upon me as regards its meaning; one does not submit to a war or an occupation as he does to an earthquake: he must take sides for or against, and the foreign wills thereby become allied or hostile. It is this interdependence which explains why oppression is possible and why it is hateful.”

In other words, our interdependence on others interferes with any Stoical distinction between things that do and do not depend us; in our relations with others, all depend on us and we depend on all. Oppression by our fellow human beings is not some natural order of the world that we must assent to; the tyrant who rides into town declaring himself ruler is not akin to a flood or an earthquake, and thus need not be accepted as such.

Hegel also had a critique of Stoicism which gets even more at the heart of my concern. As noted so far, the Stoics praised an inward freedom, a retreat into the realm of thought and individual action. Herbert Marcuse, quoting Hegel, explains that,

“‘The essence of this [Stoic] consciousness is to be free, on the throne as well as in fetters, throughout all the dependence that attaches to individual existence…’ Man is thus free because he ‘persistently withdraws from the movement of existence, from activity as well as endurance, into the mere essentiality of thought.’”

As Marcuse explains, Hegel did not view Stoic freedom as real freedom, but rather as “the counterpart of ‘a time of universal fear and bondage.’” This analysis is important, and can help partially explain the re-emergence of stoicism. It is no coincidence, Hegel would argue, that as wealth, and thus power, have become concentrated into fewer and fewer hands, many have turned to a philosophy that encourages retreat from the external world.

Be indifferent to that which is indifferent; only your own thoughts and actions are within your control, therefore that is all you should concern yourself with; accept all that happens to you since it is not under your control. What philosophy conforms more perfectly to the feeling of impotence in modern democratic societies? What surprise, then, that it should become so popular.

We cannot entirely blame this failure entirely on the Stoics themselves, since all philosophical thought is situated within a certain time and place. And though it is a rather unfair criticism to accuse Stoicism of leading to political apathy (considering that many of the Stoics themselves, notably Marcus Aurelius and Seneca, lived very political lives), encouraging people to only focus on what is under their control—defining that as being simply our own thoughts and actions—can have an apathetic effect.

What is and is not in our control is blurrier today than it was for those living under the aristocracies, oligarchies, dictatorships, and slave societies of ancient Rome and Greece. This aside, as I mentioned above, some of the finest lessons and teachings undoubtedly can be found amongst the writings of Aurelius, Seneca, and Epictetus. I myself have been profoundly impacted by their words. But we are not without justification to pause and wonder: why now?

Perhaps the rise of stoicism will be a positive thing. But perhaps Hegel is right, that it is also indicative that we are living in “a time of universal fear and bondage.”

Having a Healthy Debate:

Three Tips from Marcus Aurelius

By

Alex Barrientos

As a Roman Emperor, Marcus Aurelius faced many instances of adversity, not only from the Germanic tribes to the north, but from his generals and members of the Roman Senate as well.

So, it is no surprise to find in his Meditations various reflections on how a rational person—the type of person the Stoic strives to be—must react to disagreements with others.

Though no one reading this is an emperor, we face disagreements everyday with our family, friends, and even strangers on social media; there’s no avoiding that.

What we can try to avoid, however, is having these disagreements in an unhealthy manner, and in a way that gets us nowhere.

One could spend a lifetime learning from the wisdom contained in the Meditations. Yet, I’ve taken up the much smaller task of providing you with just three pieces of advice from Marcus Aurelius that will, hopefully, allow you to begin having healthier, more productive debates.

1. Being open to change

If anyone can refute me—show me I’m making a mistake or looking at things from the wrong perspective—I’ll gladly change. It’s the truth I’m after, and the truth never harmed anyone. What harms us is to persist in self-deceit and ignorance: Book VI, 21.

The first thing is to begin any debate or argument with a devotion to truth. You must say to yourself, “It’s the truth I’m after.” With the truth as your aim, you’re prepared to see where someone might be wrong, where you might be wrong, or where you both might be wrong. 

And, of course, sometimes there may be no “Truth” with a capital “T” to the issue in question, in which case the intellectually honest thing to do is to simply say, “I don’t know.” Being able to say those three words is not something everyone has the humility and honesty to do, but it is required more often than not, given how nuanced the world is. 

The next thing is to keep in mind that “the truth never harmed anyone.” Now, you might say, doesn’t it often hurt to hear the truth? Yes, it definitely can hurt!

But Marcus is working within the Socratic framework which holds that the truth, however painful (in Plato’s analogy of the cave, the truth is portrayed as the sun, which pains the eyes of the man who has lived his life in the shadows of ignorance), is a good in itself worthy of striving after. 

Whatever seems “harmful” or painful about the truth, in reality is good, whereas the only true harm comes from persisting in “self-deceit and ignorance.” 

Once you’ve devoted yourself to the truth, and recognized that true harm only comes from persisting in one’s own ignorance, then you’ll be open to change, which is a prerequisite for any healthy debate. 

Be patient 

The only thing that isn’t worthless: to live this life out truthfully and rightly. And be patient with those who don’t: Book VI, 47.

So, great, now you’re open to change. But your interlocutor isn’t. What do you do? 

Well, it should not be a shock to learn that most people aren’t open to changing their minds. Reading any Facebook thread serves as a great example of how futile it can often be to try to change someone else’s mind, no matter how many facts or sources you provide that back up your own view. 

In fact, sometimes, simply showing someone that they’re wrong can make them more zealous about their beliefs! 

This doesn’t mean you should just give up. There is definitely some amount of discerning you must do when deciding who to get into an argument with. If they’re not devoted to the truth, you might be best off to leave it alone. After all, if you’re going to play chess with someone, there’s not much of a point in playing someone who has no interest in playing by the same rules as you. 

However, if you do choose to debate this person, you must do so with patience.

Sure, it might be frustrating. But weren’t you, at some point, resistant to change, ignorant of the facts regarding some issue or other, or in a situation where you felt your beliefs threatened and so clinged to them tighter? 

If you’ve devoted yourself to truth, then all that you need to be concerned with is your own disposition, living “life out truthfully and rightly.” Regarding those who haven’t done so, be patient. 

As Marcus writes later on, People exist for one another. You can instruct, or endure, them: Book VIII, 59.

Be kind, humble, and consistent

Remind yourself that your task is to be a good human being; remind yourself what nature demands of people. Then do it, without hesitation, and speak the truth as you see it. But with kindness. With humility. Without hypocrisy: Book VIII, 5.

“Be a good human being”: simple enough, right? Well, not quite. 

When someone you love is espousing views you detest, it can be easy to get angry, to lose your place, and to forget what nature demands of you. That is, it can be easy to forget your duties as a rational creature. 

Now, perhaps speaking “the truth as you see it” doesn’t sound too difficult. But it’s how you do it that’s important. 

You must speak it with kindness. No one wants to hear what you think if you say it with disdain or contempt. When you speak with kindness you separate yourself from those who speak with anger or hatred, and you let the truth of what you have to say stand out more. 

You must speak it with humility. People are more likely to be receptive to what you have to say when you speak your mind acknowledging that you could be wrong, that you are open to changing what you believe if good evidence or reasons are provided. 

You must speak it without hypocrisy. Be consistent, apply the same standard to yourself that you do to others. Don’t get angry with someone who is being stubborn about changing their mind, when you’ve been stubborn in the past yourself. If you would have wanted someone to be understanding and patient with you then, be understanding and patient with others now. 

Some concluding reflections

These are just some of the many bits of advice Marcus Aurelius has to offer us when it comes to dealing with our fellow human beings in a healthy and productive way.

Those familiar with the Meditations will know that what I have listed above is a mere fraction of what Marcus had to say.

Yet, I think you’ll agree that it is very helpful advice.

Whether it’s your family, a friend, or a stranger on social media, the words of Marcus Aurelius can guide you to having healthier and more productive debates.

You’re not always going to win everyone over. You’re not gonna change everyone’s mind. Nor should that be your goal, since sometimes it is your own mind in need of changing.

The point is to try to get closer to the truth, or to realize how far away from it you are.

At least, that was what the great minds of the classical world hoped to do.

END

The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius

Translated

By

George Long

BOOK ONE

From my grandfather Verus I learned good morals and the government

of my temper.

From the reputation and remembrance of my father, modesty and a manly

character.

From my mother, piety and beneficence, and abstinence, not only from

evil deeds, but even from evil thoughts; and further, simplicity in

my way of living, far removed from the habits of the rich.

From my great-grandfather, not to have frequented public schools,

and to have had good teachers at home, and to know that on such things

a man should spend liberally.

From my governor, to be neither of the green nor of the blue party

at the games in the Circus, nor a partizan either of the Parmularius

or the Scutarius at the gladiators' fights; from him too I learned

endurance of labour, and to want little, and to work with my own hands,

and not to meddle with other people's affairs, and not to be ready

to listen to slander.

From Diognetus, not to busy myself about trifling things, and not

to give credit to what was said by miracle-workers and jugglers about

incantations and the driving away of daemons and such things; and

not to breed quails for fighting, nor to give myself up passionately

to such things; and to endure freedom of speech; and to have become

intimate with philosophy; and to have been a hearer, first of Bacchius,

then of Tandasis and Marcianus; and to have written dialogues in my

youth; and to have desired a plank bed and skin, and whatever else

of the kind belongs to the Grecian discipline.

From Rusticus I received the impression that my character required

improvement and discipline; and from him I learned not to be led astray

to sophistic emulation, nor to writing on speculative matters, nor

to delivering little hortatory orations, nor to showing myself off

as a man who practises much discipline, or does benevolent acts in

order to make a display; and to abstain from rhetoric, and poetry,

and fine writing; and not to walk about in the house in my outdoor

dress, nor to do other things of the kind; and to write my letters

with simplicity, like the letter which Rusticus wrote from Sinuessa

to my mother; and with respect to those who have offended me by words,

or done me wrong, to be easily disposed to be pacified and reconciled,

as soon as they have shown a readiness to be reconciled; and to read

carefully, and not to be satisfied with a superficial understanding

of a book; nor hastily to give my assent to those who talk overmuch;

and I am indebted to him for being acquainted with the discourses

of Epictetus, which he communicated to me out of his own collection.

From Apollonius I learned freedom of will and undeviating steadiness

of purpose; and to look to nothing else, not even for a moment, except

to reason; and to be always the same, in sharp pains, on the occasion

of the loss of a child, and in long illness; and to see clearly in

a living example that the same man can be both most resolute and yielding,

and not peevish in giving his instruction; and to have had before

my eyes a man who clearly considered his experience and his skill

in expounding philosophical principles as the smallest of his merits;

and from him I learned how to receive from friends what are esteemed

favours, without being either humbled by them or letting them pass

unnoticed.

From Sextus, a benevolent disposition, and the example of a family

governed in a fatherly manner, and the idea of living conformably

to nature; and gravity without affectation, and to look carefully

after the interests of friends, and to tolerate ignorant persons,

and those who form opinions without consideration: he had the power

of readily accommodating himself to all, so that intercourse with

him was more agreeable than any flattery; and at the same time he

was most highly venerated by those who associated with him: and he

had the faculty both of discovering and ordering, in an intelligent

and methodical way, the principles necessary for life; and he never

showed anger or any other passion, but was entirely free from passion,

and also most affectionate; and he could express approbation without

noisy display, and he possessed much knowledge without ostentation.

From Alexander the grammarian, to refrain from fault-finding, and

not in a reproachful way to chide those who uttered any barbarous

or solecistic or strange-sounding expression; but dexterously to introduce

the very expression which ought to have been used, and in the way

of answer or giving confirmation, or joining in an inquiry about the

thing itself, not about the word, or by some other fit suggestion.

From Fronto I learned to observe what envy, and duplicity, and hypocrisy

are in a tyrant, and that generally those among us who are called

Patricians are rather deficient in paternal affection.

From Alexander the Platonic, not frequently nor without necessity

to say to any one, or to write in a letter, that I have no leisure;

nor continually to excuse the neglect of duties required by our relation

to those with whom we live, by alleging urgent occupations.

From Catulus, not to be indifferent when a friend finds fault, even

if he should find fault without reason, but to try to restore him

to his usual disposition; and to be ready to speak well of teachers,

as it is reported of Domitius and Athenodotus; and to love my children

truly.

From my brother Severus, to love my kin, and to love truth, and to

love justice; and through him I learned to know Thrasea, Helvidius,

Cato, Dion, Brutus; and from him I received the idea of a polity in

which there is the same law for all, a polity administered with regard

to equal rights and equal freedom of speech, and the idea of a kingly

government which respects most of all the freedom of the governed;

I learned from him also consistency and undeviating steadiness in

my regard for philosophy; and a disposition to do good, and to give

to others readily, and to cherish good hopes, and to believe that

I am loved by my friends; and in him I observed no concealment of

his opinions with respect to those whom he condemned, and that his

friends had no need to conjecture what he wished or did not wish,

but it was quite plain.

From Maximus I learned self-government, and not to be led aside by

anything; and cheerfulness in all circumstances, as well as in illness;

and a just admixture in the moral character of sweetness and dignity,

and to do what was set before me without complaining. I observed that

everybody believed that he thought as he spoke, and that in all that

he did he never had any bad intention; and he never showed amazement

and surprise, and was never in a hurry, and never put off doing a

thing, nor was perplexed nor dejected, nor did he ever laugh to disguise

his vexation, nor, on the other hand, was he ever passionate or suspicious.

He was accustomed to do acts of beneficence, and was ready to forgive,

and was free from all falsehood; and he presented the appearance of

a man who could not be diverted from right rather than of a man who

had been improved. I observed, too, that no man could ever think that

he was despised by Maximus, or ever venture to think himself a better

man. He had also the art of being humorous in an agreeable way.

In my father I observed mildness of temper, and unchangeable resolution

in the things which he had determined after due deliberation; and

no vainglory in those things which men call honours; and a love of

labour and perseverance; and a readiness to listen to those who had

anything to propose for the common weal; and undeviating firmness

in giving to every man according to his deserts; and a knowledge derived

from experience of the occasions for vigorous action and for remission.

And I observed that he had overcome all passion for boys; and he considered

himself no more than any other citizen; and he released his friends

from all obligation to sup with him or to attend him of necessity

when he went abroad, and those who had failed to accompany him, by

reason of any urgent circumstances, always found him the same. I observed

too his habit of careful inquiry in all matters of deliberation, and

his persistency, and that he never stopped his investigation through

being satisfied with appearances which first present themselves; and

that his disposition was to keep his friends, and not to be soon tired

of them, nor yet to be extravagant in his affection; and to be satisfied

on all occasions, and cheerful; and to foresee things a long way off,

and to provide for the smallest without display; and to check immediately

popular applause and all flattery; and to be ever watchful over the

things which were necessary for the administration of the empire,

and to be a good manager of the expenditure, and patiently to endure

the blame which he got for such conduct; and he was neither superstitious

with respect to the gods, nor did he court men by gifts or by trying

to please them, or by flattering the populace; but he showed sobriety

in all things and firmness, and never any mean thoughts or action,

nor love of novelty. And the things which conduce in any way to the

commodity of life, and of which fortune gives an abundant supply,

he used without arrogance and without excusing himself; so that when

he had them, he enjoyed them without affectation, and when he had

them not, he did not want them. No one could ever say of him that

he was either a sophist or a home-bred flippant slave or a pedant;

but every one acknowledged him to be a man ripe, perfect, above flattery,

able to manage his own and other men's affairs. Besides this, he honoured

those who were true philosophers, and he did not reproach those who

pretended to be philosophers, nor yet was he easily led by them. He

was also easy in conversation, and he made himself agreeable without

any offensive affectation. He took a reasonable care of his body's

health, not as one who was greatly attached to life, nor out of regard

to personal appearance, nor yet in a careless way, but so that, through

his own attention, he very seldom stood in need of the physician's

art or of medicine or external applications. He was most ready to

give way without envy to those who possessed any particular faculty,

such as that of eloquence or knowledge of the law or of morals, or

of anything else; and he gave them his help, that each might enjoy

reputation according to his deserts; and he always acted conformably

to the institutions of his country, without showing any affectation

of doing so. Further, he was not fond of change nor unsteady, but

he loved to stay in the same places, and to employ himself about the

same things; and after his paroxysms of headache he came immediately

fresh and vigorous to his usual occupations. His secrets were not

but very few and very rare, and these only about public matters; and

he showed prudence and economy in the exhibition of the public spectacles

and the construction of public buildings, his donations to the people,

and in such things, for he was a man who looked to what ought to be

done, not to the reputation which is got by a man's acts. He did not

take the bath at unseasonable hours; he was not fond of building houses,

nor curious about what he ate, nor about the texture and colour of

his clothes, nor about the beauty of his slaves. His dress came from

Lorium, his villa on the coast, and from Lanuvium generally. We know

how he behaved to the toll-collector at Tusculum who asked his pardon;

and such was all his behaviour. There was in him nothing harsh, nor

implacable, nor violent, nor, as one may say, anything carried to

the sweating point; but he examined all things severally, as if he

had abundance of time, and without confusion, in an orderly way, vigorously

and consistently. And that might be applied to him which is recorded

of Socrates, that he was able both to abstain from, and to enjoy,

those things which many are too weak to abstain from, and cannot enjoy

without excess. But to be strong enough both to bear the one and to

be sober in the other is the mark of a man who has a perfect and invincible

soul, such as he showed in the illness of Maximus.

To the gods I am indebted for having good grandfathers, good parents,

a good sister, good teachers, good associates, good kinsmen and friends,

nearly everything good. Further, I owe it to the gods that I was not

hurried into any offence against any of them, though I had a disposition

which, if opportunity had offered, might have led me to do something

of this kind; but, through their favour, there never was such a concurrence

of circumstances as put me to the trial. Further, I am thankful to

the gods that I was not longer brought up with my grandfather's concubine,

and that I preserved the flower of my youth, and that I did not make

proof of my virility before the proper season, but even deferred the

time; that I was subjected to a ruler and a father who was able to

take away all pride from me, and to bring me to the knowledge that

it is possible for a man to live in a palace without wanting either

guards or embroidered dresses, or torches and statues, and such-like

show; but that it is in such a man's power to bring himself very near

to the fashion of a private person, without being for this reason

either meaner in thought, or more remiss in action, with respect to

the things which must be done for the public interest in a manner

that befits a ruler. I thank the gods for giving me such a brother,

who was able by his moral character to rouse me to vigilance over

myself, and who, at the same time, pleased me by his respect and affection;

that my children have not been stupid nor deformed in body; that I

did not make more proficiency in rhetoric, poetry, and the other studies,

in which I should perhaps have been completely engaged, if I had seen

that I was making progress in them; that I made haste to place those

who brought me up in the station of honour, which they seemed to desire,

without putting them off with hope of my doing it some time after,

because they were then still young; that I knew Apollonius, Rusticus,

Maximus; that I received clear and frequent impressions about living

according to nature, and what kind of a life that is, so that, so

far as depended on the gods, and their gifts, and help, and inspirations,

nothing hindered me from forthwith living according to nature, though

I still fall short of it through my own fault, and through not observing

the admonitions of the gods, and, I may almost say, their direct instructions;

that my body has held out so long in such a kind of life; that I never

touched either Benedicta or Theodotus, and that, after having fallen

into amatory passions, I was cured; and, though I was often out of

humour with Rusticus, I never did anything of which I had occasion

to repent; that, though it was my mother's fate to die young, she

spent the last years of her life with me; that, whenever I wished

to help any man in his need, or on any other occasion, I was never

told that I had not the means of doing it; and that to myself the

same necessity never happened, to receive anything from another; that

I have such a wife, so obedient, and so affectionate, and so simple;

that I had abundance of good masters for my children; and that remedies

have been shown to me by dreams, both others, and against bloodspitting

and giddiness...; and that, when I had an inclination to philosophy,

I did not fall into the hands of any sophist, and that I did not waste

my time on writers of histories, or in the resolution of syllogisms,

or occupy myself about the investigation of appearances in the heavens;

for all these things require the help of the gods and fortune.

Among the Quadi at the Granua.

----------------------------------------------------------------------

BOOK TWO

Begin the morning by saying to thyself, I shall meet with the busy-body,

the ungrateful, arrogant, deceitful, envious, unsocial. All these

things happen to them by reason of their ignorance of what is good

and evil. But I who have seen the nature of the good that it is beautiful,

and of the bad that it is ugly, and the nature of him who does wrong,

that it is akin to me, not only of the same blood or seed, but that

it participates in the same intelligence and the same portion of the

divinity, I can neither be injured by any of them, for no one can

fix on me what is ugly, nor can I be angry with my kinsman, nor hate

him, For we are made for co-operation, like feet, like hands, like

eyelids, like the rows of the upper and lower teeth. To act against

one another then is contrary to nature; and it is acting against one

another to be vexed and to turn away.

Whatever this is that I am, it is a little flesh and breath, and the

ruling part. Throw away thy books; no longer distract thyself: it

is not allowed; but as if thou wast now dying, despise the flesh;

it is blood and bones and a network, a contexture of nerves, veins,

and arteries. See the breath also, what kind of a thing it is, air,

and not always the same, but every moment sent out and again sucked

in. The third then is the ruling part: consider thus: Thou art an

old man; no longer let this be a slave, no longer be pulled by the

strings like a puppet to unsocial movements, no longer either be dissatisfied

with thy present lot, or shrink from the future.

All that is from the gods is full of Providence. That which is from

fortune is not separated from nature or without an interweaving and

involution with the things which are ordered by Providence. From thence

all things flow; and there is besides necessity, and that which is

for the advantage of the whole universe, of which thou art a part.

But that is good for every part of nature which the nature of the

whole brings, and what serves to maintain this nature. Now the universe

is preserved, as by the changes of the elements so by the changes

of things compounded of the elements. Let these principles be enough

for thee, let them always be fixed opinions. But cast away the thirst

after books, that thou mayest not die murmuring, but cheerfully, truly,

and from thy heart thankful to the gods.

Remember how long thou hast been putting off these things, and how

often thou hast received an opportunity from the gods, and yet dost

not use it. Thou must now at last perceive of what universe thou art

a part, and of what administrator of the universe thy existence is

an efflux, and that a limit of time is fixed for thee, which if thou

dost not use for clearing away the clouds from thy mind, it will go

and thou wilt go, and it will never return.

Every moment think steadily as a Roman and a man to do what thou hast

in hand with perfect and simple dignity, and feeling of affection,

and freedom, and justice; and to give thyself relief from all other

thoughts. And thou wilt give thyself relief, if thou doest every act

of thy life as if it were the last, laying aside all carelessness

and passionate aversion from the commands of reason, and all hypocrisy,

and self-love, and discontent with the portion which has been given

to thee. Thou seest how few the things are, the which if a man lays

hold of, he is able to live a life which flows in quiet, and is like

the existence of the gods; for the gods on their part will require

nothing more from him who observes these things.

Do wrong to thyself, do wrong to thyself, my soul; but thou wilt no

longer have the opportunity of honouring thyself. Every man's life

is sufficient. But thine is nearly finished, though thy soul reverences

not itself but places thy felicity in the souls of others.

Do the things external which fall upon thee distract thee? Give thyself

time to learn something new and good, and cease to be whirled around.

But then thou must also avoid being carried about the other way. For

those too are triflers who have wearied themselves in life by their

activity, and yet have no object to which to direct every movement,

and, in a word, all their thoughts.

Through not observing what is in the mind of another a man has seldom

been seen to be unhappy; but those who do not observe the movements

of their own minds must of necessity be unhappy.

This thou must always bear in mind, what is the nature of the whole,

and what is my nature, and how this is related to that, and what kind

of a part it is of what kind of a whole; and that there is no one

who hinders thee from always doing and saying the things which are

according to the nature of which thou art a part.

Theophrastus, in his comparison of bad acts- such a comparison as

one would make in accordance with the common notions of mankind- says,

like a true philosopher, that the offences which are committed through

desire are more blameable than those which are committed through anger.

For he who is excited by anger seems to turn away from reason with

a certain pain and unconscious contraction; but he who offends through

desire, being overpowered by pleasure, seems to be in a manner more

intemperate and more womanish in his offences. Rightly then, and in

a way worthy of philosophy, he said that the offence which is committed

with pleasure is more blameable than that which is committed with

pain; and on the whole the one is more like a person who has been

first wronged and through pain is compelled to be angry; but the other

is moved by his own impulse to do wrong, being carried towards doing

something by desire.

Since it is possible that thou mayest depart from life this very moment,

regulate every act and thought accordingly. But to go away from among

men, if there are gods, is not a thing to be afraid of, for the gods

will not involve thee in evil; but if indeed they do not exist, or

if they have no concern about human affairs, what is it to me to live

in a universe devoid of gods or devoid of Providence? But in truth

they do exist, and they do care for human things, and they have put

all the means in man's power to enable him not to fall into real evils.

And as to the rest, if there was anything evil, they would have provided

for this also, that it should be altogether in a man's power not to

fall into it. Now that which does not make a man worse, how can it

make a man's life worse? But neither through ignorance, nor having

the knowledge, but not the power to guard against or correct these

things, is it possible that the nature of the universe has overlooked

them; nor is it possible that it has made so great a mistake, either

through want of power or want of skill, that good and evil should

happen indiscriminately to the good and the bad. But death certainly,

and life, honour and dishonour, pain and pleasure, all these things

equally happen to good men and bad, being things which make us neither

better nor worse. Therefore they are neither good nor evil.

How quickly all things disappear, in the universe the bodies themselves,

but in time the remembrance of them; what is the nature of all sensible

things, and particularly those which attract with the bait of pleasure

or terrify by pain, or are noised abroad by vapoury fame; how worthless,

and contemptible, and sordid, and perishable, and dead they are- all

this it is the part of the intellectual faculty to observe. To observe

too who these are whose opinions and voices give reputation; what

death is, and the fact that, if a man looks at it in itself, and by

the abstractive power of reflection resolves into their parts all

the things which present themselves to the imagination in it, he will

then consider it to be nothing else than an operation of nature; and

if any one is afraid of an operation of nature, he is a child. This,

however, is not only an operation of nature, but it is also a thing

which conduces to the purposes of nature. To observe too how man comes

near to the deity, and by what part of him, and when this part of

man is so disposed.

Nothing is more wretched than a man who traverses everything in a

round, and pries into the things beneath the earth, as the poet says,

and seeks by conjecture what is in the minds of his neighbours, without

perceiving that it is sufficient to attend to the daemon within him,

and to reverence it sincerely. And reverence of the daemon consists

in keeping it pure from passion and thoughtlessness, and dissatisfaction

with what comes from gods and men. For the things from the gods merit

veneration for their excellence; and the things from men should be

dear to us by reason of kinship; and sometimes even, in a manner,

they move our pity by reason of men's ignorance of good and bad; this

defect being not less than that which deprives us of the power of

distinguishing things that are white and black.

Though thou shouldst be going to live three thousand years, and as

many times ten thousand years, still remember that no man loses any

other life than this which he now lives, nor lives any other than

this which he now loses. The longest and shortest are thus brought

to the same. For the present is the same to all, though that which

perishes is not the same; and so that which is lost appears to be

a mere moment. For a man cannot lose either the past or the future:

for what a man has not, how can any one take this from him? These

two things then thou must bear in mind; the one, that all things from

eternity are of like forms and come round in a circle, and that it

makes no difference whether a man shall see the same things during

a hundred years or two hundred, or an infinite time; and the second,

that the longest liver and he who will die soonest lose just the same.

For the present is the only thing of which a man can be deprived,

if it is true that this is the only thing which he has, and that a

man cannot lose a thing if he has it not.

Remember that all is opinion. For what was said by the Cynic Monimus

is manifest: and manifest too is the use of what was said, if a man

receives what may be got out of it as far as it is true.

The soul of man does violence to itself, first of all, when it becomes

an abscess and, as it were, a tumour on the universe, so far as it

can. For to be vexed at anything which happens is a separation of

ourselves from nature, in some part of which the natures of all other

things are contained. In the next place, the soul does violence to

itself when it turns away from any man, or even moves towards him

with the intention of injuring, such as are the souls of those who

are angry. In the third place, the soul does violence to itself when

it is overpowered by pleasure or by pain. Fourthly, when it plays

a part, and does or says anything insincerely and untruly. Fifthly,

when it allows any act of its own and any movement to be without an

aim, and does anything thoughtlessly and without considering what

it is, it being right that even the smallest things be done with reference

to an end; and the end of rational animals is to follow the reason

and the law of the most ancient city and polity.

Of human life the time is a point, and the substance is in a flux,

and the perception dull, and the composition of the whole body subject

to putrefaction, and the soul a whirl, and fortune hard to divine,

and fame a thing devoid of judgement. And, to say all in a word, everything

which belongs to the body is a stream, and what belongs to the soul

is a dream and vapour, and life is a warfare and a stranger's sojourn,

and after-fame is oblivion. What then is that which is able to conduct

a man? One thing and only one, philosophy. But this consists in keeping

the daemon within a man free from violence and unharmed, superior

to pains and pleasures, doing nothing without purpose, nor yet falsely

and with hypocrisy, not feeling the need of another man's doing or

not doing anything; and besides, accepting all that happens, and all

that is allotted, as coming from thence, wherever it is, from whence

he himself came; and, finally, waiting for death with a cheerful mind,

as being nothing else than a dissolution of the elements of which

every living being is compounded. But if there is no harm to the elements

themselves in each continually changing into another, why should a

man have any apprehension about the change and dissolution of all

the elements? For it is according to nature, and nothing is evil which

is according to nature.

This in Carnuntum.

----------------------------------------------------------------------

BOOK THREE

We ought to consider not only that our life is daily wasting away

and a smaller part of it is left, but another thing also must be taken

into the account, that if a man should live longer, it is quite uncertain

whether the understanding will still continue sufficient for the comprehension

of things, and retain the power of contemplation which strives to

acquire the knowledge of the divine and the human. For if he shall

begin to fall into dotage, perspiration and nutrition and imagination

and appetite, and whatever else there is of the kind, will not fail;

but the power of making use of ourselves, and filling up the measure

of our duty, and clearly separating all appearances, and considering

whether a man should now depart from life, and whatever else of the

kind absolutely requires a disciplined reason, all this is already

extinguished. We must make haste then, not only because we are daily

nearer to death, but also because the conception of things and the

understanding of them cease first.

We ought to observe also that even the things which follow after the

things which are produced according to nature contain something pleasing

and attractive. For instance, when bread is baked some parts are split

at the surface, and these parts which thus open, and have a certain

fashion contrary to the purpose of the baker's art, are beautiful

in a manner, and in a peculiar way excite a desire for eating. And

again, figs, when they are quite ripe, gape open; and in the ripe

olives the very circumstance of their being near to rottenness adds

a peculiar beauty to the fruit. And the ears of corn bending down,

and the lion's eyebrows, and the foam which flows from the mouth of

wild boars, and many other things- though they are far from being

beautiful, if a man should examine them severally- still, because

they are consequent upon the things which are formed by nature, help

to adorn them, and they please the mind; so that if a man should have

a feeling and deeper insight with respect to the things which are

produced in the universe, there is hardly one of those which follow

by way of consequence which will not seem to him to be in a manner

disposed so as to give pleasure. And so he will see even the real

gaping jaws of wild beasts with no less pleasure than those which

painters and sculptors show by imitation; and in an old woman and

an old man he will be able to see a certain maturity and comeliness;

and the attractive loveliness of young persons he will be able to

look on with chaste eyes; and many such things will present themselves,

not pleasing to every man, but to him only who has become truly familiar

with nature and her works.

Hippocrates after curing many diseases himself fell sick and died.

The Chaldaei foretold the deaths of many, and then fate caught them

too. Alexander, and Pompeius, and Caius Caesar, after so often completely

destroying whole cities, and in battle cutting to pieces many ten

thousands of cavalry and infantry, themselves too at last departed

from life. Heraclitus, after so many speculations on the conflagration

of the universe, was filled with water internally and died smeared

all over with mud. And lice destroyed Democritus; and other lice killed

Socrates. What means all this? Thou hast embarked, thou hast made

the voyage, thou art come to shore; get out. If indeed to another

life, there is no want of gods, not even there. But if to a state

without sensation, thou wilt cease to be held by pains and pleasures,

and to be a slave to the vessel, which is as much inferior as that

which serves it is superior: for the one is intelligence and deity;

the other is earth and corruption.

Do not waste the remainder of thy life in thoughts about others, when

thou dost not refer thy thoughts to some object of common utility.

For thou losest the opportunity of doing something else when thou

hast such thoughts as these, What is such a person doing, and why,

and what is he saying, and what is he thinking of, and what is he

contriving, and whatever else of the kind makes us wander away from

the observation of our own ruling power. We ought then to check in

the series of our thoughts everything that is without a purpose and

useless, but most of all the over-curious feeling and the malignant;

and a man should use himself to think of those things only about which

if one should suddenly ask, What hast thou now in thy thoughts? With

perfect openness thou mightest, immediately answer, This or That;

so that from thy words it should be plain that everything in thee

is simple and benevolent, and such as befits a social animal, and

one that cares not for thoughts about pleasure or sensual enjoyments

at all, nor has any rivalry or envy and suspicion, or anything else

for which thou wouldst blush if thou shouldst say that thou hadst

it in thy mind. For the man who is such and no longer delays being

among the number of the best, is like a priest and minister of the

gods, using too the deity which is planted within him, which makes

the man uncontaminated by pleasure, unharmed by any pain, untouched

by any insult, feeling no wrong, a fighter in the noblest fight, one

who cannot be overpowered by any passion, dyed deep with justice,

accepting with all his soul everything which happens and is assigned

to him as his portion; and not often, nor yet without great necessity

and for the general interest, imagining what another says, or does,

or thinks. For it is only what belongs to himself that he makes the

matter for his activity; and he constantly thinks of that which is

allotted to himself out of the sum total of things, and he makes his

own acts fair, and he is persuaded that his own portion is good. For

the lot which is assigned to each man is carried along with him and

carries him along with it. And he remembers also that every rational

animal is his kinsman, and that to care for all men is according to

man's nature; and a man should hold on to the opinion not of all,

but of those only who confessedly live according to nature. But as

to those who live not so, he always bears in mind what kind of men

they are both at home and from home, both by night and by day, and

what they are, and with what men they live an impure life. Accordingly,

he does not value at all the praise which comes from such men, since

they are not even satisfied with themselves.

Labour not unwillingly, nor without regard to the common interest,

nor without due consideration, nor with distraction; nor let studied

ornament set off thy thoughts, and be not either a man of many words,

or busy about too many things. And further, let the deity which is

in thee be the guardian of a living being, manly and of ripe age,

and engaged in matter political, and a Roman, and a ruler, who has

taken his post like a man waiting for the signal which summons him

from life, and ready to go, having need neither of oath nor of any

man's testimony. Be cheerful also, and seek not external help nor

the tranquility which others give. A man then must stand erect, not

be kept erect by others.

If thou findest in human life anything better than justice, truth,

temperance, fortitude, and, in a word, anything better than thy own

mind's self-satisfaction in the things which it enables thee to do

according to right reason, and in the condition that is assigned to

thee without thy own choice; if, I say, thou seest anything better

than this, turn to it with all thy soul, and enjoy that which thou

hast found to be the best. But if nothing appears to be better than

the deity which is planted in thee, which has subjected to itself

all thy appetites, and carefully examines all the impressions, and,

as Socrates said, has detached itself from the persuasions of sense,

and has submitted itself to the gods, and cares for mankind; if thou

findest everything else smaller and of less value than this, give

place to nothing else, for if thou dost once diverge and incline to

it, thou wilt no longer without distraction be able to give the preference

to that good thing which is thy proper possession and thy own; for

it is not right that anything of any other kind, such as praise from

the many, or power, or enjoyment of pleasure, should come into competition

with that which is rationally and politically or practically good.

All these things, even though they may seem to adapt themselves to

the better things in a small degree, obtain the superiority all at

once, and carry us away. But do thou, I say, simply and freely choose

the better, and hold to it.- But that which is useful is the better.-

Well then, if it is useful to thee as a rational being, keep to it;

but if it is only useful to thee as an animal, say so, and maintain

thy judgement without arrogance: only take care that thou makest the

inquiry by a sure method.

Never value anything as profitable to thyself which shall compel thee

to break thy promise, to lose thy self-respect, to hate any man, to

suspect, to curse, to act the hypocrite, to desire anything which

needs walls and curtains: for he who has preferred to everything intelligence

and daemon and the worship of its excellence, acts no tragic part,

does not groan, will not need either solitude or much company; and,

what is chief of all, he will live without either pursuing or flying

from death; but whether for a longer or a shorter time he shall have

the soul inclosed in the body, he cares not at all: for even if he

must depart immediately, he will go as readily as if he were going

to do anything else which can be done with decency and order; taking

care of this only all through life, that his thoughts turn not away

from anything which belongs to an intelligent animal and a member

of a civil community.

In the mind of one who is chastened and purified thou wilt find no

corrupt matter, nor impurity, nor any sore skinned over. Nor is his

life incomplete when fate overtakes him, as one may say of an actor

who leaves the stage before ending and finishing the play. Besides,

there is in him nothing servile, nor affected, nor too closely bound

to other things, nor yet detached from other things, nothing worthy

of blame, nothing which seeks a hiding-place.

Reverence the faculty which produces opinion. On this faculty it entirely

depends whether there shall exist in thy ruling part any opinion inconsistent

with nature and the constitution of the rational animal. And this

faculty promises freedom from hasty judgement, and friendship towards

men, and obedience to the gods.

Throwing away then all things, hold to these only which are few; and

besides bear in mind that every man lives only this present time,

which is an indivisible point, and that all the rest of his life is

either past or it is uncertain. Short then is the time which every

man lives, and small the nook of the earth where he lives; and short

too the longest posthumous fame, and even this only continued by a

succession of poor human beings, who will very soon die, and who know

not even themselves, much less him who died long ago.

To the aids which have been mentioned let this one still be added:-

Make for thyself a definition or description of the thing which is

presented to thee, so as to see distinctly what kind of a thing it

is in its substance, in its nudity, in its complete entirety, and

tell thyself its proper name, and the names of the things of which

it has been compounded, and into which it will be resolved. For nothing

is so productive of elevation of mind as to be able to examine methodically

and truly every object which is presented to thee in life, and always

to look at things so as to see at the same time what kind of universe

this is, and what kind of use everything performs in it, and what

value everything has with reference to the whole, and what with reference

to man, who is a citizen of the highest city, of which all other cities

are like families; what each thing is, and of what it is composed,

and how long it is the nature of this thing to endure which now makes

an impression on me, and what virtue I have need of with respect to

it, such as gentleness, manliness, truth, fidelity, simplicity, contentment,

and the rest. Wherefore, on every occasion a man should say: this

comes from God; and this is according to the apportionment and spinning

of the thread of destiny, and such-like coincidence and chance; and

this is from one of the same stock, and a kinsman and partner, one

who knows not however what is according to his nature. But I know;

for this reason I behave towards him according to the natural law

of fellowship with benevolence and justice. At the same time however

in things indifferent I attempt to ascertain the value of each.

If thou workest at that which is before thee, following right reason

seriously, vigorously, calmly, without allowing anything else to distract

thee, but keeping thy divine part pure, as if thou shouldst be bound

to give it back immediately; if thou holdest to this, expecting nothing,

fearing nothing, but satisfied with thy present activity according

to nature, and with heroic truth in every word and sound which thou

utterest, thou wilt live happy. And there is no man who is able to

prevent this.

As physicians have always their instruments and knives ready for cases

which suddenly require their skill, so do thou have principles ready

for the understanding of things divine and human, and for doing everything,

even the smallest, with a recollection of the bond which unites the

divine and human to one another. For neither wilt thou do anything

well which pertains to man without at the same time having a reference

to things divine; nor the contrary.

No longer wander at hazard; for neither wilt thou read thy own memoirs,

nor the acts of the ancient Romans and Hellenes, and the selections

from books which thou wast reserving for thy old age. Hasten then

to the end which thou hast before thee, and throwing away idle hopes,

come to thy own aid, if thou carest at all for thyself, while it is

in thy power.

They know not how many things are signified by the words stealing,

sowing, buying, keeping quiet, seeing what ought to be done; for this

is not effected by the eyes, but by another kind of vision.

Body, soul, intelligence: to the body belong sensations, to the soul

appetites, to the intelligence principles. To receive the impressions

of forms by means of appearances belongs even to animals; to be pulled

by the strings of desire belongs both to wild beasts and to men who

have made themselves into women, and to a Phalaris and a Nero: and

to have the intelligence that guides to the things which appear suitable

belongs also to those who do not believe in the gods, and who betray

their country, and do their impure deeds when they have shut the doors.

If then everything else is common to all that I have mentioned, there

remains that which is peculiar to the good man, to be pleased and

content with what happens, and with the thread which is spun for him;

and not to defile the divinity which is planted in his breast, nor

disturb it by a crowd of images, but to preserve it tranquil, following

it obediently as a god, neither saying anything contrary to the truth,

nor doing anything contrary to justice. And if all men refuse to believe

that he lives a simple, modest, and contented life, he is neither

angry with any of them, nor does he deviate from the way which leads

to the end of life, to which a man ought to come pure, tranquil, ready

to depart, and without any compulsion perfectly reconciled to his

lot.

----------------------------------------------------------------------

BOOK FOUR

That which rules within, when it is according to nature, is so affected

with respect to the events which happen, that it always easily adapts

itself to that which is and is presented to it. For it requires no

definite material, but it moves towards its purpose, under certain

conditions however; and it makes a material for itself out of that

which opposes it, as fire lays hold of what falls into it, by which

a small light would have been extinguished: but when the fire is strong,

it soon appropriates to itself the matter which is heaped on it, and

consumes it, and rises higher by means of this very material.

Let no act be done without a purpose, nor otherwise than according

to the perfect principles of art.

Men seek retreats for themselves, houses in the country, sea-shores,

and mountains; and thou too art wont to desire such things very much.

But this is altogether a mark of the most common sort of men, for

it is in thy power whenever thou shalt choose to retire into thyself.

For nowhere either with more quiet or more freedom from trouble does

a man retire than into his own soul, particularly when he has within

him such thoughts that by looking into them he is immediately in perfect

tranquility; and I affirm that tranquility is nothing else than the

good ordering of the mind. Constantly then give to thyself this retreat,

and renew thyself; and let thy principles be brief and fundamental,

which, as soon as thou shalt recur to them, will be sufficient to

cleanse the soul completely, and to send thee back free from all discontent

with the things to which thou returnest. For with what art thou discontented?

With the badness of men? Recall to thy mind this conclusion, that

rational animals exist for one another, and that to endure is a part

of justice, and that men do wrong involuntarily; and consider how

many already, after mutual enmity, suspicion, hatred, and fighting,

have been stretched dead, reduced to ashes; and be quiet at last.-

But perhaps thou art dissatisfied with that which is assigned to thee

out of the universe.- Recall to thy recollection this alternative;

either there is providence or atoms, fortuitous concurrence of things;

or remember the arguments by which it has been proved that the world

is a kind of political community, and be quiet at last.- But perhaps

corporeal things will still fasten upon thee.- Consider then further

that the mind mingles not with the breath, whether moving gently or

violently, when it has once drawn itself apart and discovered its

own power, and think also of all that thou hast heard and assented

to about pain and pleasure, and be quiet at last.- But perhaps the

desire of the thing called fame will torment thee.- See how soon everything

is forgotten, and look at the chaos of infinite time on each side

of the present, and the emptiness of applause, and the changeableness

and want of judgement in those who pretend to give praise, and the

narrowness of the space within which it is circumscribed, and be quiet

at last. For the whole earth is a point, and how small a nook in it

is this thy dwelling, and how few are there in it, and what kind of

people are they who will praise thee.

This then remains: Remember to retire into this little territory of

thy own, and above all do not distract or strain thyself, but be free,

and look at things as a man, as a human being, as a citizen, as a

mortal. But among the things readiest to thy hand to which thou shalt

turn, let there be these, which are two. One is that things do not

touch the soul, for they are external and remain immovable; but our

perturbations come only from the opinion which is within. The other

is that all these things, which thou seest, change immediately and

will no longer be; and constantly bear in mind how many of these changes

thou hast already witnessed. The universe is transformation: life

is opinion.

If our intellectual part is common, the reason also, in respect of

which we are rational beings, is common: if this is so, common also

is the reason which commands us what to do, and what not to do; if

this is so, there is a common law also; if this is so, we are fellow-citizens;

if this is so, we are members of some political community; if this

is so, the world is in a manner a state. For of what other common

political community will any one say that the whole human race are

members? And from thence, from this common political community comes

also our very intellectual faculty and reasoning faculty and our capacity

for law; or whence do they come? For as my earthly part is a portion

given to me from certain earth, and that which is watery from another

element, and that which is hot and fiery from some peculiar source

(for nothing comes out of that which is nothing, as nothing also returns

to non-existence), so also the intellectual part comes from some source.

Death is such as generation is, a mystery of nature; a composition

out of the same elements, and a decomposition into the same; and altogether

not a thing of which any man should be ashamed, for it is not contrary

to the nature of a reasonable animal, and not contrary to the reason

of our constitution.

It is natural that these things should be done by such persons, it

is a matter of necessity; and if a man will not have it so, he will

not allow the fig-tree to have juice. But by all means bear this in

mind, that within a very short time both thou and he will be dead;

and soon not even your names will be left behind.

Take away thy opinion, and then there is taken away the complaint,

"I have been harmed." Take away the complaint, "I have been harmed,"

and the harm is taken away.

That which does not make a man worse than he was, also does not make

his life worse, nor does it harm him either from without or from within.

The nature of that which is universally useful has been compelled

to do this.

Consider that everything which happens, happens justly, and if thou

observest carefully, thou wilt find it to be so. I do not say only

with respect to the continuity of the series of things, but with respect

to what is just, and as if it were done by one who assigns to each

thing its value. Observe then as thou hast begun; and whatever thou

doest, do it in conjunction with this, the being good, and in the

sense in which a man is properly understood to be good. Keep to this

in every action.

Do not have such an opinion of things as he has who does thee wrong,

or such as he wishes thee to have, but look at them as they are in

truth.

A man should always have these two rules in readiness; the one, to

do only whatever the reason of the ruling and legislating faculty

may suggest for the use of men; the other, to change thy opinion,

if there is any one at hand who sets thee right and moves thee from

any opinion. But this change of opinion must proceed only from a certain

persuasion, as of what is just or of common advantage, and the like,

not because it appears pleasant or brings reputation.

Hast thou reason? I have.- Why then dost not thou use it? For if this

does its own work, what else dost thou wish?

Thou hast existed as a part. Thou shalt disappear in that which produced

thee; but rather thou shalt be received back into its seminal principle

by transmutation.

Many grains of frankincense on the same altar: one falls before, another

falls after; but it makes no difference.

Within ten days thou wilt seem a god to those to whom thou art now

a beast and an ape, if thou wilt return to thy principles and the

worship of reason.

Do not act as if thou wert going to live ten thousand years. Death

hangs over thee. While thou livest, while it is in thy power, be good.

How much trouble he avoids who does not look to see what his neighbour

says or does or thinks, but only to what he does himself, that it

may be just and pure; or as Agathon says, look not round at the depraved

morals of others, but run straight along the line without deviating

from it.

He who has a vehement desire for posthumous fame does not consider

that every one of those who remember him will himself also die very

soon; then again also they who have succeeded them, until the whole

remembrance shall have been extinguished as it is transmitted through

men who foolishly admire and perish. But suppose that those who will

remember are even immortal, and that the remembrance will be immortal,

what then is this to thee? And I say not what is it to the dead, but

what is it to the living? What is praise except indeed so far as it

has a certain utility? For thou now rejectest unseasonably the gift

of nature, clinging to something else...

Everything which is in any way beautiful is beautiful in itself, and

terminates in itself, not having praise as part of itself. Neither

worse then nor better is a thing made by being praised. I affirm this

also of the things which are called beautiful by the vulgar, for example,

material things and works of art. That which is really beautiful has

no need of anything; not more than law, not more than truth, not more

than benevolence or modesty. Which of these things is beautiful because

it is praised, or spoiled by being blamed? Is such a thing as an emerald

made worse than it was, if it is not praised? Or gold, ivory, purple,

a lyre, a little knife, a flower, a shrub?

If souls continue to exist, how does the air contain them from eternity?-

But how does the earth contain the bodies of those who have been buried

from time so remote? For as here the mutation of these bodies after

a certain continuance, whatever it may be, and their dissolution make

room for other dead bodies; so the souls which are removed into the

air after subsisting for some time are transmuted and diffused, and

assume a fiery nature by being received into the seminal intelligence

of the universe, and in this way make room for the fresh souls which

come to dwell there. And this is the answer which a man might give

on the hypothesis of souls continuing to exist. But we must not only

think of the number of bodies which are thus buried, but also of the

number of animals which are daily eaten by us and the other animals.

For what a number is consumed, and thus in a manner buried in the

bodies of those who feed on them! And nevertheless this earth receives

them by reason of the changes of these bodies into blood, and the

transformations into the aerial or the fiery element.

What is the investigation into the truth in this matter? The division

into that which is material and that which is the cause of form, the

formal.

Do not be whirled about, but in every movement have respect to justice,

and on the occasion of every impression maintain the faculty of comprehension

or understanding.

Everything harmonizes with me, which is harmonious to thee, O Universe.

Nothing for me is too early nor too late, which is in due time for

thee. Everything is fruit to me which thy seasons bring, O Nature:

from thee are all things, in thee are all things, to thee all things

return. The poet says, Dear city of Cecrops; and wilt not thou say,

Dear city of Zeus?

Occupy thyself with few things, says the philosopher, if thou wouldst

be tranquil.- But consider if it would not be better to say, Do what

is necessary, and whatever the reason of the animal which is naturally

social requires, and as it requires. For this brings not only the

tranquility which comes from doing well, but also that which comes

from doing few things. For the greatest part of what we say and do

being unnecessary, if a man takes this away, he will have more leisure

and less uneasiness. Accordingly on every occasion a man should ask

himself, Is this one of the unnecessary things? Now a man should take

away not only unnecessary acts, but also, unnecessary thoughts, for

thus superfluous acts will not follow after.

Try how the life of the good man suits thee, the life of him who is

satisfied with his portion out of the whole, and satisfied with his

own just acts and benevolent disposition.

Hast thou seen those things? Look also at these. Do not disturb thyself.

Make thyself all simplicity. Does any one do wrong? It is to himself

that he does the wrong. Has anything happened to thee? Well; out of

the universe from the beginning everything which happens has been

apportioned and spun out to thee. In a word, thy life is short. Thou

must turn to profit the present by the aid of reason and justice.

Be sober in thy relaxation.

Either it is a well-arranged universe or a chaos huddled together,

but still a universe. But can a certain order subsist in thee, and

disorder in the All? And this too when all things are so separated

and diffused and sympathetic.

A black character, a womanish character, a stubborn character, bestial,

childish, animal, stupid, counterfeit, scurrilous, fraudulent, tyrannical.

If he is a stranger to the universe who does not know what is in it,

no less is he a stranger who does not know what is going on in it.

He is a runaway, who flies from social reason; he is blind, who shuts

the eyes of the understanding; he is poor, who has need of another,

and has not from himself all things which are useful for life. He

is an abscess on the universe who withdraws and separates himself

from the reason of our common nature through being displeased with

the things which happen, for the same nature produces this, and has

produced thee too: he is a piece rent asunder from the state, who

tears his own soul from that of reasonable animals, which is one.

The one is a philosopher without a tunic, and the other without a

book: here is another half naked: Bread I have not, he says, and I

abide by reason.- And I do not get the means of living out of my learning,

and I abide by my reason.

Love the art, poor as it may be, which thou hast learned, and be content

with it; and pass through the rest of life like one who has intrusted

to the gods with his whole soul all that he has, making thyself neither

the tyrant nor the slave of any man.

Consider, for example, the times of Vespasian. Thou wilt see all these

things, people marrying, bringing up children, sick, dying, warring,

feasting, trafficking, cultivating the ground, flattering, obstinately

arrogant, suspecting, plotting, wishing for some to die, grumbling

about the present, loving, heaping up treasure, desiring counsulship,

kingly power. Well then, that life of these people no longer exists

at all. Again, remove to the times of Trajan. Again, all is the same.

Their life too is gone. In like manner view also the other epochs

of time and of whole nations, and see how many after great efforts

soon fell and were resolved into the elements. But chiefly thou shouldst

think of those whom thou hast thyself known distracting themselves

about idle things, neglecting to do what was in accordance with their

proper constitution, and to hold firmly to this and to be content

with it. And herein it is necessary to remember that the attention

given to everything has its proper value and proportion. For thus

thou wilt not be dissatisfied, if thou appliest thyself to smaller

matters no further than is fit.

The words which were formerly familiar are now antiquated: so also

the names of those who were famed of old, are now in a manner antiquated,

Camillus, Caeso, Volesus, Leonnatus, and a little after also Scipio

and Cato, then Augustus, then also Hadrian and Antoninus. For all

things soon pass away and become a mere tale, and complete oblivion

soon buries them. And I say this of those who have shone in a wondrous

way. For the rest, as soon as they have breathed out their breath,

they are gone, and no man speaks of them. And, to conclude the matter,

what is even an eternal remembrance? A mere nothing. What then is

that about which we ought to employ our serious pains? This one thing,

thoughts just, and acts social, and words which never lie, and a disposition

which gladly accepts all that happens, as necessary, as usual, as

flowing from a principle and source of the same kind.

Willingly give thyself up to Clotho, one of the Fates, allowing her

to spin thy thread into whatever things she pleases.

Everything is only for a day, both that which remembers and that which

is remembered.

Observe constantly that all things take place by change, and accustom

thyself to consider that the nature of the Universe loves nothing

so much as to change the things which are and to make new things like

them. For everything that exists is in a manner the seed of that which

will be. But thou art thinking only of seeds which are cast into the

earth or into a womb: but this is a very vulgar notion.

Thou wilt soon die, and thou art not yet simple, not free from perturbations,

nor without suspicion of being hurt by external things, nor kindly

disposed towards all; nor dost thou yet place wisdom only in acting

justly.

Examine men's ruling principles, even those of the wise, what kind

of things they avoid, and what kind they pursue.

What is evil to thee does not subsist in the ruling principle of another;

nor yet in any turning and mutation of thy corporeal covering. Where

is it then? It is in that part of thee in which subsists the power

of forming opinions about evils. Let this power then not form such

opinions, and all is well. And if that which is nearest to it, the

poor body, is burnt, filled with matter and rottenness, nevertheless

let the part which forms opinions about these things be quiet, that

is, let it judge that nothing is either bad or good which can happen

equally to the bad man and the good. For that which happens equally

to him who lives contrary to nature and to him who lives according

to nature, is neither according to nature nor contrary to nature.

Constantly regard the universe as one living being, having one substance

and one soul; and observe how all things have reference to one perception,

the perception of this one living being; and how all things act with

one movement; and how all things are the cooperating causes of all

things which exist; observe too the continuous spinning of the thread

and the contexture of the web.

Thou art a little soul bearing about a corpse, as Epictetus used to

say.

It is no evil for things to undergo change, and no good for things

to subsist in consequence of change.

Time is like a river made up of the events which happen, and a violent

stream; for as soon as a thing has been seen, it is carried away,

and another comes in its place, and this will be carried away too.

Everything which happens is as familiar and well known as the rose

in spring and the fruit in summer; for such is disease, and death,

and calumny, and treachery, and whatever else delights fools or vexes

them.

In the series of things those which follow are always aptly fitted

to those which have gone before; for this series is not like a mere

enumeration of disjointed things, which has only a necessary sequence,

but it is a rational connection: and as all existing things are arranged

together harmoniously, so the things which come into existence exhibit

no mere succession, but a certain wonderful relationship.

Always remember the saying of Heraclitus, that the death of earth

is to become water, and the death of water is to become air, and the

death of air is to become fire, and reversely. And think too of him

who forgets whither the way leads, and that men quarrel with that

with which they are most constantly in communion, the reason which

governs the universe; and the things which daily meet with seem to

them strange: and consider that we ought not to act and speak as if

we were asleep, for even in sleep we seem to act and speak; and that

we ought not, like children who learn from their parents, simply to

act and speak as we have been taught.

If any god told thee that thou shalt die to-morrow, or certainly on

the day after to-morrow, thou wouldst not care much whether it was

on the third day or on the morrow, unless thou wast in the highest

degree mean-spirited- for how small is the difference?- So think it

no great thing to die after as many years as thou canst name rather

than to-morrow.

Think continually how many physicians are dead after often contracting

their eyebrows over the sick; and how many astrologers after predicting

with great pretensions the deaths of others; and how many philosophers

after endless discourses on death or immortality; how many heroes

after killing thousands; and how many tyrants who have used their

power over men's lives with terrible insolence as if they were immortal;

and how many cities are entirely dead, so to speak, Helice and Pompeii

and Herculaneum, and others innumerable. Add to the reckoning all

whom thou hast known, one after another. One man after burying another

has been laid out dead, and another buries him: and all this in a

short time. To conclude, always observe how ephemeral and worthless

human things are, and what was yesterday a little mucus to-morrow

will be a mummy or ashes. Pass then through this little space of time

conformably to nature, and end thy journey in content, just as an

olive falls off when it is ripe, blessing nature who produced it,

and thanking the tree on which it grew.

Be like the promontory against which the waves continually break,

but it stands firm and tames the fury of the water around it.

Unhappy am I because this has happened to me.- Not so, but happy am

I, though this has happened to me, because I continue free from pain,

neither crushed by the present nor fearing the future. For such a

thing as this might have happened to every man; but every man would

not have continued free from pain on such an occasion. Why then is

that rather a misfortune than this a good fortune? And dost thou in

all cases call that a man's misfortune, which is not a deviation from

man's nature? And does a thing seem to thee to be a deviation from

man's nature, when it is not contrary to the will of man's nature?

Well, thou knowest the will of nature. Will then this which has happened

prevent thee from being just, magnanimous, temperate, prudent, secure

against inconsiderate opinions and falsehood; will it prevent thee

from having modesty, freedom, and everything else, by the presence

of which man's nature obtains all that is its own? Remember too on

every occasion which leads thee to vexation to apply this principle:

not that this is a misfortune, but that to bear it nobly is good fortune.

It is a vulgar, but still a useful help towards contempt of death,

to pass in review those who have tenaciously stuck to life. What more

then have they gained than those who have died early? Certainly they

lie in their tombs somewhere at last, Cadicianus, Fabius, Julianus,

Lepidus, or any one else like them, who have carried out many to be

buried, and then were carried out themselves. Altogether the interval

is small between birth and death; and consider with how much trouble,

and in company with what sort of people and in what a feeble body

this interval is laboriously passed. Do not then consider life a thing

of any value. For look to the immensity of time behind thee, and to

the time which is before thee, another boundless space. In this infinity

then what is the difference between him who lives three days and him

who lives three generations?

Always run to the short way; and the short way is the natural: accordingly

say and do everything in conformity with the soundest reason. For

such a purpose frees a man from trouble, and warfare, and all artifice

and ostentatious display.

----------------------------------------------------------------------

BOOK FIVE

In he morning when thou risest unwillingly, let this thought be present-

I am rising to the work of a human being. Why then am I dissatisfied

if I am going to do the things for which I exist and for which I was

brought into the world? Or have I been made for this, to lie in the

bed-clothes and keep myself warm?- But this is more pleasant.- Dost

thou exist then to take thy pleasure, and not at all for action or

exertion? Dost thou not see the little plants, the little birds, the

ants, the spiders, the bees working together to put in order their

several parts of the universe? And art thou unwilling to do the work

of a human being, and dost thou not make haste to do that which is

according to thy nature?- But it is necessary to take rest also.-

It is necessary: however nature has fixed bounds to this too: she

has fixed bounds both to eating and drinking, and yet thou goest beyond

these bounds, beyond what is sufficient; yet in thy acts it is not

so, but thou stoppest short of what thou canst do. So thou lovest

not thyself, for if thou didst, thou wouldst love thy nature and her

will. But those who love their several arts exhaust themselves in

working at them unwashed and without food; but thou valuest thy own

own nature less than the turner values the turning art, or the dancer

the dancing art, or the lover of money values his money, or the vainglorious

man his little glory. And such men, when they have a violent affection

to a thing, choose neither to eat nor to sleep rather than to perfect

the things which they care for. But are the acts which concern society

more vile in thy eyes and less worthy of thy labour?

How easy it is to repel and to wipe away every impression which is

troublesome or unsuitable, and immediately to be in all tranquility.

Judge every word and deed which are according to nature to be fit

for thee; and be not diverted by the blame which follows from any

people nor by their words, but if a thing is good to be done or said,

do not consider it unworthy of thee. For those persons have their

peculiar leading principle and follow their peculiar movement; which

things do not thou regard, but go straight on, following thy own nature

and the common nature; and the way of both is one.

I go through the things which happen according to nature until I shall

fall and rest, breathing out my breath into that element out of which

I daily draw it in, and falling upon that earth out of which my father

collected the seed, and my mother the blood, and my nurse the milk;

out of which during so many years I have been supplied with food and

drink; which bears me when I tread on it and abuse it for so many

purposes.

Thou sayest, Men cannot admire the sharpness of thy wits.- Be it so:

but there are many other things of which thou canst not say, I am

not formed for them by nature. Show those qualities then which are

altogether in thy power, sincerity, gravity, endurance of labour,

aversion to pleasure, contentment with thy portion and with few things,

benevolence, frankness, no love of superfluity, freedom from trifling

magnanimity. Dost thou not see how many qualities thou art immediately

able to exhibit, in which there is no excuse of natural incapacity

and unfitness, and yet thou still remainest voluntarily below the

mark? Or art thou compelled through being defectively furnished by

nature to murmur, and to be stingy, and to flatter, and to find fault

with thy poor body, and to try to please men, and to make great display,

and to be so restless in thy mind? No, by the gods: but thou mightest

have been delivered from these things long ago. Only if in truth thou

canst be charged with being rather slow and dull of comprehension,

thou must exert thyself about this also, not neglecting it nor yet

taking pleasure in thy dulness.

One man, when he has done a service to another, is ready to set it

down to his account as a favour conferred. Another is not ready to

do this, but still in his own mind he thinks of the man as his debtor,

and he knows what he has done. A third in a manner does not even know

what he has done, but he is like a vine which has produced grapes,

and seeks for nothing more after it has once produced its proper fruit.

As a horse when he has run, a dog when he has tracked the game, a

bee when it has made the honey, so a man when he has done a good act,

does not call out for others to come and see, but he goes on to another

act, as a vine goes on to produce again the grapes in season.- Must

a man then be one of these, who in a manner act thus without observing

it?- Yes.- But this very thing is necessary, the observation of what

a man is doing: for, it may be said, it is characteristic of the social

animal to perceive that he is working in a social manner, and indeed

to wish that his social partner also should perceive it.- It is true

what thou sayest, but thou dost not rightly understand what is now

said: and for this reason thou wilt become one of those of whom I

spoke before, for even they are misled by a certain show of reason.

But if thou wilt choose to understand the meaning of what is said,

do not fear that for this reason thou wilt omit any social act.

A prayer of the Athenians: Rain, rain, O dear Zeus, down on the ploughed

fields of the Athenians and on the plains.- In truth we ought not

to pray at all, or we ought to pray in this simple and noble fashion.

Just as we must understand when it is said, That Aesculapius prescribed

to this man horse-exercise, or bathing in cold water or going without

shoes; so we must understand it when it is said, That the nature of

the universe prescribed to this man disease or mutilation or loss

or anything else of the kind. For in the first case Prescribed means

something like this: he prescribed this for this man as a thing adapted

to procure health; and in the second case it means: That which happens

to (or, suits) every man is fixed in a manner for him suitably to

his destiny. For this is what we mean when we say that things are

suitable to us, as the workmen say of squared stones in walls or the

pyramids, that they are suitable, when they fit them to one another

in some kind of connexion. For there is altogether one fitness, harmony.

And as the universe is made up out of all bodies to be such a body

as it is, so out of all existing causes necessity (destiny) is made

up to be such a cause as it is. And even those who are completely

ignorant understand what I mean, for they say, It (necessity, destiny)

brought this to such a person.- This then was brought and this was

precribed to him. Let us then receive these things, as well as those

which Aesculapius prescribes. Many as a matter of course even among

his prescriptions are disagreeable, but we accept them in the hope

of health. Let the perfecting and accomplishment of the things, which

the common nature judges to be good, be judged by thee to be of the

same kind as thy health. And so accept everything which happens, even

if it seem disagreeable, because it leads to this, to the health of

the universe and to the prosperity and felicity of Zeus (the universe).

For he would not have brought on any man what he has brought, if it

were not useful for the whole. Neither does the nature of anything,

whatever it may be, cause anything which is not suitable to that which

is directed by it. For two reasons then it is right to be content

with that which happens to thee; the one, because it was done for

thee and prescribed for thee, and in a manner had reference to thee,

originally from the most ancient causes spun with thy destiny; and

the other, because even that which comes severally to every man is

to the power which administers the universe a cause of felicity and

perfection, nay even of its very continuance. For the integrity of

the whole is mutilated, if thou cuttest off anything whatever from

the conjunction and the continuity either of the parts or of the causes.

And thou dost cut off, as far as it is in thy power, when thou art

dissatisfied, and in a manner triest to put anything out of the way.

Be not disgusted, nor discouraged, nor dissatisfied, if thou dost

not succeed in doing everything according to right principles; but

when thou bast failed, return back again, and be content if the greater

part of what thou doest is consistent with man's nature, and love

this to which thou returnest; and do not return to philosophy as if

she were a master, but act like those who have sore eyes and apply

a bit of sponge and egg, or as another applies a plaster, or drenching

with water. For thus thou wilt not fail to obey reason, and thou wilt

repose in it. And remember that philosophy requires only the things

which thy nature requires; but thou wouldst have something else which

is not according to nature.- It may be objected, Why what is more

agreeable than this which I am doing?- But is not this the very reason

why pleasure deceives us? And consider if magnanimity, freedom, simplicity,

equanimity, piety, are not more agreeable. For what is more agreeable

than wisdom itself, when thou thinkest of the security and the happy

course of all things which depend on the faculty of understanding

and knowledge?

Things are in such a kind of envelopment that they have seemed to

philosophers, not a few nor those common philosophers, altogether

unintelligible; nay even to the Stoics themselves they seem difficult

to understand. And all our assent is changeable; for where is the

man who never changes? Carry thy thoughts then to the objects themselves,

and consider how short-lived they are and worthless, and that they

may be in the possession of a filthy wretch or a whore or a robber.

Then turn to the morals of those who live with thee, and it is hardly

possible to endure even the most agreeable of them, to say nothing

of a man being hardly able to endure himself. In such darkness then

and dirt and in so constant a flux both of substance and of time,

and of motion and of things moved, what there is worth being highly

prized or even an object of serious pursuit, I cannot imagine. But

on the contrary it is a man's duty to comfort himself, and to wait

for the

natural dissolution and not to be vexed at the delay, but to rest

in these principles only: the one, that nothing will happen to me

which is not conformable to the nature of the universe; and the other,

that it is in my power never to act contrary to my god and daemon:

for there is no man who will compel me to this.

About what am I now employing my own soul? On every occasion I must

ask myself this question, and inquire, what have I now in this part

of me which they call the ruling principle? And whose soul have I

now? That of a child, or of a young man, or of a feeble woman, or

of a tyrant, or of a domestic animal, or of a wild beast?

What kind of things those are which appear good to the many, we may

learn even from this. For if any man should conceive certain things

as being really good, such as prudence, temperance, justice, fortitude,

he would not after having first conceived these endure to listen to

anything which should not be in harmony with what is really good.

But if a man has first conceived as good the things which appear to

the many to be good, he will listen and readily receive as very applicable

that which was said by the comic writer. Thus even the many perceive

the difference. For were it not so, this saying would not offend and

would not be rejected in the first case, while we receive it when

it is said of wealth, and of the means which further luxury and fame,

as said fitly and wittily. Go on then and ask if we should value and

think those things to be good, to which after their first conception

in the mind the words of the comic writer might be aptly applied-

that he who has them, through pure abundance has not a place to ease

himself in.

I am composed of the formal and the material; and neither of them

will perish into non-existence, as neither of them came into existence

out of non-existence. Every part of me then will be reduced by change

into some part of the universe, and that again will change into another

part of the universe, and so on for ever. And by consequence of such

a change I too exist, and those who begot me, and so on for ever in

the other direction. For nothing hinders us from saying so, even if

the universe is administered according to definite periods of revolution.

Reason and the reasoning art (philosophy) are powers which are sufficient

for themselves and for their own works. They move then from a first

principle which is their own, and they make their way to the end which

is proposed to them; and this is the reason why such acts are named

catorthoseis or right acts, which word signifies that they proceed

by the right road.

None of these things ought to be called a man's, which do not belong

to a man, as man. They are not required of a man, nor does man's nature

promise them, nor are they the means of man's nature attaining its

end. Neither then does the end of man lie in these things, nor yet

that which aids to the accomplishment of this end, and that which

aids towards this end is that which is good. Besides, if any of these

things did belong to man, it would not be right for a man to despise

them and to set himself against them; nor would a man be worthy of

praise who showed that he did not want these things, nor would he

who stinted himself in any of them be good, if indeed these things

were good. But now the more of these things a man deprives himself

of, or of other things like them, or even when he is deprived of any

of them, the more patiently he endures the loss, just in the same

degree he is a better man.

Such as are thy habitual thoughts, such also will be the character

of thy mind; for the soul is dyed by the thoughts. Dye it then with

a continuous series of such thoughts as these: for instance, that

where a man can live, there he can also live well. But he must live

in a palace;- well then, he can also live well in a palace. And again,

consider that for whatever purpose each thing has been constituted,

for this it has been constituted, and towards this it is carried;

and its end is in that towards which it is carried; and where the

end is, there also is the advantage and the good of each thing. Now

the good for the reasonable animal is society; for that we are made

for society has been shown above. Is it not plain that the inferior

exist for the sake of the superior? But the things which have life

are superior to those which have not life, and of those which have

life the superior are those which have reason.

To seek what is impossible is madness: and it is impossible that the

bad should not do something of this kind.

Nothing happens to any man which he is not formed by nature to bear.

The same things happen to another, and either because he does not

see that they have happened or because he would show a great spirit

he is firm and remains unharmed. It is a shame then that ignorance

and conceit should be stronger than wisdom.

Things themselves touch not the soul, not in the least degree; nor

have they admission to the soul, nor can they turn or move the soul:

but the soul turns and moves itself alone, and whatever judgements

it may think proper to make, such it makes for itself the things which

present themselves to it.

In one respect man is the nearest thing to me, so far as I must do

good to men and endure them. But so far as some men make themselves

obstacles to my proper acts, man becomes to me one of the things which

are indifferent, no less than the sun or wind or a wild beast. Now

it is true that these may impede my action, but they are no impediments

to my affects and disposition, which have the power of acting conditionally

and changing: for the mind converts and changes every hindrance to

its activity into an aid; and so that which is a hindrance is made

a furtherance to an act; and that which is an obstacle on the road

helps us on this road.

Reverence that which is best in the universe; and this is that which

makes use of all things and directs all things. And in like manner

also reverence that which is best in thyself; and this is of the same

kind as that. For in thyself also, that which makes use of everything

else, is this, and thy life is directed by this.

That which does no harm to the state, does no harm to the citizen.

In the case of every appearance of harm apply this rule: if the state

is not harmed by this, neither am I harmed. But if the state is harmed,

thou must not be angry with him who does harm to the state. Show him

where his error is.

Often think of the rapidity with which things pass by and disappear,

both the things which are and the things which are produced. For substance

is like a river in a continual flow, and the activities of things

are in constant change, and the causes work in infinite varieties;

and there is hardly anything which stands still. And consider this

which is near to thee, this boundless abyss of the past and of the

future in which all things disappear. How then is he not a fool who

is puffed up with such things or plagued about them and makes himself

miserable? for they vex him only for a time, and a short time.

Think of the universal substance, of which thou hast a very small

portion; and of universal time, of which a short and indivisible interval

has been assigned to thee; and of that which is fixed by destiny,

and how small a part of it thou art.

Does another do me wrong? Let him look to it. He has his own disposition,

his own activity. I now have what the universal nature wills me to

have; and I do what my nature now wills me to do.

Let the part of thy soul which leads and governs be undisturbed by

the movements in the flesh, whether of pleasure or of pain; and let

it not unite with them, but let it circumscribe itself and limit those

affects to their parts. But when these affects rise up to the mind

by virtue of that other sympathy that naturally exists in a body which

is all one, then thou must not strive to resist the sensation, for

it is natural: but let not the ruling part of itself add to the sensation

the opinion that it is either good or bad.

Live with the gods. And he does live with the gods who constantly

shows to them, his own soul is satisfied with that which is assigned

to him, and that it does all that the daemon wishes, which Zeus hath

given to every man for his guardian and guide, a portion of himself.

And this is every man's understanding and reason.

Art thou angry with him whose armpits stink? Art thou angry with him

whose mouth smells foul? What good will this danger do thee? He has

such a mouth, he has such arm-pits: it is necessary that such an emanation

must come from such things- but the man has reason, it will be said,

and he is able, if he takes pain, to discover wherein he offends-

I wish thee well of thy discovery. Well then, and thou hast reason:

by thy rational faculty stir up his rational faculty; show him his

error, admonish him. For if he listens, thou wilt cure him, and there

is no need of anger. Neither tragic actor nor whore...

As thou intendest to live when thou art gone out,...so it is in thy

power to live here. But if men do not permit thee, then get away out

of life, yet so as if thou wert suffering no harm. The house is smoky,

and I quit it. Why dost thou think that this is any trouble? But so

long as nothing of the kind drives me out, I remain, am free, and

no man shall hinder me from doing what I choose; and I choose to do

what is according to the nature of the rational and social animal.

The intelligence of the universe is social. Accordingly it has made

the inferior things for the sake of the superior, and it has fitted

the superior to one another. Thou seest how it has subordinated, co-ordinated

and assigned to everything its proper portion, and has brought together

into concord with one another the things which are the best.

How hast thou behaved hitherto to the gods, thy parents, brethren,

children, teachers, to those who looked after thy infancy, to thy

friends, kinsfolk, to thy slaves? Consider if thou hast hitherto behaved

to all in such a way that this may be said of thee:

Never has wronged a man in deed or word. And call to recollection

both how many things thou hast passed through, and how many things

thou hast been able to endure: and that the history of thy life is

now complete and thy service is ended: and how many beautiful things

thou hast seen: and how many pleasures and pains thou hast despised;

and how many things called honourable thou hast spurned; and to how

many ill-minded folks thou hast shown a kind disposition.

Why do unskilled and ignorant souls disturb him who has skill and

knowledge? What soul then has skill and knowledge? That which knows

beginning and end, and knows the reason which pervades all substance

and through all time by fixed periods (revolutions) administers the

universe.

Soon, very soon, thou wilt be ashes, or a skeleton, and either a name

or not even a name; but name is sound and echo. And the things which

are much valued in life are empty and rotten and trifling, and like

little dogs biting one another, and little children quarrelling, laughing,

and then straightway weeping. But fidelity and modesty and justice

and truth are fled

Up to Olympus from the wide-spread earth. What then is there which

still detains thee here? If the objects of sense are easily changed

and never stand still, and the organs of perception are dull and easily

receive false impressions; and the poor soul itself is an exhalation

from blood. But to have good repute amidst such a world as this is

an empty thing. Why then dost thou not wait in tranquility for thy

end, whether it is extinction or removal to another state? And until

that time comes, what is sufficient? Why, what else than to venerate

the gods and bless them, and to do good to men, and to practise tolerance

and self-restraint; but as to everything which is beyond the limits

of the poor flesh and breath, to remember that this is neither thine

nor in thy power.

Thou canst pass thy life in an equable flow of happiness, if thou

canst go by the right way, and think and act in the right way. These

two things are common both to the soul of God and to the soul of man,

and to the soul of every rational being, not to be hindered by another;

and to hold good to consist in the disposition to justice and the

practice of it, and in this to let thy desire find its termination.

If this is neither my own badness, nor an effect of my own badness,

and the common weal is not injured, why am I troubled about it? And

what is the harm to the common weal?

Do not be carried along inconsiderately by the appearance of things,

but give help to all according to thy ability and their fitness; and

if they should have sustained loss in matters which are indifferent,

do not imagine this to be a damage. For it is a bad habit. But as

the old man, when he went away, asked back his foster-child's top,

remembering that it was a top, so do thou in this case also.

When thou art calling out on the Rostra, hast thou forgotten, man,

what these things are?- Yes; but they are objects of great concern

to these people- wilt thou too then be made a fool for these things?-

I was once a fortunate man, but I lost it, I know not how.- But fortunate

means that a man has assigned to himself a good fortune: and a good

fortune is good disposition of the soul, good emotions, good actions.

----------------------------------------------------------------------

BOOK SIX

The substance of the universe is obedient and compliant; and the

reason which governs it has in itself no cause for doing evil, for

it has no malice, nor does it do evil to anything, nor is anything

harmed by it. But all things are made and perfected according to this

reason.

Let it make no difference to thee whether thou art cold or warm, if

thou art doing thy duty; and whether thou art drowsy or satisfied

with sleep; and whether ill-spoken of or praised; and whether dying

or doing something else. For it is one of the acts of life, this act

by which we die: it is sufficient then in this act also to do well

what we have in hand.

Look within. Let neither the peculiar quality of anything nor its

value escape thee.

All existing things soon change, and they will either be reduced to

vapour, if indeed all substance is one, or they will be dispersed.

The reason which governs knows what its own disposition is, and what

it does, and on what material it works.

The best way of avenging thyself is not to become like the wrong doer.

Take pleasure in one thing and rest in it, in passing from one social

act to another social act, thinking of God.

The ruling principle is that which rouses and turns itself, and while

it makes itself such as it is and such as it wills to be, it also

makes everything which happens appear to itself to be such as it wills.

In conformity to the nature of the universe every single thing is

accomplished, for certainly it is not in conformity to any other nature

that each thing is accomplished, either a nature which externally

comprehends this, or a nature which is comprehended within this nature,

or a nature external and independent of this.

The universe is either a confusion, and a mutual involution of things,

and a dispersion; or it is unity and order and providence. If then

it is the former, why do I desire to tarry in a fortuitous combination

of things and such a disorder? And why do I care about anything else

than how I shall at last become earth? And why am I disturbed, for

the dispersion of my elements will happen whatever I do. But if the

other supposition is true, I venerate, and I am firm, and I trust

in him who governs.

When thou hast been compelled by circumstances to be disturbed in

a manner, quickly return to thyself and do not continue out of tune

longer than the compulsion lasts; for thou wilt have more mastery

over the harmony by continually recurring to it.

If thou hadst a step-mother and a mother at the same time, thou wouldst

be dutiful to thy step-mother, but still thou wouldst constantly return

to thy mother. Let the court and philosophy now be to thee step-mother

and mother: return to philosophy frequently and repose in her, through

whom what thou meetest with in the court appears to thee tolerable,

and thou appearest tolerable in the court.

When we have meat before us and such eatables we receive the impression,

that this is the dead body of a fish, and this is the dead body of

a bird or of a pig; and again, that this Falernian is only a little

grape juice, and this purple robe some sheep's wool dyed with the

blood of a shell-fish: such then are these impressions, and they reach

the things themselves and penetrate them, and so we see what kind

of things they are. Just in the same way ought we to act all through

life, and where there are things which appear most worthy of our approbation,

we ought to lay them bare and look at their worthlessness and strip

them of all the words by which they are exalted. For outward show

is a wonderful perverter of the reason, and when thou art most sure

that thou art employed about things worth thy pains, it is then that

it cheats thee most. Consider then what Crates says of Xenocrates

himself.

Most of the things which the multitude admire are referred to objects

of the most general kind, those which are held together by cohesion

or natural organization, such as stones, wood, fig-trees, vines, olives.

But those which are admired by men who are a little more reasonable

are referred to the things which are held together by a living principle,

as flocks, herds. Those which are admired by men who are still more

instructed are the things which are held together by a rational soul,

not however a universal soul, but rational so far as it is a soul

skilled in some art, or expert in some other way, or simply rational

so far as it possesses a number of slaves. But he who values rational

soul, a soul universal and fitted for political life, regards nothing

else except this; and above all things he keeps his soul in a condition

and in an activity conformable to reason and social life, and he co-operates

to this end with those who are of the same kind as himself.

Some things are hurrying into existence, and others are hurrying out

of it; and of that which is coming into existence part is already

extinguished. Motions and changes are continually renewing the world,

just as the uninterrupted course of time is always renewing the infinite

duration of ages. In this flowing stream then, on which there is no

abiding, what is there of the things which hurry by on which a man

would set a high price? It would be just as if a man should fall in

love with one of the sparrows which fly by, but it has already passed

out of sight. Something of this kind is the very life of every man,

like the exhalation of the blood and the respiration of the air. For

such as it is to have once drawn in the air and to have given it back,

which we do every moment, just the same is it with the whole respiratory

power, which thou didst receive at thy birth yesterday and the day

before, to give it back to the element from which thou didst first

draw it.

Neither is transpiration, as in plants, a thing to be valued, nor

respiration, as in domesticated animals and wild beasts, nor the receiving

of impressions by the appearances of things, nor being moved by desires

as puppets by strings, nor assembling in herds, nor being nourished

by food; for this is just like the act of separating and parting with

the useless part of our food. What then is worth being valued? To

be received with clapping of hands? No. Neither must we value the

clapping of tongues, for the praise which comes from the many is a

clapping of tongues. Suppose then that thou hast given up this worthless

thing called fame, what remains that is worth valuing? This in my

opinion, to move thyself and to restrain thyself in conformity to

thy proper constitution, to which end both all employments and arts

lead. For every art aims at this, that the thing which has been made

should be adapted to the work for which it has been made; and both

the vine-planter who looks after the vine, and the horse-breaker,

and he who trains the dog, seek this end. But the education and the

teaching of youth aim at something. In this then is the value of the

education and the teaching. And if this is well, thou wilt not seek

anything else. Wilt thou not cease to value many other things too?

Then thou wilt be neither free, nor sufficient for thy own happiness,

nor without passion. For of necessity thou must be envious, jealous,

and suspicious of those who can take away those things, and plot against

those who have that which is valued by thee. Of necessity a man must

be altogether in a state of perturbation who wants any of these things;

and besides, he must often find fault with the gods. But to reverence

and honour thy own mind will make thee content with thyself, and in

harmony with society, and in agreement with the gods, that is, praising

all that they give and have ordered.

Above, below, all around are the movements of the elements. But the

motion of virtue is in none of these: it is something more divine,

and advancing by a way hardly observed it goes happily on its road.

How strangely men act. They will not praise those who are living at

the same time and living with themselves; but to be themselves praised

by posterity, by those whom they have never seen or ever will see,

this they set much value on. But this is very much the same as if

thou shouldst be grieved because those who have lived before thee

did not praise thee.

If a thing is difficult to be accomplished by thyself, do not think

that it is impossible for man: but if anything is possible for man

and conformable to his nature, think that this can be attained by

thyself too.

In the gymnastic exercises suppose that a man has torn thee with his

nails, and by dashing against thy head has inflicted a wound. Well,

we neither show any signs of vexation, nor are we offended, nor do

we suspect him afterwards as a treacherous fellow; and yet we are

on our guard against him, not however as an enemy, nor yet with suspicion,

but we quietly get out of his way. Something like this let thy behaviour

be in all the other parts of life; let us overlook many things in

those who are like antagonists in the gymnasium. For it is in our

power, as I said, to get out of the way, and to have no suspicion

nor hatred.

If any man is able to convince me and show me that I do not think

or act right, I will gladly change; for I seek the truth by which

no man was ever injured. But he is injured who abides in his error

and ignorance.

I do my duty: other things trouble me not; for they are either things

without life, or things without reason, or things that have rambled

and know not the way.

As to the animals which have no reason and generally all things and

objects, do thou, since thou hast reason and they have none, make

use of them with a generous and liberal spirit. But towards human

beings, as they have reason, behave in a social spirit. And on all

occasions call on the gods, and do not perplex thyself about the length

of time in which thou shalt do this; for even three hours so spent

are sufficient.

Alexander the Macedonian and his groom by death were brought to the

same state; for either they were received among the same seminal principles

of the universe, or they were alike dispersed among the atoms.

Consider how many things in the same indivisible time take place in

each of us, things which concern the body and things which concern

the soul: and so thou wilt not wonder if many more things, or rather

all things which come into existence in that which is the one and

all, which we call Cosmos, exist in it at the same time.

If any man should propose to thee the question, how the name Antoninus

is written, wouldst thou with a straining of the voice utter each

letter? What then if they grow angry, wilt thou be angry too? Wilt

thou not go on with composure and number every letter? just so then

in this life also remember that every duty is made up of certain parts.

These it is thy duty to observe and without being disturbed or showing

anger towards those who are angry with thee to go on thy way and finish

that which is set before thee.

How cruel it is not to allow men to strive after the things which

appear to them to be suitable to their nature and profitable! And

yet in a manner thou dost not allow them to do this, when thou art

vexed because they do wrong. For they are certainly moved towards

things because they suppose them to be suitable to their nature and

profitable to them.- But it is not so.- Teach them then, and show

them without being angry.

Death is a cessation of the impressions through the senses, and of

the pulling of the strings which move the appetites, and of the discursive

movements of the thoughts, and of the service to the flesh.

It is a shame for the soul to be first to give way in this life, when

thy body does not give way.

Take care that thou art not made into a Caesar, that thou art not

dyed with this dye; for such things happen. Keep thyself then simple,

good, pure, serious, free from affectation, a friend of justice, a

worshipper of the gods, kind, affectionate, strenuous in all proper

acts. Strive to continue to be such as philosophy wished to make thee.

Reverence the gods, and help men. Short is life. There is only one

fruit of this terrene life, a pious disposition and social acts. Do

everything as a disciple of Antoninus. Remember his constancy in every

act which was conformable to reason, and his evenness in all things,

and his piety, and the serenity of his countenance, and his sweetness,

and his disregard of empty fame, and his efforts to understand things;

and how he would never let anything pass without having first most

carefully examined it and clearly understood it; and how he bore with

those who blamed him unjustly without blaming them in return; how

he did nothing in a hurry; and how he listened not to calumnies, and

how exact an examiner of manners and actions he was; and not given

to reproach people, nor timid, nor suspicious, nor a sophist; and

with how little he was satisfied, such as lodging, bed, dress, food,

servants; and how laborious and patient; and how he was able on account

of his sparing diet to hold out to the evening, not even requiring

to relieve himself by any evacuations except at the usual hour; and

his firmness and uniformity in his friendships; and how he tolerated

freedom of speech in those who opposed his opinions; and the pleasure

that he had when any man showed him anything better; and how religious

he was without superstition. Imitate all this that thou mayest have

as good a conscience, when thy last hour comes, as he had.

Return to thy sober senses and call thyself back; and when thou hast

roused thyself from sleep and hast perceived that they were only dreams

which troubled thee, now in thy waking hours look at these (the things

about thee) as thou didst look at those (the dreams).

I consist of a little body and a soul. Now to this little body all

things are indifferent, for it is not able to perceive differences.

But to the understanding those things only are indifferent, which

are not the works of its own activity. But whatever things are the

works of its own activity, all these are in its power. And of these

however only those which are done with reference to the present; for

as to the future and the past activities of the mind, even these are

for the present indifferent.

Neither the labour which the hand does nor that of the foot is contrary

to nature, so long as the foot does the foot's work and the hand the

hand's. So then neither to a man as a man is his labour contrary to

nature, so long as it does the things of a man. But if the labour

is not contrary to his nature, neither is it an evil to him.

How many pleasures have been enjoyed by robbers, patricides, tyrants.

Dost thou not see how the handicraftsmen accommodate themselves up

to a certain point to those who are not skilled in their craft- nevertheless

they cling to the reason (the principles) of their art and do not

endure to depart from it? Is it not strange if the architect and the

physician shall have more respect to the reason (the principles) of

their own arts than man to his own reason, which is common to him

and the gods?

Asia, Europe are corners of the universe: all the sea a drop in the

universe; Athos a little clod of the universe: all the present time

is a point in eternity. All things are little, changeable, perishable.

All things come from thence, from that universal ruling power either

directly proceeding or by way of sequence. And accordingly the lion's

gaping jaws, and that which is poisonous, and every harmful thing,

as a thorn, as mud, are after-products of the grand and beautiful.

Do not then imagine that they are of another kind from that which

thou dost venerate, but form a just opinion of the source of all.

He who has seen present things has seen all, both everything which

has taken place from all eternity and everything which will be for

time without end; for all things are of one kin and of one form.

Frequently consider the connexion of all things in the universe and

their relation to one another. For in a manner all things are implicated

with one another, and all in this way are friendly to one another;

for one thing comes in order after another, and this is by virtue

of the active movement and mutual conspiration and the unity of the

substance.

Adapt thyself to the things with which thy lot has been cast: and

the men among whom thou hast received thy portion, love them, but

do it truly, sincerely.

Every instrument, tool, vessel, if it does that for which it has been

made, is well, and yet he who made it is not there. But in the things

which are held together by nature there is within and there abides

in them the power which made them; wherefore the more is it fit to

reverence this power, and to think, that, if thou dost live and act

according to its will, everything in thee is in conformity to intelligence.

And thus also in the universe the things which belong to it are in

conformity to intelligence.

Whatever of the things which are not within thy power thou shalt suppose

to be good for thee or evil, it must of necessity be that, if such

a bad thing befall thee or the loss of such a good thing, thou wilt

blame the gods, and hate men too, those who are the cause of the misfortune

or the loss, or those who are suspected of being likely to be the

cause; and indeed we do much injustice, because we make a difference

between these things. But if we judge only those things which are

in our power to be good or bad, there remains no reason either for

finding fault with God or standing in a hostile attitude to man.

We are all working together to one end, some with knowledge and design,

and others without knowing what they do; as men also when they are

asleep, of whom it is Heraclitus, I think, who says that they are

labourers and co-operators in the things which take place in the universe.

But men co-operate after different fashions: and even those co-operate

abundantly, who find fault with what happens and those who try to

oppose it and to hinder it; for the universe had need even of such

men as these. It remains then for thee to understand among what kind

of workmen thou placest thyself; for he who rules all things will

certainly make a right use of thee, and he will receive thee among

some part of the co-operators and of those whose labours conduce to

one end. But be not thou such a part as the mean and ridiculous verse

in the play, which Chrysippus speaks of.

Does the sun undertake to do the work of the rain, or Aesculapius

the work of the Fruit-bearer (the earth)? And how is it with respect

to each of the stars, are they not different and yet they work together

to the same end?

If the gods have determined about me and about the things which must

happen to me, they have determined well, for it is not easy even to

imagine a deity without forethought; and as to doing me harm, why

should they have any desire towards that? For what advantage would

result to them from this or to the whole, which is the special object

of their providence? But if they have not determined about me individually,

they have certainly determined about the whole at least, and the things

which happen by way of sequence in this general arrangement I ought

to accept with pleasure and to be content with them. But if they determine

about nothing- which it is wicked to believe, or if we do believe

it, let us neither sacrifice nor pray nor swear by them nor do anything

else which we do as if the gods were present and lived with us- but

if however the gods determine about none of the things which concern

us, I am able to determine about myself, and I can inquire about that

which is useful; and that is useful to every man which is conformable

to his own constitution and nature. But my nature is rational and

social; and my city and country, so far as I am Antoninus, is Rome,

but so far as I am a man, it is the world. The things then which are

useful to these cities are alone useful to me. Whatever happens to

every man, this is for the interest of the universal: this might be

sufficient. But further thou wilt observe this also as a general truth,

if thou dost observe, that whatever is profitable to any man is profitable

also to other men. But let the word profitable be taken here in the

common sense as said of things of the middle kind, neither good nor

bad.

As it happens to thee in the amphitheatre and such places, that the

continual sight of the same things and the uniformity make the spectacle

wearisome, so it is in the whole of life; for all things above, below,

are the same and from the same. How long then?

Think continually that all kinds of men and of all kinds of pursuits

and of all nations are dead, so that thy thoughts come down even to

Philistion and Phoebus and Origanion. Now turn thy thoughts to the

other kinds of men. To that place then we must remove, where there

are so many great orators, and so many noble philosophers, Heraclitus,

Pythagoras, Socrates; so many heroes of former days, and so many generals

after them, and tyrants; besides these, Eudoxus, Hipparchus, Archimedes,

and other men of acute natural talents, great minds, lovers of labour,

versatile, confident, mockers even of the perishable and ephemeral

life of man, as Menippus and such as are like him. As to all these

consider that they have long been in the dust. What harm then is this

to them; and what to those whose names are altogether unknown? One

thing here is worth a great deal, to pass thy life in truth and justice,

with a benevolent disposition even to liars and unjust men.

When thou wishest to delight thyself, think of the virtues of those

who live with thee; for instance, the activity of one, and the modesty

of another, and the liberality of a third, and some other good quality

of a fourth. For nothing delights so much as the examples of the virtues,

when they are exhibited in the morals of those who live with us and

present themselves in abundance, as far as is possible. Wherefore

we must keep them before us.

Thou art not dissatisfied, I suppose, because thou weighest only so

many litrae and not three hundred. Be not dissatisfied then that thou

must live only so many years and not more; for as thou art satisfied

with the amount of substance which has been assigned to thee, so be

content with the time.

Let us try to persuade them (men). But act even against their will,

when the principles of justice lead that way. If however any man by

using force stands in thy way, betake thyself to contentment and tranquility,

and at the same time employ the hindrance towards the exercise of

some other virtue; and remember that thy attempt was with a reservation,

that thou didst not desire to do impossibilities. What then didst

thou desire?- Some such effort as this.- But thou attainest thy object,

if the things to which thou wast moved are accomplished.

He who loves fame considers another man's activity to be his own good;

and he who loves pleasure, his own sensations; but he who has understanding,

considers his own acts to be his own good.

It is in our power to have no opinion about a thing, and not to be

disturbed in our soul; for things themselves have no natural power

to form our judgements.

Accustom thyself to attend carefully to what is said by another, and

as much as it is possible, be in the speaker's mind.

That which is not good for the swarm, neither is it good for the bee.

If sailors abused the helmsman or the sick the doctor, would they

listen to anybody else; or how could the helmsman secure the safety

of those in the ship or the doctor the health of those whom he attends?

How many together with whom I came into the world are already gone

out of it.

To the jaundiced honey tastes bitter, and to those bitten by mad dogs

water causes fear; and to little children the ball is a fine thing.

Why then am I angry? Dost thou think that a false opinion has less

power than the bile in the jaundiced or the poison in him who is bitten

by a mad dog?

No man will hinder thee from living according to the reason of thy

own nature: nothing will happen to thee contrary to the reason of

the universal nature.

What kind of people are those whom men wish to please, and for what

objects, and by what kind of acts? How soon will time cover all things,

and how many it has covered already.

----------------------------------------------------------------------

BOOK SEVEN

What is badness? It is that which thou hast often seen. And on the

occasion of everything which happens keep this in mind, that it is

that which thou hast often seen. Everywhere up and down thou wilt

find the same things, with which the old histories are filled, those

of the middle ages and those of our own day; with which cities and

houses are filled now. There is nothing new: all things are both familiar

and short-lived.

How can our principles become dead, unless the impressions (thoughts)

which correspond to them are extinguished? But it is in thy power

continuously to fan these thoughts into a flame. I can have that opinion

about anything, which I ought to have. If I can, why am I disturbed?

The things which are external to my mind have no relation at all to

my mind.- Let this be the state of thy affects, and thou standest

erect. To recover thy life is in thy power. Look at things again as

thou didst use to look at them; for in this consists the recovery

of thy life.

The idle business of show, plays on the stage, flocks of sheep, herds,

exercises with spears, a bone cast to little dogs, a bit of bread

into fish-ponds, labourings of ants and burden-carrying, runnings

about of frightened little mice, puppets pulled by strings- all alike.

It is thy duty then in the midst of such things to show good humour

and not a proud air; to understand however that every man is worth

just so much as the things are worth about which he busies himself.

In discourse thou must attend to what is said, and in every movement

thou must observe what is doing. And in the one thou shouldst see

immediately to what end it refers, but in the other watch carefully

what is the thing signified.

Is my understanding sufficient for this or not? If it is sufficient,

I use it for the work as an instrument given by the universal nature.

But if it is not sufficient, then either I retire from the work and

give way to him who is able to do it better, unless there be some

reason why I ought not to do so; or I do it as well as I can, taking

to help me the man who with the aid of my ruling principle can do

what is now fit and useful for the general good. For whatsoever either

by myself or with another I can do, ought to be directed to this only,

to that which is useful and well suited to society.

How many after being celebrated by fame have been given up to oblivion;

and how many who have celebrated the fame of others have long been

dead.

Be not ashamed to be helped; for it is thy business to do thy duty

like a soldier in the assault on a town. How then, if being lame thou

canst not mount up on the battlements alone, but with the help of

another it is possible?

Let not future things disturb thee, for thou wilt come to them, if

it shall be necessary, having with thee the same reason which now

thou usest for present things.

All things are implicated with one another, and the bond is holy;

and there is hardly anything unconnected with any other thing. For

things have been co-ordinated, and they combine to form the same universe

(order). For there is one universe made up of all things, and one

God who pervades all things, and one substance, and one law, one common

reason in all intelligent animals, and one truth; if indeed there

is also one perfection for all animals which are of the same stock

and participate in the same reason.

Everything material soon disappears in the substance of the whole;

and everything formal (causal) is very soon taken back into the universal

reason; and the memory of everything is very soon overwhelmed in time.

To the rational animal the same act is according to nature and according

to reason.

Be thou erect, or be made erect.

Just as it is with the members in those bodies which are united in

one, so it is with rational beings which exist separate, for they

have been constituted for one co-operation. And the perception of

this will be more apparent to thee, if thou often sayest to thyself

that I am a member (melos) of the system of rational beings. But if

(using the letter r) thou sayest that thou art a part (meros) thou

dost not yet love men from thy heart; beneficence does not yet delight

thee for its own sake; thou still doest it barely as a thing of propriety,

and not yet as doing good to thyself.

Let there fall externally what will on the parts which can feel the

effects of this fall. For those parts which have felt will complain,

if they choose. But I, unless I think that what has happened is an

evil, am not injured. And it is in my power not to think so.

Whatever any one does or says, I must be good, just as if the gold,

or the emerald, or the purple were always saying this, Whatever any

one does or says, I must be emerald and keep my colour.

The ruling faculty does not disturb itself; I mean, does not frighten

itself or cause itself pain. But if any one else can frighten or pain

it, let him do so. For the faculty itself will not by its own opinion

turn itself into such ways. Let the body itself take care, if it can,

that is suffer nothing, and let it speak, if it suffers. But the soul

itself, that which is subject to fear, to pain, which has completely

the power of forming an opinion about these things, will suffer nothing,

for it will never deviate into such a judgement. The leading principle

in itself wants nothing, unless it makes a want for itself; and therefore

it is both free from perturbation and unimpeded, if it does not disturb

and impede itself.

Eudaemonia (happiness) is a good daemon, or a good thing. What then

art thou doing here, O imagination? Go away, I entreat thee by the

gods, as thou didst come, for I want thee not. But thou art come according

to thy old fashion. I am not angry with thee: only go away.

Is any man afraid of change? Why what can take place without change?

What then is more pleasing or more suitable to the universal nature?

And canst thou take a bath unless the wood undergoes a change? And

canst thou be nourished, unless the food undergoes a change? And can

anything else that is useful be accomplished without change? Dost

thou not see then that for thyself also to change is just the same,

and equally necessary for the universal nature?

Through the universal substance as through a furious torrent all bodies

are carried, being by their nature united with and cooperating with

the whole, as the parts of our body with one another. How many a Chrysippus,

how many a Socrates, how many an Epictetus has time already swallowed

up? And let the same thought occur to thee with reference to every

man and thing.

One thing only troubles me, lest I should do something which the constitution

of man does not allow, or in the way which it does not allow, or what

it does not allow now.

Near is thy forgetfulness of all things; and near the forgetfulness

of thee by all.

It is peculiar to man to love even those who do wrong. And this happens,

if when they do wrong it occurs to thee that they are kinsmen, and

that they do wrong through ignorance and unintentionally, and that

soon both of you will die; and above all, that the wrong-doer has

done thee no harm, for he has not made thy ruling faculty worse than

it was before.

The universal nature out of the universal substance, as if it were

wax, now moulds a horse, and when it has broken this up, it uses the

material for a tree, then for a man, then for something else; and

each of these things subsists for a very short time. But it is no

hardship for the vessel to be broken up, just as there was none in

its being fastened together.

A scowling look is altogether unnatural; when it is often assumed,

the result is that all comeliness dies away, and at last is so completely

extinguished that it cannot be again lighted up at all. Try to conclude

from this very fact that it is contrary to reason. For if even the

perception of doing wrong shall depart, what reason is there for living

any longer?

Nature which governs the whole will soon change all things which thou

seest, and out of their substance will make other things, and again

other things from the substance of them, in order that the world may

be ever new.

When a man has done thee any wrong, immediately consider with what

opinion about good or evil he has done wrong. For when thou hast seen

this, thou wilt pity him, and wilt neither wonder nor be angry. For

either thou thyself thinkest the same thing to be good that he does

or another thing of the same kind. It is thy duty then to pardon him.

But if thou dost not think such things to be good or evil, thou wilt

more readily be well disposed to him who is in error.

Think not so much of what thou hast not as of what thou hast: but

of the things which thou hast select the best, and then reflect how

eagerly they would have been sought, if thou hadst them not. At the

same time however take care that thou dost not through being so pleased

with them accustom thyself to overvalue them, so as to be disturbed

if ever thou shouldst not have them.

Retire into thyself. The rational principle which rules has this nature,

that it is content with itself when it does what is just, and so secures

tranquility.

Wipe out the imagination. Stop the pulling of the strings. Confine

thyself to the present. Understand well what happens either to thee

or to another. Divide and distribute every object into the causal

(formal) and the material. Think of thy last hour. Let the wrong which

is done by a man stay there where the wrong was done.

Direct thy attention to what is said. Let thy understanding enter

into the things that are doing and the things which do them.

Adorn thyself with simplicity and modesty and with indifference towards

the things which lie between virtue and vice. Love mankind. Follow

God. The poet says that Law rules all.- And it is enough to remember

that Law rules all.

About death: Whether it is a dispersion, or a resolution into atoms,

or annihilation, it is either extinction or change.

About pain: The pain which is intolerable carries us off; but that

which lasts a long time is tolerable; and the mind maintains its own

tranquility by retiring into itself, and the ruling faculty is not

made worse. But the parts which are harmed by pain, let them, if they

can, give their opinion about it.

About fame: Look at the minds of those who seek fame, observe what

they are, and what kind of things they avoid, and what kind of things

they pursue. And consider that as the heaps of sand piled on one another

hide the former sands, so in life the events which go before are soon

covered by those which come after.

From Plato: The man who has an elevated mind and takes a view of all

time and of all substance, dost thou suppose it possible for him to

think that human life is anything great? it is not possible, he said.-

Such a man then will think that death also is no evil.- Certainly

not.

From Antisthenes: It is royal to do good and to be abused.

It is a base thing for the countenance to be obedient and to regulate

and compose itself as the mind commands, and for the mind not to be

regulated and composed by itself.

It is not right to vex ourselves at things,

For they care nought about it.

To the immortal gods and us give joy.

Life must be reaped like the ripe ears of corn:

One man is born; another dies.

If gods care not for me and for my children,

There is a reason for it.

For the good is with me, and the just.

No joining others in their wailing, no violent emotion.

From Plato: But I would make this man a sufficient answer, which is

this: Thou sayest not well, if thou thinkest that a man who is good

for anything at all ought to compute the hazard of life or death,

and should not rather look to this only in all that he does, whether

he is doing what is just or unjust, and the works of a good or a bad

man.

For thus it is, men of Athens, in truth: wherever a man has placed

himself thinking it the best place for him, or has been placed by

a commander, there in my opinion he ought to stay and to abide the

hazard, taking nothing into the reckoning, either death or anything

else, before the baseness of deserting his post.

But, my good friend, reflect whether that which is noble and good

is not something different from saving and being saved; for as to

a man living such or such a time, at least one who is really a man,

consider if this is not a thing to be dismissed from the thoughts:

and there must be no love of life: but as to these matters a man must

intrust them to the deity and believe what the women say, that no

man can escape his destiny, the next inquiry being how he may best

live the time that he has to live.

Look round at the courses of the stars, as if thou wert going along

with them; and constantly consider the changes of the elements into

one another; for such thoughts purge away the filth of the terrene

life.

This is a fine saying of Plato: That he who is discoursing about men

should look also at earthly things as if he viewed them from some

higher place; should look at them in their assemblies, armies, agricultural

labours, marriages, treaties, births, deaths, noise of the courts

of justice, desert places, various nations of barbarians, feasts,

lamentations, markets, a mixture of all things and an orderly combination

of contraries.

Consider the past; such great changes of political supremacies. Thou

mayest foresee also the things which will be. For they will certainly

be of like form, and it is not possible that they should deviate from

the order of the things which take place now: accordingly to have

contemplated human life for forty years is the same as to have contemplated

it for ten thousand years. For what more wilt thou see?

That which has grown from the earth to the earth,

But that which has sprung from heavenly seed,

Back to the heavenly realms returns. This is either a dissolution

of the mutual involution of the atoms, or a similar dispersion of

the unsentient elements.

With food and drinks and cunning magic arts

Turning the channel's course to 'scape from death.

The breeze which heaven has sent

We must endure, and toil without complaining.

Another may be more expert in casting his opponent; but he is not

more social, nor more modest, nor better disciplined to meet all that

happens, nor more considerate with respect to the faults of his neighbours.

Where any work can be done conformably to the reason which is common

to gods and men, there we have nothing to fear: for where we are able

to get profit by means of the activity which is successful and proceeds

according to our constitution, there no harm is to be suspected.

Everywhere and at all times it is in thy power piously to acquiesce

in thy present condition, and to behave justly to those who are about

thee, and to exert thy skill upon thy present thoughts, that nothing

shall steal into them without being well examined.

Do not look around thee to discover other men's ruling principles,

but look straight to this, to what nature leads thee, both the universal

nature through the things which happen to thee, and thy own nature

through the acts which must be done by thee. But every being ought

to do that which is according to its constitution; and all other things

have been constituted for the sake of rational beings, just as among

irrational things the inferior for the sake of the superior, but the

rational for the sake of one another.

The prime principle then in man's constitution is the social. And

the second is not to yield to the persuasions of the body, for it

is the peculiar office of the rational and intelligent motion to circumscribe

itself, and never to be overpowered either by the motion of the senses

or of the appetites, for both are animal; but the intelligent motion

claims superiority and does not permit itself to be overpowered by

the others. And with good reason, for it is formed by nature to use

all of them. The third thing in the rational constitution is freedom

from error and from deception. Let then the ruling principle holding

fast to these things go straight on, and it has what is its own.

Consider thyself to be dead, and to have completed thy life up to

the present time; and live according to nature the remainder which

is allowed thee.

Love that only which happens to thee and is spun with the thread of

thy destiny. For what is more suitable?

In everything which happens keep before thy eyes those to whom the

same things happened, and how they were vexed, and treated them as

strange things, and found fault with them: and now where are they?

Nowhere. Why then dost thou too choose to act in the same way? And

why dost thou not leave these agitations which are foreign to nature,

to those who cause them and those who are moved by them? And why art

thou not altogether intent upon the right way of making use of the

things which happen to thee? For then thou wilt use them well, and

they will be a material for thee to work on. Only attend to thyself,

and resolve to be a good man in every act which thou doest: and remember...

Look within. Within is the fountain of good, and it will ever bubble

up, if thou wilt ever dig.

The body ought to be compact, and to show no irregularity either in

motion or attitude. For what the mind shows in the face by maintaining

in it the expression of intelligence and propriety, that ought to

be required also in the whole body. But all of these things should

be observed without affectation.

The art of life is more like the wrestler's art than the dancer's,

in respect of this, that it should stand ready and firm to meet onsets

which are sudden and unexpected.

Constantly observe who those are whose approbation thou wishest to

have, and what ruling principles they possess. For then thou wilt

neither blame those who offend involuntarily, nor wilt thou want their

approbation, if thou lookest to the sources of their opinions and

appetites.

Every soul, the philosopher says, is involuntarily deprived of truth;

consequently in the same way it is deprived of justice and temperance

and benevolence and everything of the kind. It is most necessary to

bear this constantly in mind, for thus thou wilt be more gentle towards

all.

In every pain let this thought be present, that there is no dishonour

in it, nor does it make the governing intelligence worse, for it does

not damage the intelligence either so far as the intelligence is rational

or so far as it is social. Indeed in the case of most pains let this

remark of Epicurus aid thee, that pain is neither intolerable nor

everlasting, if thou bearest in mind that it has its limits, and if

thou addest nothing to it in imagination: and remember this too, that

we do not perceive that many things which are disagreeable to us are

the same as pain, such as excessive drowsiness, and the being scorched

by heat, and the having no appetite. When then thou art discontented

about any of these things, say to thyself, that thou art yielding

to pain.

Take care not to feel towards the inhuman, as they feel towards men.

How do we know if Telauges was not superior in character to Socrates?

For it is not enough that Socrates died a more noble death, and disputed

more skilfully with the sophists, and passed the night in the cold

with more endurance, and that when he was bid to arrest Leon of Salamis,

he considered it more noble to refuse, and that he walked in a swaggering

way in the streets- though as to this fact one may have great doubts

if it was true. But we ought to inquire, what kind of a soul it was

that Socrates possessed, and if he was able to be content with being

just towards men and pious towards the gods, neither idly vexed on

account of men's villainy, nor yet making himself a slave to any man's

ignorance, nor receiving as strange anything that fell to his share

out of the universal, nor enduring it as intolerable, nor allowing

his understanding to sympathize with the affects of the miserable

flesh.

Nature has not so mingled the intelligence with the composition of

the body, as not to have allowed thee the power of circumscribing

thyself and of bringing under subjection to thyself all that is thy

own; for it is very possible to be a divine man and to be recognised

as such by no one. Always bear this in mind; and another thing too,

that very little indeed is necessary for living a happy life. And

because thou hast despaired of becoming a dialectician and skilled

in the knowledge of nature, do not for this reason renounce the hope

of being both free and modest and social and obedient to God.

It is in thy power to live free from all compulsion in the greatest

tranquility of mind, even if all the world cry out against thee as

much as they choose, and even if wild beasts tear in pieces the members

of this kneaded matter which has grown around thee. For what hinders

the mind in the midst of all this from maintaining itself in tranquility

and in a just judgement of all surrounding things and in a ready use

of the objects which are presented to it, so that the judgement may

say to the thing which falls under its observation: This thou art

in substance (reality), though in men's opinion thou mayest appear

to be of a different kind; and the use shall say to that which falls

under the hand: Thou art the thing that I was seeking; for to me that

which presents itself is always a material for virtue both rational

and political, and in a word, for the exercise of art, which belongs

to man or God. For everything which happens has a relationship either

to God or man, and is neither new nor difficult to handle, but usual

and apt matter to work on.

The perfection of moral character consists in this, in passing every

day as the last, and in being neither violently excited nor torpid

nor playing the hypocrite.

The gods who are immortal are not vexed because during so long a time

they must tolerate continually men such as they are and so many of

them bad; and besides this, they also take care of them in all ways.

But thou, who art destined to end so soon, art thou wearied of enduring

the bad, and this too when thou art one of them?

It is a ridiculous thing for a man not to fly from his own badness,

which is indeed possible, but to fly from other men's badness, which

is impossible.

Whatever the rational and political (social) faculty finds to be neither

intelligent nor social, it properly judges to be inferior to itself.

When thou hast done a good act and another has received it, why dost

thou look for a third thing besides these, as fools do, either to

have the reputation of having done a good act or to obtain a return?

No man is tired of receiving what is useful. But it is useful to act

according to nature. Do not then be tired of receiving what is useful

by doing it to others.

The nature of the An moved to make the universe. But now either everything

that takes place comes by way of consequence or continuity; or even

the chief things towards which the ruling power of the universe directs

its own movement are governed by no rational principle. If this is

remembered it will make thee more tranquil in many things.

----------------------------------------------------------------------

BOOK EIGHT

This reflection also tends to the removal of the desire of empty

fame, that it is no longer in thy power to have lived the whole of

thy life, or at least thy life from thy youth upwards, like a philosopher;

but both to many others and to thyself it is plain that thou art far

from philosophy. Thou hast fallen into disorder then, so that it is

no longer easy for thee to get the reputation of a philosopher; and

thy plan of life also opposes it. If then thou hast truly seen where

the matter lies, throw away the thought, How thou shalt seem to others,

and be content if thou shalt live the rest of thy life in such wise

as thy nature wills. Observe then what it wills, and let nothing else

distract thee; for thou hast had experience of many wanderings without

having found happiness anywhere, not in syllogisms, nor in wealth,

nor in reputation, nor in enjoyment, nor anywhere. Where is it then?

In doing what man's nature requires. How then shall a man do this?

If he has principles from which come his affects and his acts. What

principles? Those which relate to good and bad: the belief that there

is nothing good for man, which does not make him just, temperate,

manly, free; and that there is nothing bad, which does not do the

contrary to what has been mentioned.

On the occasion of every act ask thyself, How is this with respect

to me? Shall I repent of it? A little time and I am dead, and all

is gone. What more do I seek, if what I am now doing is work of an

intelligent living being, and a social being, and one who is under

the same law with God?

Alexander and Gaius and Pompeius, what are they in comparison with

Diogenes and Heraclitus and Socrates? For they were acquainted with

things, and their causes (forms), and their matter, and the ruling

principles of these men were the same. But as to the others, how many

things had they to care for, and to how many things were they slaves?

Consider that men will do the same things nevertheless, even though

thou shouldst burst.

This is the chief thing: Be not perturbed, for all things are according

to the nature of the universal; and in a little time thou wilt be

nobody and nowhere, like Hadrian and Augustus. In the next place having

fixed thy eyes steadily on thy business look at it, and at the same

time remembering that it is thy duty to be a good man, and what man's

nature demands, do that without turning aside; and speak as it seems

to thee most just, only let it be with a good disposition and with

modesty and without hypocrisy.

The nature of the universal has this work to do, to remove to that

place the things which are in this, to change them, to take them away

hence, and to carry them there. All things are change, yet we need

not fear anything new. All things are familiar to us; but the distribution

of them still remains the same.

Every nature is contented with itself when it goes on its way well;

and a rational nature goes on its way well, when in its thoughts it

assents to nothing false or uncertain, and when it directs its movements

to social acts only, and when it confines its desires and aversions

to the things which are in its power, and when it is satisfied with

everything that is assigned to it by the common nature. For of this

common nature every particular nature is a part, as the nature of

the leaf is a part of the nature of the plant; except that in the

plant the nature of the leaf is part of a nature which has not perception

or reason, and is subject to be impeded; but the nature of man is

part of a nature which is not subject to impediments, and is intelligent

and just, since it gives to everything in equal portions and according

to its worth, times, substance, cause (form), activity, and incident.

But examine, not to discover that any one thing compared with any

other single thing is equal in all respects, but by taking all the

parts together of one thing and comparing them with all the parts

together of another.

Thou hast not leisure or ability to read. But thou hast leisure or

ability to check arrogance: thou hast leisure to be superior to pleasure

and pain: thou hast leisure to be superior to love of fame, and not

to be vexed at stupid and ungrateful people, nay even to care for

them.

Let no man any longer hear thee finding fault with the court life

or with thy own.

Repentance is a kind of self-reproof for having neglected something

useful; but that which is good must be something useful, and the perfect

good man should look after it. But no such man would ever repent of

having refused any sensual pleasure. Pleasure then is neither good

nor useful.

This thing, what is it in itself, in its own constitution? What is

its substance and material? And what its causal nature (or form)?

And what is it doing in the world? And how long does it subsist?

When thou risest from sleep with reluctance, remember that it is according

to thy constitution and according to human nature to perform social

acts, but sleeping is common also to irrational animals. But that

which is according to each individual's nature is also more peculiarly

its own, and more suitable to its nature, and indeed also more agreeable.

Constantly and, if it be possible, on the occasion of every impression

on the soul, apply to it the principles of Physic, of Ethic, and of

Dialectic.

Whatever man thou meetest with, immediately say to thyself: What opinions

has this man about good and bad? For if with respect to pleasure and

pain and the causes of each, and with respect to fame and ignominy,

death and life, he has such and such opinions, it will seem nothing

wonderful or strange to me, if he does such and such things; and I

shall bear in mind that he is compelled to do so.

Remember that as it is a shame to be surprised if the fig-tree produces

figs, so it is to be surprised if the world produces such and such

things of which it is productive; and for the physician and the helmsman

it is a shame to be surprised, if a man has a fever, or if the wind

is unfavourable.

Remember that to change thy opinion and to follow him who corrects

thy error is as consistent with freedom as it is to persist in thy

error. For it is thy own, the activity which is exerted according

to thy own movement and judgement, and indeed according to thy own

understanding too.

If a thing is in thy own power, why dost thou do it? But if it is

in the power of another, whom dost thou blame? The atoms (chance)

or the gods? Both are foolish. Thou must blame nobody. For if thou

canst, correct that which is the cause; but if thou canst not do this,

correct at least the thing itself; but if thou canst not do even this,

of what use is it to thee to find fault? For nothing should be done

without a purpose.

That which has died falls not out of the universe. If it stays here,

it also changes here, and is dissolved into its proper parts, which

are elements of the universe and of thyself. And these too change,

and they murmur not.

Everything exists for some end, a horse, a vine. Why dost thou wonder?

Even the sun will say, I am for some purpose, and the rest of the

gods will say the same. For what purpose then art thou? to enjoy pleasure?

See if common sense allows this.

Nature has had regard in everything no less to the end than to the

beginning and the continuance, just like the man who throws up a ball.

What good is it then for the ball to be thrown up, or harm for it

to come down, or even to have fallen? And what good is it to the bubble

while it holds together, or what harm when it is burst? The same may

be said of a light also.

Turn it (the body) inside out, and see what kind of thing it is; and

when it has grown old, what kind of thing it becomes, and when it

is diseased.

Short-lived are both the praiser and the praised, and the rememberer

and the remembered: and all this in a nook of this part of the world;

and not even here do all agree, no, not any one with himself: and

the whole earth too is a point.

Attend to the matter which is before thee, whether it is an opinion

or an act or a word.

Thou sufferest this justly: for thou choosest rather to become good

to-morrow than to be good to-day.

Am I doing anything? I do it with reference to the good of mankind.

Does anything happen to me? I receive it and refer it to the gods,

and the source of all things, from which all that happens is derived.

Such as bathing appears to thee- oil, sweat, dirt, filthy water, all

things disgusting- so is every part of life and everything.

Lucilla saw Verus die, and then Lucilla died. Secunda saw Maximus

die, and then Secunda died. Epitynchanus saw Diotimus die, and Epitynchanus

died. Antoninus saw Faustina die, and then Antoninus died. Such is

everything. Celer saw Hadrian die, and then Celer died. And those

sharp-witted men, either seers or men inflated with pride, where are

they? For instance the sharp-witted men, Charax and Demetrius the

Platonist and Eudaemon, and any one else like them. All ephemeral,

dead long ago. Some indeed have not been remembered even for a short

time, and others have become the heroes of fables, and again others

have disappeared even from fables. Remember this then, that this little

compound, thyself, must either be dissolved, or thy poor breath must

be extinguished, or be removed and placed elsewhere.

It is satisfaction to a man to do the proper works of a man. Now it

is a proper work of a man to be benevolent to his own kind, to despise

the movements of the senses, to form a just judgement of plausible

appearances, and to take a survey of the nature of the universe and

of the things which happen in it.

There are three relations between thee and other things: the one to

the body which surrounds thee; the second to the divine cause from

which all things come to all; and the third to those who live with

thee.

Pain is either an evil to the body- then let the body say what it

thinks of it- or to the soul; but it is in the power of the soul to

maintain its own serenity and tranquility, and not to think that pain

is an evil. For every judgement and movement and desire and aversion

is within, and no evil ascends so high.

Wipe out thy imaginations by often saying to thyself: now it is in

my power to let no badness be in this soul, nor desire nor any perturbation

at all; but looking at all things I see what is their nature, and

I use each according to its value.- Remember this power which thou

hast from nature.

Speak both in the senate and to every man, whoever he may be, appropriately,

not with any affectation: use plain discourse.

Augustus' court, wife, daughter, descendants, ancestors, sister, Agrippa,

kinsmen, intimates, friends, Areius, Maecenas, physicians and sacrificing

priests- the whole court is dead. Then turn to the rest, not considering

the death of a single man, but of a whole race, as of the Pompeii;

and that which is inscribed on the tombs- The last of his race. Then

consider what trouble those before them have had that they might leave

a successor; and then, that of necessity some one must be the last.

Again here consider the death of a whole race.

It is thy duty to order thy life well in every single act; and if

every act does its duty, as far as is possible, be content; and no

one is able to hinder thee so that each act shall not do its duty.-

But something external will stand in the way.- Nothing will stand

in the way of thy acting justly and soberly and considerately.- But

perhaps some other active power will be hindered.- Well, but by acquiescing

in the hindrance and by being content to transfer thy efforts to that

which is allowed, another opportunity of action is immediately put

before thee in place of that which was hindered, and one which will

adapt itself to this ordering of which we are speaking.

Receive wealth or prosperity without arrogance; and be ready to let

it go.

If thou didst ever see a hand cut off, or a foot, or a head, lying

anywhere apart from the rest of the body, such does a man make himself,

as far as he can, who is not content with what happens, and separates

himself from others, or does anything unsocial. Suppose that thou

hast detached thyself from the natural unity- for thou wast made by

nature a part, but now thou hast cut thyself off- yet here there is

this beautiful provision, that it is in thy power again to unite thyself.

God has allowed this to no other part, after it has been separated

and cut asunder, to come together again. But consider the kindness

by which he has distinguished man, for he has put it in his power

not to be separated at all from the universal; and when he has been

separated, he has allowed him to return and to be united and to resume

his place as a part.

As the nature of the universal has given to every rational being all

the other powers that it has, so we have received from it this power

also. For as the universal nature converts and fixes in its predestined

place everything which stands in the way and opposes it, and makes

such things a part of itself, so also the rational animal is able

to make every hindrance its own material, and to use it for such purposes

as it may have designed.

Do not disturb thyself by thinking of the whole of thy life. Let not

thy thoughts at once embrace all the various troubles which thou mayest

expect to befall thee: but on every occasion ask thyself, What is

there in this which is intolerable and past bearing? For thou wilt

be ashamed to confess. In the next place remember that neither the

future nor the past pains thee, but only the present. But this is

reduced to a very little, if thou only circumscribest it, and chidest

thy mind, if it is unable to hold out against even this.

Does Panthea or Pergamus now sit by the tomb of Verus? Does Chaurias

or Diotimus sit by the tomb of Hadrian? That would be ridiculous.

Well, suppose they did sit there, would the dead be conscious of it?

And if the dead were conscious, would they be pleased? And if they

were pleased, would that make them immortal? Was it not in the order

of destiny that these persons too should first become old women and

old men and then die? What then would those do after these were dead?

All this is foul smell and blood in a bag.

If thou canst see sharp, look and judge wisely, says the philosopher.

In the constitution of the rational animal I see no virtue which is

opposed to justice; but I see a virtue which is opposed to love of

pleasure, and that is temperance.

If thou takest away thy opinion about that which appears to give thee

pain, thou thyself standest in perfect security.- Who is this self?-

The reason.- But I am not reason.- Be it so. Let then the reason itself

not trouble itself. But if any other part of thee suffers, let it

have its own opinion about itself.

Hindrance to the perceptions of sense is an evil to the animal nature.

Hindrance to the movements (desires) is equally an evil to the animal

nature. And something else also is equally an impediment and an evil

to the constitution of plants. So then that which is a hindrance to

the intelligence is an evil to the intelligent nature. Apply all these

things then to thyself. Does pain or sensuous pleasure affect thee?

The senses will look to that.- Has any obstacle opposed thee in thy

efforts towards an object? if indeed thou wast making this effort

absolutely (unconditionally, or without any reservation), certainly

this obstacle is an evil to thee considered as a rational animal.

But if thou takest into consideration the usual course of things,

thou hast not yet been injured nor even impeded. The things however

which are proper to the understanding no other man is used to impede,

for neither fire, nor iron, nor tyrant, nor abuse, touches it in any

way. When it has been made a sphere, it continues a sphere.

It is not fit that I should give myself pain, for I have never intentionally

given pain even to another.

Different things delight different people. But it is my delight to

keep the ruling faculty sound without turning away either from any

man or from any of the things which happen to men, but looking at

and receiving all with welcome eyes and using everything according

to its value.

See that thou secure this present time to thyself: for those who rather

pursue posthumous fame do consider that the men of after time will

be exactly such as these whom they cannot bear now; and both are mortal.

And what is it in any way to thee if these men of after time utter

this or that sound, or have this or that opinion about thee?

Take me and cast me where thou wilt; for there I shall keep my divine

part tranquil, that is, content, if it can feel and act conformably

to its proper constitution. Is this change of place sufficient reason

why my soul should be unhappy and worse than it was, depressed, expanded,

shrinking, affrighted? And what wilt thou find which is sufficient

reason for this?

Nothing can happen to any man which is not a human accident, nor to

an ox which is not according to the nature of an ox, nor to a vine

which is not according to the nature of a vine, nor to a stone which

is not proper to a stone. If then there happens to each thing both

what is usual and natural, why shouldst thou complain? For the common

nature brings nothing which may not be borne by thee.

If thou art pained by any external thing, it is not this thing that

disturbs thee, but thy own judgement about it. And it is in thy power

to wipe out this judgement now. But if anything in thy own disposition

gives thee pain, who hinders thee from correcting thy opinion? And

even if thou art pained because thou art not doing some particular

thing which seems to thee to be right, why dost thou not rather act

than complain?- But some insuperable obstacle is in the way?- Do not

be grieved then, for the cause of its not being done depends not on

thee.- But it is not worth while to live if this cannot be done.-

Take thy departure then from life contentedly, just as he dies who

is in full activity, and well pleased too with the things which are

obstacles.

Remember that the ruling faculty is invincible, when self-collected

it is satisfied with itself, if it does nothing which it does not

choose to do, even if it resist from mere obstinacy. What then will

it be when it forms a judgement about anything aided by reason and

deliberately? Therefore the mind which is free from passions is a

citadel, for man has nothing more secure to which he can fly for,

refuge and for the future be inexpugnable. He then who has not seen

this is an ignorant man; but he who has seen it and does not fly to

this refuge is unhappy.

Say nothing more to thyself than what the first appearances report.

Suppose that it has been reported to thee that a certain person speaks

ill of thee. This has been reported; but that thou hast been injured,

that has not been reported. I see that my child is sick. I do see;

but that he is in danger, I do not see. Thus then always abide by

the first appearances, and add nothing thyself from within, and then

nothing happens to thee. Or rather add something, like a man who knows

everything that happens in the world.

A cucumber is bitter.- Throw it away.- There are briars in the road.-

Turn aside from them.- This is enough. Do not add, And why were such

things made in the world? For thou wilt be ridiculed by a man who

is acquainted with nature, as thou wouldst be ridiculed by a carpenter

and shoemaker if thou didst find fault because thou seest in their

workshop shavings and cuttings from the things which they make. And

yet they have places into which they can throw these shavings and

cuttings, and the universal nature has no external space; but the

wondrous part of her art is that though she has circumscribed herself,

everything within her which appears to decay and to grow old and to

be useless she changes into herself, and again makes other new things

from these very same, so that she requires neither substance from

without nor wants a place into which she may cast that which decays.

She is content then with her own space, and her own matter and her

own art.

Neither in thy actions be sluggish nor in thy conversation without

method, nor wandering in thy thoughts, nor let there be in thy soul

inward contention nor external effusion, nor in life be so busy as

to have no leisure.

Suppose that men kill thee, cut thee in pieces, curse thee. What then

can these things do to prevent thy mind from remaining pure, wise,

sober, just? For instance, if a man should stand by a limpid pure

spring, and curse it, the spring never ceases sending up potable water;

and if he should cast clay into it or filth, it will speedily disperse

them and wash them out, and will not be at all polluted. How then

shalt thou possess a perpetual fountain and not a mere well? By forming

thyself hourly to freedom conjoined with contentment, simplicity and

modesty.

He who does not know what the world is, does not know where he is.

And he who does not know for what purpose the world exists, does not

know who he is, nor what the world is. But he who has failed in any

one of these things could not even say for what purpose he exists

himself. What then dost thou think of him who avoids or seeks the

praise of those who applaud, of men who know not either where they

are or who they are?

Dost thou wish to be praised by a man who curses himself thrice every

hour? Wouldst thou wish to please a man who does not please himself?

Does a man please himself who repents of nearly everything that he

does?

No longer let thy breathing only act in concert with the air which

surrounds thee, but let thy intelligence also now be in harmony with

the intelligence which embraces all things. For the intelligent power

is no less diffused in all parts and pervades all things for him who

is willing to draw it to him than the aerial power for him who is

able to respire it.

Generally, wickedness does no harm at all to the universe; and particularly,

the wickedness of one man does no harm to another. It is only harmful

to him who has it in his power to be released from it, as soon as

he shall choose.

To my own free will the free will of my neighbour is just as indifferent

as his poor breath and flesh. For though we are made especially for

the sake of one another, still the ruling power of each of us has

its own office, for otherwise my neighbour's wickedness would be my

harm, which God has not willed in order that my unhappiness may not

depend on another.

The sun appears to be poured down, and in all directions indeed it

is diffused, yet it is not effused. For this diffusion is extension:

Accordingly its rays are called Extensions [aktines] because they

are extended [apo tou ekteinesthai]. But one may judge what kind of

a thing a ray is, if he looks at the sun's light passing through a

narrow opening into a darkened room, for it is extended in a right

line, and as it were is divided when it meets with any solid body

which stands in the way and intercepts the air beyond; but there the

light remains fixed and does not glide or fall off. Such then ought

to be the out-pouring and diffusion of the understanding, and it should

in no way be an effusion, but an extension, and it should make no

violent or impetuous collision with the obstacles which are in its

way; nor yet fall down, but be fixed and enlighten that which receives

it. For a body will deprive itself of the illumination, if it does

not admit it.

He who fears death either fears the loss of sensation or a different

kind of sensation. But if thou shalt have no sensation, neither wilt

thou feel any harm; and if thou shalt acquire another kind of sensation,

thou wilt be a different kind of living being and thou wilt not cease

to live.

Men exist for the sake of one another. Teach them then or bear with

them.

In one way an arrow moves, in another way the mind. The mind indeed,

both when it exercises caution and when it is employed about inquiry,

moves straight onward not the less, and to its object.

Enter into every man's ruling faculty; and also let every other man

enter into thine.

----------------------------------------------------------------------

BOOK NINE

He ho acts unjustly acts impiously. For since the universal nature

has made rational animals for the sake of one another to help one

another according to their deserts, but in no way to injure one another,

he who transgresses her will, is clearly guilty of impiety towards

the highest divinity. And he too who lies is guilty of impiety to

the same divinity; for the universal nature is the nature of things

that are; and things that are have a relation to all things that come

into existence. And further, this universal nature is named truth,

and is the prime cause of all things that are true. He then who lies

intentionally is guilty of impiety inasmuch as he acts unjustly by

deceiving; and he also who lies unintentionally, inasmuch as he is

at variance with the universal nature, and inasmuch as he disturbs

the order by fighting against the nature of the world; for he fights

against it, who is moved of himself to that which is contrary to truth,

for he had received powers from nature through the neglect of which

he is not able now to distinguish falsehood from truth. And indeed

he who pursues pleasure as good, and avoids pain as evil, is guilty

of impiety. For of necessity such a man must often find fault with

the universal nature, alleging that it assigns things to the bad and

the good contrary to their deserts, because frequently the bad are

in the enjoyment of pleasure and possess the things which procure

pleasure, but the good have pain for their share and the things which

cause pain. And further, he who is afraid of pain will sometimes also

be afraid of some of the things which will happen in the world, and

even this is impiety. And he who pursues pleasure will not abstain

from injustice, and this is plainly impiety. Now with respect to the

things towards which the universal nature is equally affected- for

it would not have made both, unless it was equally affected towards

both- towards these they who wish to follow nature should be of the

same mind with it, and equally affected. With respect to pain, then,

and pleasure, or death and life, or honour and dishonour, which the

universal nature employs equally, whoever is not equally affected

is manifestly acting impiously. And I say that the universal nature

employs them equally, instead of saying that they happen alike to

those who are produced in continuous series and to those who come

after them by virtue of a certain original movement of Providence,

according to which it moved from a certain beginning to this ordering

of things, having conceived certain principles of the things which

were to be, and having determined powers productive of beings and

of changes and of such like successions.

It would be a man's happiest lot to depart from mankind without having

had any taste of lying and hypocrisy and luxury and pride. However

to breathe out one's life when a man has had enough of these things

is the next best voyage, as the saying is. Hast thou determined to

abide with vice, and has not experience yet induced thee to fly from

this pestilence? For the destruction of the understanding is a pestilence,

much more indeed than any such corruption and change of this atmosphere

which surrounds us. For this corruption is a pestilence of animals

so far as they are animals; but the other is a pestilence of men so

far as they are men.

Do not despise death, but be well content with it, since this too

is one of those things which nature wills. For such as it is to be

young and to grow old, and to increase and to reach maturity, and

to have teeth and beard and grey hairs, and to beget, and to be pregnant

and to bring forth, and all the other natural operations which the

seasons of thy life bring, such also is dissolution. This, then, is

consistent with the character of a reflecting man, to be neither careless

nor impatient nor contemptuous with respect to death, but to wait

for it as one of the operations of nature. As thou now waitest for

the time when the child shall come out of thy wife's womb, so be ready

for the time when thy soul shall fall out of this envelope. But if

thou requirest also a vulgar kind of comfort which shall reach thy

heart, thou wilt be made best reconciled to death by observing the

objects from which thou art going to be removed, and the morals of

those with whom thy soul will no longer be mingled. For it is no way

right to be offended with men, but it is thy duty to care for them

and to bear with them gently; and yet to remember that thy departure

will be not from men who have the same principles as thyself. For

this is the only thing, if there be any, which could draw us the contrary

way and attach us to life, to be permitted to live with those who

have the same principles as ourselves. But now thou seest how great

is the trouble arising from the discordance of those who live together,

so that thou mayest say, Come quick, O death, lest perchance I, too,

should forget myself.

He who does wrong does wrong against himself. He who acts unjustly

acts unjustly to himself, because he makes himself bad.

He often acts unjustly who does not do a certain thing; not only he

who does a certain thing.

Thy present opinion founded on understanding, and thy present conduct

directed to social good, and thy present disposition of contentment

with everything which happens- that is enough.

Wipe out imagination: check desire: extinguish appetite: keep the

ruling faculty in its own power.

Among the animals which have not reason one life is distributed; but

among reasonable animals one intelligent soul is distributed: just

as there is one earth of all things which are of an earthy nature,

and we see by one light, and breathe one air, all of us that have

the faculty of vision and all that have life.

All things which participate in anything which is common to them all

move towards that which is of the same kind with themselves. Everything

which is earthy turns towards the earth, everything which is liquid

flows together, and everything which is of an aerial kind does the

same, so that they require something to keep them asunder, and the

application of force. Fire indeed moves upwards on account of the

elemental fire, but it is so ready to be kindled together with all

the fire which is here, that even every substance which is somewhat

dry, is easily ignited, because there is less mingled with it of that

which is a hindrance to ignition. Accordingly then everything also

which participates in the common intelligent nature moves in like

manner towards that which is of the same kind with itself, or moves

even more. For so much as it is superior in comparison with all other

things, in the same degree also is it more ready to mingle with and

to be fused with that which is akin to it. Accordingly among animals

devoid of reason we find swarms of bees, and herds of cattle, and

the nurture of young birds, and in a manner, loves; for even in animals

there are souls, and that power which brings them together is seen

to exert itself in the superior degree, and in such a way as never

has been observed in plants nor in stones nor in trees. But in rational

animals there are political communities and friendships, and families

and meetings of people; and in wars, treaties and armistices. But

in the things which are still superior, even though they are separated

from one another, unity in a manner exists, as in the stars. Thus

the ascent to the higher degree is able to produce a sympathy even

in things which are separated. See, then, what now takes place. For

only intelligent animals have now forgotten this mutual desire and

inclination, and in them alone the property of flowing together is

not seen. But still though men strive to avoid this union, they are

caught and held by it, for their nature is too strong for them; and

thou wilt see what I say, if thou only observest. Sooner, then, will

one find anything earthy which comes in contact with no earthy thing

than a man altogether separated from other men.

Both man and God and the universe produce fruit; at the proper seasons

each produces it. But if usage has especially fixed these terms to

the vine and like things, this is nothing. Reason produces fruit both

for all and for itself, and there are produced from it other things

of the same kind as reason itself.

If thou art able, correct by teaching those who do wrong; but if thou

canst not, remember that indulgence is given to thee for this purpose.

And the gods, too, are indulgent to such persons; and for some purposes

they even help them to get health, wealth, reputation; so kind they

are. And it is in thy power also; or say, who hinders thee?

Labour not as one who is wretched, nor yet as one who would be pitied

or admired: but direct thy will to one thing only, to put thyself

in motion and to check thyself, as the social reason requires.

To-day I have got out of all trouble, or rather I have cast out all

trouble, for it was not outside, but within and in my opinions.

All things are the same, familiar in experience, and ephemeral in

time, and worthless in the matter. Everything now is just as it was

in the time of those whom we have buried.

Things stand outside of us, themselves by themselves, neither knowing

aught of themselves, nor expressing any judgement. What is it, then,

which does judge about them? The ruling faculty.

Not in passivity, but in activity lie the evil and the good of the

rational social animal, just as his virtue and his vice lie not in

passivity, but in activity.

For the stone which has been thrown up it is no evil to come down,

nor indeed any good to have been carried up.

Penetrate inwards into men's leading principles, and thou wilt see

what judges thou art afraid of, and what kind of judges they are of

themselves.

All things are changing: and thou thyself art in continuous mutation

and in a manner in continuous destruction, and the whole universe

too.

It is thy duty to leave another man's wrongful act there where it

is.

Termination of activity, cessation from movement and opinion, and

in a sense their death, is no evil. Turn thy thoughts now to the consideration

of thy life, thy life as a child, as a youth, thy manhood, thy old

age, for in these also every change was a death. Is this anything

to fear? Turn thy thoughts now to thy life under thy grandfather,

then to thy life under thy mother, then to thy life under thy father;

and as thou findest many other differences and changes and terminations,

ask thyself, Is this anything to fear? In like manner, then, neither

are the termination and cessation and change of thy whole life a thing

to be afraid of.

Hasten to examine thy own ruling faculty and that of the universe

and that of thy neighbour: thy own that thou mayest make it just:

and that of the universe, that thou mayest remember of what thou art

a part; and that of thy neighbour, that thou mayest know whether he

has acted ignorantly or with knowledge, and that thou mayest also

consider that his ruling faculty is akin to thine.

As thou thyself art a component part of a social system, so let every

act of thine be a component part of social life. Whatever act of thine

then has no reference either immediately or remotely to a social end,

this tears asunder thy life, and does not allow it to be one, and

it is of the nature of a mutiny, just as when in a popular assembly

a man acting by himself stands apart from the general agreement.

Quarrels of little children and their sports, and poor spirits carrying

about dead bodies, such is everything; and so what is exhibited in

the representation of the mansions of the dead strikes our eyes more

clearly.

Examine into the quality of the form of an object, and detach it altogether

from its material part, and then contemplate it; then determine the

time, the longest which a thing of this peculiar form is naturally

made to endure.

Thou hast endured infinite troubles through not being contented with

thy ruling faculty, when it does the things which it is constituted

by nature to do. But enough of this.

When another blames thee or hates thee, or when men say about thee

anything injurious, approach their poor souls, penetrate within, and

see what kind of men they are. Thou wilt discover that there is no

reason to take any trouble that these men may have this or that opinion

about thee. However thou must be well disposed towards them, for by

nature they are friends. And the gods too aid them in all ways, by

dreams, by signs, towards the attainment of those things on which

they set a value.

The periodic movements of the universe are the same, up and down from

age to age. And either the universal intelligence puts itself in motion

for every separate effect, and if this is so, be thou content with

that which is the result of its activity; or it puts itself in motion

once, and everything else comes by way of sequence in a manner; or

indivisible elements are the origin of all things.- In a word, if

there is a god, all is well; and if chance rules, do not thou also

be governed by it.

Soon will the earth cover us all: then the earth, too, will change,

and the things also which result from change will continue to change

for ever, and these again for ever. For if a man reflects on the changes

and transformations which follow one another like wave after wave

and their rapidity, he will despise everything which is perishable.

The universal cause is like a winter torrent: it carries everything

along with it. But how worthless are all these poor people who are

engaged in matters political, and, as they suppose, are playing the

philosopher! All drivellers. Well then, man: do what nature now requires.

Set thyself in motion, if it is in thy power, and do not look about

thee to see if any one will observe it; nor yet expect Plato's Republic:

but be content if the smallest thing goes on well, and consider such

an event to be no small matter. For who can change men's opinions?

And without a change of opinions what else is there than the slavery

of men who groan while they pretend to obey? Come now and tell me

of Alexander and Philip and Demetrius of Phalerum. They themselves

shall judge whether they discovered what the common nature required,

and trained themselves accordingly. But if they acted like tragedy

heroes, no one has condemned me to imitate them. Simple and modest

is the work of philosophy. Draw me not aside to indolence and pride.

Look down from above on the countless herds of men and their countless

solemnities, and the infinitely varied voyagings in storms and calms,

and the differences among those who are born, who live together, and

die. And consider, too, the life lived by others in olden time, and

the life of those who will live after thee, and the life now lived

among barbarous nations, and how many know not even thy name, and

how many will soon forget it, and how they who perhaps now are praising

thee will very soon blame thee, and that neither a posthumous name

is of any value, nor reputation, nor anything else.

Let there be freedom from perturbations with respect to the things

which come from the external cause; and let there be justice in the

things done by virtue of the internal cause, that is, let there be

movement and action terminating in this, in social acts, for this

is according to thy nature.

Thou canst remove out of the way many useless things among those which

disturb thee, for they lie entirely in thy opinion; and thou wilt

then gain for thyself ample space by comprehending the whole universe

in thy mind, and by contemplating the eternity of time, and observing

the rapid change of every several thing, how short is the time from

birth to dissolution, and the illimitable time before birth as well

as the equally boundless time after dissolution.

All that thou seest will quickly perish, and those who have been spectators

of its dissolution will very soon perish too. And he who dies at the

extremest old age will be brought into the same condition with him

who died prematurely.

What are these men's leading principles, and about what kind of things

are they busy, and for what kind of reasons do they love and honour?

Imagine that thou seest their poor souls laid bare. When they think

that they do harm by their blame or good by their praise, what an

idea!

Loss is nothing else than change. But the universal nature delights

in change, and in obedience to her all things are now done well, and

from eternity have been done in like form, and will be such to time

without end. What, then, dost thou say? That all things have been

and all things always will be bad, and that no power has ever been

found in so many gods to rectify these things, but the world has been

condemned to be found in never ceasing evil?

The rottenness of the matter which is the foundation of everything!

Water, dust, bones, filth: or again, marble rocks, the callosities

of the earth; and gold and silver, the sediments; and garments, only

bits of hair; and purple dye, blood; and everything else is of the

same kind. And that which is of the nature of breath is also another

thing of the same kind, changing from this to that.

Enough of this wretched life and murmuring and apish tricks. Why art

thou disturbed? What is there new in this? What unsettles thee? Is

it the form of the thing? Look at it. Or is it the matter? Look at

it. But besides these there is nothing. Towards the gods, then, now

become at last more simple and better. It is the same whether we examine

these things for a hundred years or three.

If any man has done wrong, the harm is his own. But perhaps he has

not done wrong.

Either all things proceed from one intelligent source and come together

as in one body, and the part ought not to find fault with what is

done for the benefit of the whole; or there are only atoms, and nothing

else than mixture and dispersion. Why, then, art thou disturbed? Say

to the ruling faculty, Art thou dead, art thou corrupted, art thou

playing the hypocrite, art thou become a beast, dost thou herd and

feed with the rest?

Either the gods have no power or they have power. If, then, they have

no power, why dost thou pray to them? But if they have power, why

dost thou not pray for them to give thee the faculty of not fearing

any of the things which thou fearest, or of not desiring any of the

things which thou desirest, or not being pained at anything, rather

than pray that any of these things should not happen or happen? for

certainly if they can co-operate with men, they can co-operate for

these purposes. But perhaps thou wilt say, the gods have placed them

in thy power. Well, then, is it not better to use what is in thy power

like a free man than to desire in a slavish and abject way what is

not in thy power? And who has told thee that the gods do not aid us

even in the things which are in our power? Begin, then, to pray for

such things, and thou wilt see. One man prays thus: How shall I be

able to lie with that woman? Do thou pray thus: How shall I not desire

to lie with her? Another prays thus: How shall I be released from

this? Another prays: How shall I not desire to be released? Another

thus: How shall I not lose my little son? Thou thus: How shall I not

be afraid to lose him? In fine, turn thy prayers this way, and see

what comes.

Epicurus says, In my sickness my conversation was not about my bodily

sufferings, nor, says he, did I talk on such subjects to those who

visited me; but I continued to discourse on the nature of things as

before, keeping to this main point, how the mind, while participating

in such movements as go on in the poor flesh, shall be free from perturbations

and maintain its proper good. Nor did I, he says, give the physicians

an opportunity of putting on solemn looks, as if they were doing something

great, but my life went on well and happily. Do, then, the same that

he did both in sickness, if thou art sick, and in any other circumstances;

for never to desert philosophy in any events that may befall us, nor

to hold trifling talk either with an ignorant man or with one unacquainted

with nature, is a principle of all schools of philosophy; but to be

intent only on that which thou art now doing and on the instrument

by which thou doest it.

When thou art offended with any man's shameless conduct, immediately

ask thyself, Is it possible, then, that shameless men should not be

in the world? It is not possible. Do not, then, require what is impossible.

For this man also is one of those shameless men who must of necessity

be in the world. Let the same considerations be present to thy mind

in the case of the knave, and the faithless man, and of every man

who does wrong in any way. For at the same time that thou dost remind

thyself that it is impossible that such kind of men should not exist,

thou wilt become more kindly disposed towards every one individually.

It is useful to perceive this, too, immediately when the occasion

arises, what virtue nature has given to man to oppose to every wrongful

act. For she has given to man, as an antidote against the stupid man,

mildness, and against another kind of man some other power. And in

all cases it is possible for thee to correct by teaching the man who

is gone astray; for every man who errs misses his object and is gone

astray. Besides wherein hast thou been injured? For thou wilt find

that no one among those against whom thou art irritated has done anything

by which thy mind could be made worse; but that which is evil to thee

and harmful has its foundation only in the mind. And what harm is

done or what is there strange, if the man who has not been instructed

does the acts of an uninstructed man? Consider whether thou shouldst

not rather blame thyself, because thou didst not expect such a man

to err in such a way. For thou hadst means given thee by thy reason

to suppose that it was likely that he would commit this error, and

yet thou hast forgotten and art amazed that he has erred. But most

of all when thou blamest a man as faithless or ungrateful, turn to

thyself. For the fault is manifestly thy own, whether thou didst trust

that a man who had such a disposition would keep his promise, or when

conferring thy kindness thou didst not confer it absolutely, nor yet

in such way as to have received from thy very act all the profit.

For what more dost thou want when thou hast done a man a service?

Art thou not content that thou hast done something conformable to

thy nature, and dost thou seek to be paid for it? Just as if the eye

demanded a recompense for seeing, or the feet for walking. For as

these members are formed for a particular purpose, and by working

according to their several constitutions obtain what is their own;

so also as man is formed by nature to acts of benevolence, when he

has done anything benevolent or in any other way conducive to the

common interest, he has acted conformably to his constitution, and

he gets what is his own.

----------------------------------------------------------------------

BOOK TEN

Wilt thou, then, my soul, never be good and simple and one and naked,

more manifest than the body which surrounds thee? Wilt thou never

enjoy an affectionate and contented disposition? Wilt thou never be

full and without a want of any kind, longing for nothing more, nor

desiring anything, either animate or inanimate, for the enjoyment

of pleasures? Nor yet desiring time wherein thou shalt have longer

enjoyment, or place, or pleasant climate, or society of men with whom

thou mayest live in harmony? But wilt thou be satisfied with thy present

condition, and pleased with all that is about thee, and wilt thou

convince thyself that thou hast everything and that it comes from

the gods, that everything is well for thee, and will be well whatever

shall please them, and whatever they shall give for the conservation

of the perfect living being, the good and just and beautiful, which

generates and holds together all things, and contains and embraces

all things which are dissolved for the production of other like things?

Wilt thou never be such that thou shalt so dwell in community with

gods and men as neither to find fault with them at all, nor to be

condemned by them?

Observe what thy nature requires, so far as thou art governed by nature

only: then do it and accept it, if thy nature, so far as thou art

a living being, shall not be made worse by it.

And next thou must observe what thy nature requires so far as thou

art a living being. And all this thou mayest allow thyself, if thy

nature, so far as thou art a rational animal, shall not be made worse

by it. But the rational animal is consequently also a political (social)

animal. Use these rules, then, and trouble thyself about nothing else.

Everything which happens either happens in such wise as thou art formed

by nature to bear it, or as thou art not formed by nature to bear

it. If, then, it happens to thee in such way as thou art formed by

nature to bear it, do not complain, but bear it as thou art formed

by nature to bear it. But if it happens in such wise as thou art not

formed by nature to bear it, do not complain, for it will perish after

it has consumed thee. Remember, however, that thou art formed by nature

to bear everything, with respect to which it depends on thy own opinion

to make it endurable and tolerable, by thinking that it is either

thy interest or thy duty to do this.

If a man is mistaken, instruct him kindly and show him his error.

But if thou art not able, blame thyself, or blame not even thyself.

Whatever may happen to thee, it was prepared for thee from all eternity;

and the implication of causes was from eternity spinning the thread

of thy being, and of that which is incident to it.

Whether the universe is a concourse of atoms, or nature is a system,

let this first be established, that I am a part of the whole which

is governed by nature; next, I am in a manner intimately related to

the parts which are of the same kind with myself. For remembering

this, inasmuch as I am a part, I shall be discontented with none of

the things which are assigned to me out of the whole; for nothing

is injurious to the part, if it is for the advantage of the whole.

For the whole contains nothing which is not for its advantage; and

all natures indeed have this common principle, but the nature of the

universe has this principle besides, that it cannot be compelled even

by any external cause to generate anything harmful to itself. By remembering,

then, that I am a part of such a whole, I shall be content with everything

that happens. And inasmuch as I am in a manner intimately related

to the parts which are of the same kind with myself, I shall do nothing

unsocial, but I shall rather direct myself to the things which are

of the same kind with myself, and I shall turn an my efforts to the

common interest, and divert them from the contrary. Now, if these

things are done so, life must flow on happily, just as thou mayest

observe that the life of a citizen is happy, who continues a course

of action which is advantageous to his fellow-citizens, and is content

with whatever the state may assign to him.

The parts of the whole, everything, I mean, which is naturally comprehended

in the universe, must of necessity perish; but let this be understood

in this sense, that they must undergo change. But if this is naturally

both an evil and a necessity for the parts, the whole would not continue

to exist in a good condition, the parts being subject to change and

constituted so as to perish in various ways. For whether did nature

herself design to do evil to the things which are parts of herself,

and to make them subject to evil and of necessity fall into evil,

or have such results happened without her knowing it? Both these suppositions,

indeed, are incredible. But if a man should even drop the term Nature

(as an efficient power), and should speak of these things as natural,

even then it would be ridiculous to affirm at the same time that the

parts of the whole are in their nature subject to change, and at the

same time to be surprised or vexed as if something were happening

contrary to nature, particularly as the dissolution of things is into

those things of which each thing is composed. For there is either

a dispersion of the elements out of which everything has been compounded,

or a change from the solid to the earthy and from the airy to the

aerial, so that these parts are taken back into the universal reason,

whether this at certain periods is consumed by fire or renewed by

eternal changes. And do not imagine that the solid and the airy part

belong to thee from the time of generation. For all this received

its accretion only yesterday and the day before, as one may say, from

the food and the air which is inspired. This, then, which has received

the accretion, changes, not that which thy mother brought forth. But

suppose that this which thy mother brought forth implicates thee very

much with that other part, which has the peculiar quality of change,

this is nothing in fact in the way of objection to what is said.

When thou hast assumed these names, good, modest, true, rational,

a man of equanimity, and magnanimous, take care that thou dost not

change these names; and if thou shouldst lose them, quickly return

to them. And remember that the term Rational was intended to signify

a discriminating attention to every several thing and freedom from

negligence; and that Equanimity is the voluntary acceptance of the

things which are assigned to thee by the common nature; and that Magnanimity

is the elevation of the intelligent part above the pleasurable or

painful sensations of the flesh, and above that poor thing called

fame, and death, and all such things. If, then, thou maintainest thyself

in the possession of these names, without desiring to be called by

these names by others, thou wilt be another person and wilt enter

on another life. For to continue to be such as thou hast hitherto

been, and to be tom in pieces and defiled in such a life, is the character

of a very stupid man and one overfond of his life, and like those

half-devoured fighters with wild beasts, who though covered with wounds

and gore, still intreat to be kept to the following day, though they

will be exposed in the same state to the same claws and bites. Therefore

fix thyself in the possession of these few names: and if thou art

able to abide in them, abide as if thou wast removed to certain islands

of the Happy. But if thou shalt perceive that thou fallest out of

them and dost not maintain thy hold, go courageously into some nook

where thou shalt maintain them, or even depart at once from life,

not in passion, but with simplicity and freedom and modesty, after

doing this one laudable thing at least in thy life, to have gone out

of it thus. In order, however, to the remembrance of these names,

it will greatly help thee, if thou rememberest the gods, and that

they wish not to be flattered, but wish all reasonable beings to be

made like themselves; and if thou rememberest that what does the work

of a fig-tree is a fig-tree, and that what does the work of a dog

is a dog, and that what does the work of a bee is a bee, and that

what does the work of a man is a man.

Mimi, war, astonishment, torpor, slavery, will daily wipe out those

holy principles of thine. How many things without studying nature

dost thou imagine, and how many dost thou neglect? But it is thy duty

so to look on and so to do everything, that at the same time the power

of dealing with circumstances is perfected, and the contemplative

faculty is exercised, and the confidence which comes from the knowledge

of each several thing is maintained without showing it, but yet not

concealed. For when wilt thou enjoy simplicity, when gravity, and

when the knowledge of every several thing, both what it is in substance,

and what place it has in the universe, and how long it is formed to

exist and of what things it is compounded, and to whom it can belong,

and who are able both to give it and take it away?

A spider is proud when it has caught a fly, and another when he has

caught a poor hare, and another when he has taken a little fish in

a net, and another when he has taken wild boars, and another when

he has taken bears, and another when he has taken Sarmatians. Are

not these robbers, if thou examinest their opinions?

Acquire the contemplative way of seeing how all things change into

one another, and constantly attend to it, and exercise thyself about

this part of philosophy. For nothing is so much adapted to produce

magnanimity. Such a man has put off the body, and as he sees that

he must, no one knows how soon, go away from among men and leave everything

here, he gives himself up entirely to just doing in all his actions,

and in everything else that happens he resigns himself to the universal

nature. But as to what any man shall say or think about him or do

against him, he never even thinks of it, being himself contented with

these two things, with acting justly in what he now does, and being

satisfied with what is now assigned to him; and he lays aside all

distracting and busy pursuits, and desires nothing else than to accomplish

the straight course through the law, and by accomplishing the straight

course to follow God.

What need is there of suspicious fear, since it is in thy power to

inquire what ought to be done? And if thou seest clear, go by this

way content, without turning back: but if thou dost not see clear,

stop and take the best advisers. But if any other things oppose thee,

go on according to thy powers with due consideration, keeping to that

which appears to be just. For it is best to reach this object, and

if thou dost fail, let thy failure be in attempting this. He who follows

reason in all things is both tranquil and active at the same time,

and also cheerful and collected.

Inquire of thyself as soon as thou wakest from sleep, whether it will

make any difference to thee, if another does what is just and right.

It will make no difference.

Thou hast not forgotten, I suppose, that those who assume arrogant

airs in bestowing their praise or blame on others, are such as they

are at bed and at board, and thou hast not forgotten what they do,

and what they avoid and what they pursue, and how they steal and how

they rob, not with hands and feet, but with their most valuable part,

by means of which there is produced, when a man chooses, fidelity,

modesty, truth, law, a good daemon (happiness)?

To her who gives and takes back all, to nature, the man who is instructed

and modest says, Give what thou wilt; take back what thou wilt. And

he says this not proudly, but obediently and well pleased with her.

Short is the little which remains to thee of life. Live as on a mountain.

For it makes no difference whether a man lives there or here, if he

lives everywhere in the world as in a state (political community).

Let men see, let them know a real man who lives according to nature.

If they cannot endure him, let them kill him. For that is better than

to live thus as men do.

No longer talk at all about the kind of man that a good man ought

to be, but be such.

Constantly contemplate the whole of time and the whole of substance,

and consider that all individual things as to substance are a grain

of a fig, and as to time, the turning of a gimlet.

Look at everything that exists, and observe that it is already in

dissolution and in change, and as it were putrefaction or dispersion,

or that everything is so constituted by nature as to die.

Consider what men are when they are eating, sleeping, generating,

easing themselves and so forth. Then what kind of men they are when

they are imperious and arrogant, or angry and scolding from their

elevated place. But a short time ago to how many they were slaves

and for what things; and after a little time consider in what a condition

they will be.

That is for the good of each thing, which the universal nature brings

to each. And it is for its good at the time when nature brings it.

"The earth loves the shower"; and "the solemn aether loves": and the

universe loves to make whatever is about to be. I say then to the

universe, that I love as thou lovest. And is not this too said, that

"this or that loves (is wont) to be produced"?

Either thou livest here and hast already accustomed thyself to it,

or thou art going away, and this was thy own will; or thou art dying

and hast discharged thy duty. But besides these things there is nothing.

Be of good cheer, then.

Let this always be plain to thee, that this piece of land is like

any other; and that all things here are the same with things on top

of a mountain, or on the sea-shore, or wherever thou choosest to be.

For thou wilt find just what Plato says, Dwelling within the walls

of a city as in a shepherd's fold on a mountain.

What is my ruling faculty now to me? And of what nature am I now making

it? And for what purpose am I now using it? Is it void of understanding?

Is it loosed and rent asunder from social life? Is it melted into

and mixed with the poor flesh so as to move together with it?

He who flies from his master is a runaway; but the law is master,

and he who breaks the law is a runaway. And he also who is grieved

or angry or afraid, is dissatisfied because something has been or

is or shall be of the things which are appointed by him who rules

all things, and he is Law, and assigns to every man what is fit. He

then who fears or is grieved or is angry is a runaway.

A man deposits seed in a womb and goes away, and then another cause

takes it, and labours on it and makes a child. What a thing from such

a material! Again, the child passes food down through the throat,

and then another cause takes it and makes perception and motion, and

in fine life and strength and other things; how many and how strange

I Observe then the things which are produced in such a hidden way,

and see the power just as we see the power which carries things downwards

and upwards, not with the eyes, but still no less plainly.

Constantly consider how all things such as they now are, in time past

also were; and consider that they will be the same again. And place

before thy eyes entire dramas and stages of the same form, whatever

thou hast learned from thy experience or from older history; for example,

the whole court of Hadrian, and the whole court of Antoninus, and

the whole court of Philip, Alexander, Croesus; for all those were

such dramas as we see now, only with different actors.

Imagine every man who is grieved at anything or discontented to be

like a pig which is sacrificed and kicks and screams.

Like this pig also is he who on his bed in silence laments the bonds

in which we are held. And consider that only to the rational animal

is it given to follow voluntarily what happens; but simply to follow

is a necessity imposed on all.

Severally on the occasion of everything that thou doest, pause and

ask thyself, if death is a dreadful thing because it deprives thee

of this.

When thou art offended at any man's fault, forthwith turn to thyself

and reflect in what like manner thou dost err thyself; for example,

in thinking that money is a good thing, or pleasure, or a bit of reputation,

and the like. For by attending to this thou wilt quickly forget thy

anger, if this consideration also is added, that the man is compelled:

for what else could he do? or, if thou art able, take away from him

the compulsion.

When thou hast seen Satyron the Socratic, think of either Eutyches

or Hymen, and when thou hast seen Euphrates, think of Eutychion or

Silvanus, and when thou hast seen Alciphron think of Tropaeophorus,

and when thou hast seen Xenophon think of Crito or Severus, and when

thou hast looked on thyself, think of any other Caesar, and in the

case of every one do in like manner. Then let this thought be in thy

mind, Where then are those men? Nowhere, or nobody knows where. For

thus continuously thou wilt look at human things as smoke and nothing

at all; especially if thou reflectest at the same time that what has

once changed will never exist again in the infinite duration of time.

But thou, in what a brief space of time is thy existence? And why

art thou not content to pass through this short time in an orderly

way? What matter and opportunity for thy activity art thou avoiding?

For what else are all these things, except exercises for the reason,

when it has viewed carefully and by examination into their nature

the things which happen in life? Persevere then until thou shalt have

made these things thy own, as the stomach which is strengthened makes

all things its own, as the blazing fire makes flame and brightness

out of everything that is thrown into it.

Let it not be in any man's power to say truly of thee that thou art

not simple or that thou are not good; but let him be a liar whoever

shall think anything of this kind about thee; and this is altogether

in thy power. For who is he that shall hinder thee from being good

and simple? Do thou only determine to live no longer, unless thou

shalt be such. For neither does reason allow thee to live, if thou

art not such.

What is that which as to this material (our life) can be done or said

in the way most conformable to reason. For whatever this may be, it

is in thy power to do it or to say it, and do not make excuses that

thou art hindered. Thou wilt not cease to lament till thy mind is

in such a condition that, what luxury is to those who enjoy pleasure,

such shall be to thee, in the matter which is subjected and presented

to thee, the doing of the things which are conformable to man's constitution;

for a man ought to consider as an enjoyment everything which it is

in his power to do according to his own nature. And it is in his power

everywhere. Now, it is not given to a cylinder to move everywhere

by its own motion, nor yet to water nor to fire, nor to anything else

which is governed by nature or an irrational soul, for the things

which check them and stand in the way are many. But intelligence and

reason are able to go through everything that opposes them, and in

such manner as they are formed by nature and as they choose. Place

before thy eyes this facility with which the reason will be carried

through all things, as fire upwards, as a stone downwards, as a cylinder

down an inclined surface, and seek for nothing further. For all other

obstacles either affect the body only which is a dead thing; or, except

through opinion and the yielding of the reason itself, they do not

crush nor do any harm of any kind; for if they did, he who felt it

would immediately become bad. Now, in the case of all things which

have a certain constitution, whatever harm may happen to any of them,

that which is so affected becomes consequently worse; but in the like

case, a man becomes both better, if one may say so, and more worthy

of praise by making a right use of these accidents. And finally remember

that nothing harms him who is really a citizen, which does not harm

the state; nor yet does anything harm the state, which does not harm

law (order); and of these things which are called misfortunes not

one harms law. What then does not harm law does not harm either state

or citizen.

To him who is penetrated by true principles even the briefest precept

is sufficient, and any common precept, to remind him that he should

be free from grief and fear. For example-

Leaves, some the wind scatters on the ground-

So is the race of men. Leaves, also, are thy children; and leaves,

too, are they who cry out as if they were worthy of credit and bestow

their praise, or on the contrary curse, or secretly blame and sneer;

and leaves, in like manner, are those who shall receive and transmit

a man's fame to aftertimes. For all such things as these "are produced

in the season of spring," as the poet says; then the wind casts them

down; then the forest produces other leaves in their places. But a

brief existence is common to all things, and yet thou avoidest and

pursuest all things as if they would be eternal. A little time, and

thou shalt close thy eyes; and him who has attended thee to thy grave

another soon will lament.

The healthy eye ought to see all visible things and not to say, I

wish for green things; for this is the condition of a diseased eye.

And the healthy hearing and smelling ought to be ready to perceive

all that can be heard and smelled. And the healthy stomach ought to

be with respect to all food just as the mill with respect to all things

which it is formed to grind. And accordingly the healthy understanding

ought to be prepared for everything which happens; but that which

says, Let my dear children live, and let all men praise whatever I

may do, is an eye which seeks for green things, or teeth which seek

for soft things.

There is no man so fortunate that there shall not be by him when he

is dying some who are pleased with what is going to happen. Suppose

that he was a good and wise man, will there not be at last some one

to say to himself, Let us at last breathe freely being relieved from

this schoolmaster? It is true that he was harsh to none of us, but

I perceived that he tacitly condemns us.- This is what is said of

a good man. But in our own case how many other things are there for

which there are many who wish to get rid of us. Thou wilt consider

this then when thou art dying, and thou wilt depart more contentedly

by reflecting thus: I am going away from such a life, in which even

my associates in behalf of whom I have striven so much, prayed, and

cared, themselves wish me to depart, hoping perchance to get some

little advantage by it. Why then should a man cling to a longer stay

here? Do not however for this reason go away less kindly disposed

to them, but preserving thy own character, and friendly and benevolent

and mild, and on the other hand not as if thou wast torn away; but

as when a man dies a quiet death, the poor soul is easily separated

from the body, such also ought thy departure from men to be, for nature

united thee to them and associated thee. But does she now dissolve

the union? Well, I am separated as from kinsmen, not however dragged

resisting, but without compulsion; for this too is one of the things

according to nature.

Accustom thyself as much as possible on the occasion of anything being

done by any person to inquire with thyself, For what object is this

man doing this? But begin with thyself, and examine thyself first.

Remember that this which pulls the strings is the thing which is hidden

within: this is the power of persuasion, this is life, this, if one

may so say, is man. In contemplating thyself never include the vessel

which surrounds thee and these instruments which are attached about

it. For they are like to an axe, differing only in this that they

grow to the body. For indeed there is no more use in these parts without

the cause which moves and checks them than in the weaver's shuttle,

and the writer's pen and the driver's whip.

----------------------------------------------------------------------

BOOK ELEVEN

These are the properties of the rational soul: it sees itself, analyses

itself, and makes itself such as it chooses; the fruit which it bears

itself enjoys- for the fruits of plants and that in animals which

corresponds to fruits others enjoy- it obtains its own end, wherever

the limit of life may be fixed. Not as in a dance and in a play and

in such like things, where the whole action is incomplete, if anything

cuts it short; but in every part and wherever it may be stopped, it

makes what has been set before it full and complete, so that it can

say, I have what is my own. And further it traverses the whole universe,

and the surrounding vacuum, and surveys its form, and it extends itself

into the infinity of time, and embraces and comprehends the periodical

renovation of all things, and it comprehends that those who come after

us will see nothing new, nor have those before us seen anything more,

but in a manner he who is forty years old, if he has any understanding

at all, has seen by virtue of the uniformity that prevails all things

which have been and all that will be. This too is a property of the

rational soul, love of one's neighbour, and truth and modesty, and

to value nothing more more than itself, which is also the property

of Law. Thus then right reason differs not at all from the reason

of justice.

Thou wilt set little value on pleasing song and dancing and the pancratium,

if thou wilt distribute the melody of the voice into its several sounds,

and ask thyself as to each, if thou art mastered by this; for thou

wilt be prevented by shame from confessing it: and in the matter of

dancing, if at each movement and attitude thou wilt do the same; and

the like also in the matter of the pancratium. In all things, then,

except virtue and the acts of virtue, remember to apply thyself to

their several parts, and by this division to come to value them little:

and apply this rule also to thy whole life.

What a soul that is which is ready, if at any moment it must be separated

from the body, and ready either to be extinguished or dispersed or

continue to exist; but so that this readiness comes from a man's own

judgement, not from mere obstinacy, as with the Christians, but considerately

and with dignity and in a way to persuade another, without tragic

show.

Have I done something for the general interest? Well then I have had

my reward. Let this always be present to thy mind, and never stop

doing such good.

What is thy art? To be good. And how is this accomplished well except

by general principles, some about the nature of the universe, and

others about the proper constitution of man?

At first tragedies were brought on the stage as means of reminding

men of the things which happen to them, and that it is according to

nature for things to happen so, and that, if you are delighted with

what is shown on the stage, you should not be troubled with that which

takes place on the larger stage. For you see that these things must

be accomplished thus, and that even they bear them who cry out "O

Cithaeron." And, indeed, some things are said well by the dramatic

writers, of which kind is the following especially:-

Me and my children if the gods neglect,

This has its reason too. And again-

We must not chale and fret at that which happens. And

Life's harvest reap like the wheat's fruitful ear. And other things

of the same kind.

After tragedy the old comedy was introduced, which had a magisterial

freedom of speech, and by its very plainness of speaking was useful

in reminding men to beware of insolence; and for this purpose too

Diogenes used to take from these writers.

But as to the middle comedy which came next, observe what it was,

and again, for what object the new comedy was introduced, which gradually

sunk down into a mere mimic artifice. That some good things are said

even by these writers, everybody knows: but the whole plan of such

poetry and dramaturgy, to what end does it look!

How plain does it appear that there is not another condition of life

so well suited for philosophising as this in which thou now happenest

to be.

A branch cut off from the adjacent branch must of necessity be cut

off from the whole tree also. So too a man when he is separated from

another man has fallen off from the whole social community. Now as

to a branch, another cuts it off, but a man by his own act separates

himself from his neighbour when he hates him and turns away from him,

and he does not know that he has at the same time cut himself off

from the whole social system. Yet he has this privilege certainly

from Zeus who framed society, for it is in our power to grow again

to that which is near to us, and be to come a part which helps to

make up the whole. However, if it often happens, this kind of separation,

it makes it difficult for that which detaches itself to be brought

to unity and to be restored to its former condition. Finally, the

branch, which from the first grew together with the tree, and has

continued to have one life with it, is not like that which after being

cut off is then ingrafted, for this is something like what the gardeners

mean when they say that it grows with the rest of the tree, but that

it has not the same mind with it.

As those who try to stand in thy way when thou art proceeding according

to right reason, will not be able to turn thee aside from thy proper

action, so neither let them drive thee from thy benevolent feelings

towards them, but be on thy guard equally in both matters, not only

in the matter of steady judgement and action, but also in the matter

of gentleness towards those who try to hinder or otherwise trouble

thee. For this also is a weakness, to be vexed at them, as well as

to be diverted from thy course of action and to give way through fear;

for both are equally deserters from their post, the man who does it

through fear, and the man who is alienated from him who is by nature

a kinsman and a friend.

There is no nature which is inferior to art, for the arts imitate

the nature of things. But if this is so, that nature which is the

most perfect and the most comprehensive of all natures, cannot fall

short of the skill of art. Now all arts do the inferior things for

the sake of the superior; therefore the universal nature does so too.

And, indeed, hence is the origin of justice, and in justice the other

virtues have their foundation: for justice will not be observed, if

we either care for middle things (things indifferent), or are easily

deceived and careless and changeable.

If the things do not come to thee, the pursuits and avoidances of

which disturb thee, still in a manner thou goest to them. Let then

thy judgement about them be at rest, and they will remain quiet, and

thou wilt not be seen either pursuing or avoiding.

The spherical form of the soul maintains its figure, when it is neither

extended towards any object, nor contracted inwards, nor dispersed

nor sinks down, but is illuminated by light, by which it sees the

truth, the truth of all things and the truth that is in itself.

Suppose any man shall despise me. Let him look to that himself. But

I will look to this, that I be not discovered doing or saying anything

deserving of contempt. Shall any man hate me? Let him look to it.

But I will be mild and benevolent towards every man, and ready to

show even him his mistake, not reproachfully, nor yet as making a

display of my endurance, but nobly and honestly, like the great Phocion,

unless indeed he only assumed it. For the interior parts ought to

be such, and a man ought to be seen by the gods neither dissatisfied

with anything nor complaining. For what evil is it to thee, if thou

art now doing what is agreeable to thy own nature, and art satisfied

with that which at this moment is suitable to the nature of the universe,

since thou art a human being placed at thy post in order that what

is for the common advantage may be done in some way?

Men despise one another and flatter one another; and men wish to raise

themselves above one another, and crouch before one another.

How unsound and insincere is he who says, I have determined to deal

with thee in a fair way.- What art thou doing, man? There is no occasion

to give this notice. It will soon show itself by acts. The voice ought

to be plainly written on the forehead. Such as a man's character is,

he immediately shows it in his eyes, just as he who is beloved forthwith

reads everything in the eyes of lovers. The man who is honest and

good ought to be exactly like a man who smells strong, so that the

bystander as soon as he comes near him must smell whether he choose

or not. But the affectation of simplicity is like a crooked stick.

Nothing is more disgraceful than a wolfish friendship (false friendship).

Avoid this most of all. The good and simple and benevolent show all

these things in the eyes, and there is no mistaking.

As to living in the best way, this power is in the soul, if it be

indifferent to things which are indifferent. And it will be indifferent,

if it looks on each of these things separately and all together, and

if it remembers that not one of them produces in us an opinion about

itself, nor comes to us; but these things remain immovable, and it

is we ourselves who produce the judgements about them, and, as we

may say, write them in ourselves, it being in our power not to write

them, and it being in our power, if perchance these judgements have

imperceptibly got admission to our minds, to wipe them out; and if

we remember also that such attention will only be for a short time,

and then life will be at an end. Besides, what trouble is there at

all in doing this? For if these things are according to nature, rejoice

in them, and they will be easy to thee: but if contrary to nature,

seek what is conformable to thy own nature, and strive towards this,

even if it bring no reputation; for every man is allowed to seek his

own good.

Consider whence each thing is come, and of what it consists, and into

what it changes, and what kind of a thing it will be when it has changed,

and that it will sustain no harm.

If any have offended against thee, consider first: What is my relation

to men, and that we are made for one another; and in another respect,

I was made to be set over them, as a ram over the flock or a bull

over the herd. But examine the matter from first principles, from

this: If all things are not mere atoms, it is nature which orders

all things: if this is so, the inferior things exist for the sake

of the superior, and these for the sake of one another.

Second, consider what kind of men they are at table, in bed, and so

forth: and particularly, under what compulsions in respect of opinions

they are; and as to their acts, consider with what pride they do what

they do.

Third, that if men do rightly what they do, we ought not to be displeased;

but if they do not right, it is plain that they do so involuntarily

and in ignorance. For as every soul is unwillingly deprived of the

truth, so also is it unwillingly deprived of the power of behaving

to each man according to his deserts. Accordingly men are pained when

they are called unjust, ungrateful, and greedy, and in a word wrong-doers

to their neighbours.

Fourth, consider that thou also doest many things wrong, and that

thou art a man like others; and even if thou dost abstain from certain

faults, still thou hast the disposition to commit them, though either

through cowardice, or concern about reputation, or some such mean

motive, thou dost abstain from such faults.

Fifth, consider that thou dost not even understand whether men are

doing wrong or not, for many things are done with a certain reference

to circumstances. And in short, a man must learn a great deal to enable

him to pass a correct judgement on another man's acts.

Sixth, consider when thou art much vexed or grieved, that man's life

is only a moment, and after a short time we are all laid out dead.

Seventh, that it is not men's acts which disturb us, for those acts

have their foundation in men's ruling principles, but it is our own

opinions which disturb us. Take away these opinions then, and resolve

to dismiss thy judgement about an act as if it were something grievous,

and thy anger is gone. How then shall I take away these opinions?

By reflecting that no wrongful act of another brings shame on thee:

for unless that which is shameful is alone bad, thou also must of

necessity do many things wrong, and become a robber and everything

else.

Eighth, consider how much more pain is brought on us by the anger

and vexation caused by such acts than by the acts themselves, at which

we are angry and vexed.

Ninth, consider that a good disposition is invincible, if it be genuine,

and not an affected smile and acting a part. For what will the most

violent man do to thee, if thou continuest to be of a kind disposition

towards him, and if, as opportunity offers, thou gently admonishest

him and calmly correctest his errors at the very time when he is trying

to do thee harm, saying, Not so, my child: we are constituted by nature

for something else: I shall certainly not be injured, but thou art

injuring thyself, my child.- And show him with gentle tact and by

general principles that this is so, and that even bees do not do as

he does, nor any animals which are formed by nature to be gregarious.

And thou must do this neither with any double meaning nor in the way

of reproach, but affectionately and without any rancour in thy soul;

and not as if thou wert lecturing him, nor yet that any bystander

may admire, but either when he is alone, and if others are present...

Remember these nine rules, as if thou hadst received them as a gift

from the Muses, and begin at last to be a man while thou livest. But

thou must equally avoid flattering men and being veied at them, for

both are unsocial and lead to harm. And let this truth be present

to thee in the excitement of anger, that to be moved by passion is

not manly, but that mildness and gentleness, as they are more agreeable

to human nature, so also are they more manly; and he who possesses

these qualities possesses strength, nerves and courage, and not the

man who is subject to fits of passion and discontent. For in the same

degree in which a man's mind is nearer to freedom from all passion,

in the same degree also is it nearer to strength: and as the sense

of pain is a characteristic of weakness, so also is anger. For he

who yields to pain and he who yields to anger, both are wounded and

both submit.

But if thou wilt, receive also a tenth present from the leader of

the Muses (Apollo), and it is this- that to expect bad men not to

do wrong is madness, for he who expects this desires an impossibility.

But to allow men to behave so to others, and to expect them not to

do thee any wrong, is irrational and tyrannical.

There are four principal aberrations of the superior faculty against

which thou shouldst be constantly on thy guard, and when thou hast

detected them, thou shouldst wipe them out and say on each occasion

thus: this thought is not necessary: this tends to destroy social

union: this which thou art going to say comes not from the real thoughts;

for thou shouldst consider it among the most absurd of things for

a man not to speak from his real thoughts. But the fourth is when

thou shalt reproach thyself for anything, for this is an evidence

of the diviner part within thee being overpowered and yielding to

the less honourable and to the perishable part, the body, and to its

gross pleasures.

Thy aerial part and all the fiery parts which are mingled in thee,

though by nature they have an upward tendency, still in obedience

to the disposition of the universe they are overpowered here in the

compound mass (the body). And also the whole of the earthy part in

thee and the watery, though their tendency is downward, still are

raised up and occupy a position which is not their natural one. In

this manner then the elemental parts obey the universal, for when

they have been fixed in any place perforce they remain there until

again the universal shall sound the signal for dissolution. Is it

not then strange that thy intelligent part only should be disobedient

and discontented with its own place? And yet no force is imposed on

it, but only those things which are conformable to its nature: still

it does not submit, but is carried in the opposite direction. For

the movement towards injustice and intemperance and to anger and grief

and fear is nothing else than the act of one who deviates from nature.

And also when the ruling faculty is discontented with anything that

happens, then too it deserts its post: for it is constituted for piety

and reverence towards the gods no less than for justice. For these

qualities also are comprehended under the generic term of contentment

with the constitution of things, and indeed they are prior to acts

of justice.

He who has not one and always the same object in life, cannot be one

and the same all through his life. But what I have said is not enough,

unless this also is added, what this object ought to be. For as there

is not the same opinion about all the things which in some way or

other are considered by the majority to be good, but only about some

certain things, that is, things which concern the common interest;

so also ought we to propose to ourselves an object which shall be

of a common kind (social) and political. For he who directs all his

own efforts to this object, will make all his acts alike, and thus

will always be the same.

Think of the country mouse and of the town mouse, and of the alarm

and trepidation of the town mouse.

Socrates used to call the opinions of the many by the name of Lamiae,

bugbears to frighten children.

The Lacedaemonians at their public spectacles used to set seats in

the shade for strangers, but themselves sat down anywhere.

Socrates excused himself to Perdiccas for not going to him, saying,

It is because I would not perish by the worst of all ends, that is,

I would not receive a favour and then be unable to return it.

In the writings of the Ephesians there was this precept, constantly

to think of some one of the men of former times who practised virtue.

The Pythagoreans bid us in the morning look to the heavens that we

may be reminded of those bodies which continually do the same things

and in the same manner perform their work, and also be reminded of

their purity and nudity. For there is no veil over a star.

Consider what a man Socrates was when he dressed himself in a skin,

after Xanthippe had taken his cloak and gone out, and what Socrates

said to his friends who were ashamed of him and drew back from him

when they saw him dressed thus.

Neither in writing nor in reading wilt thou be able to lay down rules

for others before thou shalt have first learned to obey rules thyself.

Much more is this so in life.

A slave thou art: free speech is not for thee.

And my heart laughed within.

And virtue they will curse, speaking harsh words.

To look for the fig in winter is a madman's act: such is he who looks

for his child when it is no longer allowed.

When a man kisses his child, said Epictetus, he should whisper to

himself, "To-morrow perchance thou wilt die."- But those are words

of bad omen.- "No word is a word of bad omen," said Epictetus, "which

expresses any work of nature; or if it is so, it is also a word of

bad omen to speak of the ears of corn being reaped."

The unripe grape, the ripe bunch, the dried grape, all are changes,

not into nothing, but into something which exists not yet.

No man can rob us of our free will.

Epictetus also said, A man must discover an art (or rules) with respect

to giving his assent; and in respect to his movements he must be careful

that they be made with regard to circumstances, that they be consistent

with social interests, that they have regard to the value of the object;

and as to sensual desire, he should altogether keep away from it;

and as to avoidance (aversion) he should not show it with respect

to any of the things which are not in our power.

The dispute then, he said, is not about any common matter, but about

being mad or not.

Socrates used to say, What do you want? Souls of rational men or irrational?-

Souls of rational men.- Of what rational men? Sound or unsound?- Sound.-

Why then do you not seek for them?- Because we have them.- Why then

do you fight and quarrel?

----------------------------------------------------------------------

BOOK TWELVE

All those things at which thou wishest to arrive by a circuitous

road, thou canst have now, if thou dost not refuse them to thyself.

And this means, if thou wilt take no notice of all the past, and trust

the future to providence, and direct the present only conformably

to piety and justice. Conformably to piety, that thou mayest be content

with the lot which is assigned to thee, for nature designed it for

thee and thee for it. Conformably to justice, that thou mayest always

speak the truth freely and without disguise, and do the things which

are agreeable to law and according to the worth of each. And let neither

another man's wickedness hinder thee, nor opinion nor voice, nor yet

the sensations of the poor flesh which has grown about thee; for the

passive part will look to this. If then, whatever the time may be

when thou shalt be near to thy departure, neglecting everything else

thou shalt respect only thy ruling faculty and the divinity within

thee, and if thou shalt be afraid not because thou must some time

cease to live, but if thou shalt fear never to have begun to live

according to nature- then thou wilt be a man worthy of the universe

which has produced thee, and thou wilt cease to be a stranger in thy

native land, and to wonder at things which happen daily as if they

were something unexpected, and to be dependent on this or that.

God sees the minds (ruling principles) of all men bared of the material

vesture and rind and impurities. For with his intellectual part alone

he touches the intelligence only which has flowed and been derived

from himself into these bodies. And if thou also usest thyself to

do this, thou wilt rid thyself of thy much trouble. For he who regards

not the poor flesh which envelops him, surely will not trouble himself

by looking after raiment and dwelling and fame and such like externals

and show.

The things are three of which thou art composed, a little body, a

little breath (life), intelligence. Of these the first two are thine,

so far as it is thy duty to take care of them; but the third alone

is properly thine. Therefore if thou shalt separate from thyself,

that is, from thy understanding, whatever others do or say, and whatever

thou hast done or said thyself, and whatever future things trouble

thee because they may happen, and whatever in the body which envelops

thee or in the breath (life), which is by nature associated with the

body, is attached to thee independent of thy will, and whatever the

external circumfluent vortex whirls round, so that the intellectual

power exempt from the things of fate can live pure and free by itself,

doing what is just and accepting what happens and saying the truth:

if thou wilt separate, I say, from this ruling faculty the things

which are attached to it by the impressions of sense, and the things

of time to come and of time that is past, and wilt make thyself like

Empedocles' sphere,

All round, and in its joyous rest reposing; and if thou shalt strive

to live only what is really thy life, that is, the present- then thou

wilt be able to pass that portion of life which remains for thee up

to the time of thy death, free from perturbations, nobly, and obedient

to thy own daemon (to the god that is within thee).

I have often wondered how it is that every man loves himself more

than all the rest of men, but yet sets less value on his own opinion

of himself than on the opinion of others. If then a god or a wise

teacher should present himself to a man and bid him to think of nothing

and to design nothing which he would not express as soon as he conceived

it, he could not endure it even for a single day. So much more respect

have we to what our neighbours shall think of us than to what we shall

think of ourselves.

How can it be that the gods after having arranged all things well

and benevolently for mankind, have overlooked this alone, that some

men and very good men, and men who, as we may say, have had most communion

with the divinity, and through pious acts and religious observances

have been most intimate with the divinity, when they have once died

should never exist again, but should be completely extinguished?

But if this is so, be assured that if it ought to have been otherwise,

the gods would have done it. For if it were just, it would also be

possible; and if it were according to nature, nature would have had

it so. But because it is not so, if in fact it is not so, be thou

convinced that it ought not to have been so:- for thou seest even

of thyself that in this inquiry thou art disputing with the diety;

and we should not thus dispute with the gods, unless they were most

excellent and most just;- but if this is so, they would not have allowed

anything in the ordering of the universe to be neglected unjustly

and irrationally.

Practise thyself even in the things which thou despairest of accomplishing.

For even the left hand, which is ineffectual for all other things

for want of practice, holds the bridle more vigorously than the right

hand; for it has been practised in this.

Consider in what condition both in body and soul a man should be when

he is overtaken by death; and consider the shortness of life, the

boundless abyss of time past and future, the feebleness of all matter.

Contemplate the formative principles (forms) of things bare of their

coverings; the purposes of actions; consider what pain is, what pleasure

is, and death, and fame; who is to himself the cause of his uneasiness;

how no man is hindered by another; that everything is opinion.

In the application of thy principles thou must be like the pancratiast,

not like the gladiator; for the gladiator lets fall the sword which

he uses and is killed; but the other always has his hand, and needs

to do nothing else than use it.

See what things are in themselves, dividing them into matter, form

and purpose.

What a power man has to do nothing except what God will approve, and

to accept all that God may give him.

With respect to that which happens conformably to nature, we ought

to blame neither gods, for they do nothing wrong either voluntarily

or involuntarily, nor men, for they do nothing wrong except involuntarily.

Consequently we should blame nobody.

How ridiculous and what a stranger he is who is surprised at anything

which happens in life.

Either there is a fatal necessity and invincible order, or a kind

Providence, or a confusion without a purpose and without a director

(Book IV). If then there is an invincible necessity, why dost thou

resist? But if there is a Providence which allows itself to be propitiated,

make thyself worthy of the help of the divinity. But if there is a

confusion without governor, be content that in such a tempest thou

hast in thyself a certain ruling intelligence. And even if the tempest

carry thee away, let it carry away the poor flesh, the poor breath,

everything else; for the intelligence at least it will not carry away.

Does the light of the lamp shine without losing its splendour until

it is extinguished; and shall the truth which is in thee and justice

and temperance be extinguished before thy death?

When a man has presented the appearance of having done wrong, say,

How then do I know if this is a wrongful act? And even if he has done

wrong, how do I know that he has not condemned himself? and so this

is like tearing his own face. Consider that he, who would not have

the bad man do wrong, is like the man who would not have the fig-tree

to bear juice in the figs and infants to cry and the horse to neigh,

and whatever else must of necessity be. For what must a man do who

has such a character? If then thou art irritable, cure this man's

disposition.

If it is not right, do not do it: if it is not true, do not say it.

For let thy efforts be-

In everything always observe what the thing is which produces for

thee an appearance, and resolve it by dividing it into the formal,

the material, the purpose, and the time within which it must end.

Perceive at last that thou hast in thee something better and more

divine than the things which cause the various affects, and as it

were pull thee by the strings. What is there now in my mind? Is it

fear, or suspicion, or desire, or anything of the kind?

First, do nothing inconsiderately, nor without a purpose. Second,

make thy acts refer to nothing else than to a social end.

Consider that before long thou wilt be nobody and nowhere, nor will

any of the things exist which thou now seest, nor any of those who

are now living. For all things are formed by nature to change and

be turned and to perish in order that other things in continuous succession

may exist.

Consider that everything is opinion, and opinion is in thy power.

Take away then, when thou choosest, thy opinion, and like a mariner,

who has doubled the promontory, thou wilt find calm, everything stable,

and a waveless bay.

Any one activity whatever it may be, when it has ceased at its proper

time, suffers no evil because it has ceased; nor he who has done this

act, does he suffer any evil for this reason that the act has ceased.

In like manner then the whole which consists of all the acts, which

is our life, if it cease at its proper time, suffers no evil for this

reason that it has ceased; nor he who has terminated this series at

the proper time, has he been ill dealt with. But the proper time and

the limit nature fixes, sometimes as in old age the peculiar nature

of man, but always the universal nature, by the change of whose parts

the whole universe continues ever young and perfect. And everything

which is useful to the universal is always good and in season. Therefore

the termination of life for every man is no evil, because neither

is it shameful, since it is both independent of the will and not opposed

to the general interest, but it is good, since it is seasonable and

profitable to and congruent with the universal. For thus too he is

moved by the deity who is moved in the same manner with the deity

and moved towards the same things in his mind.

These three principles thou must have in readiness. In the things

which thou doest do nothing either inconsiderately or otherwise than

as justice herself would act; but with respect to what may happen

to thee from without, consider that it happens either by chance or

according to Providence, and thou must neither blame chance nor accuse

Providence. Second, consider what every being is from the seed to

the time of its receiving a soul, and from the reception of a soul

to the giving back of the same, and of what things every being is

compounded and into what things it is resolved. Third, if thou shouldst

suddenly be raised up above the earth, and shouldst look down on human

things, and observe the variety of them how great it is, and at the

same time also shouldst see at a glance how great is the number of

beings who dwell around in the air and the aether, consider that as

often as thou shouldst be raised up, thou wouldst see the same things,

sameness of form and shortness of duration. Are these things to be

proud of?

Cast away opinion: thou art saved. Who then hinders thee from casting

it away?

When thou art troubled about anything, thou hast forgotten this, that

all things happen according to the universal nature; and forgotten

this, that a man's wrongful act is nothing to thee; and further thou

hast forgotten this, that everything which happens, always happened

so and will happen so, and now happens so everywhere; forgotten this

too, how close is the kinship between a man and the whole human race,

for it is a community, not of a little blood or seed, but of intelligence.

And thou hast forgotten this too, that every man's intelligence is

a god, and is an efflux of the deity; and forgotten this, that nothing

is a man's own, but that his child and his body and his very soul

came from the deity; forgotten this, that everything is opinion; and

lastly thou hast forgotten that every man lives the present time only,

and loses only this.

Constantly bring to thy recollection those who have complained greatly

about anything, those who have been most conspicuous by the greatest

fame or misfortunes or enmities or fortunes of any kind: then think

where are they all now? Smoke and ash and a tale, or not even a tale.

And let there be present to thy mind also everything of this sort,

how Fabius Catullinus lived in the country, and Lucius Lupus in his

gardens, and Stertinius at Baiae, and Tiberius at Capreae and Velius

Rufus (or Rufus at Velia); and in fine think of the eager pursuit

of anything conjoined with pride; and how worthless everything is

after which men violently strain; and how much more philosophical

it is for a man in the opportunities presented to him to show.

END